Marine Corps Gazette

JANUARY 1961
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Marine Corps Gazette

BOX 1844, QUANTICO, VA.

Marine Corps 1961

The Marine Corps Association Newsletter

An unofficial digest of news of interest to our members

Volume 45, Number 1 | Marine Corps Gazette | January, 1961

GRAPHIC PRESENTATION OF PLANNED ROTATION SCHEDULE
FOR INFANTRY TRANSPLACEMENT BATTALIONS



GMST & Promotion: Good Marines Stay Trained

"Marine first, specialist second."

That's no idle slogan. Piece-by-piece a firm, new policy on enlisted promotion and general military subjects training and testing is taking shape. Here's what you can expect:

- A campaign to enforce CMC's policy that only military subjects training *required to maintain proficiency* gets scheduled. Not wanted: so many hours, scheduled over and over.
- Similar military subjects tests for local commanders to use, by the I.G., and for promotion—all based on the same, readily available references and graded the same way. Not planned: a "canned" syllabus; there will be a training guide with sample lesson plans and tests.
- Greater reliance on SRB, fitness report markings to measure specialist proficiency. Technical Tests are out for this year's promotion cycle; they may be killed entirely.
- A *passing score* (65) for SNCO/GMST. Pass and your name goes befort the selection board; you *don't* have to outscore the year's average.
- At least three Corps-wide "GMST days," widely known and scheduled far in advance.
- A similar system for the Marine Corps Reserve which will greatly increase promotions in the Organized Reserve this year.

Here's how it will work:

Sgt (E-5) Joe Marine is a Messkit Repairman at Post "A." He hopes to make SSgt this year. This is what happens.

MilSubj Training: CMC doesn't want Joe to get same training as Sgt John

(See **Good Marines,** next page)

Regimented Battalions

1st and 3d MarDivs now have all infantry battalions named after their parent regiments. It'll stay that way, too. in spite of transplacement. (See chart.)

How? The battalions stay where they are; transplacement moves the *Marines.* It works like this:

On 1 Jan all infantry battalions were redesignated by the name of the T/O slot they're actually filling. (Exception: 1/3 becomes 3/1 for 30 days.) When battalion moves to Okinawa it changes name with unit it relieves.

It's not complicated. In a stabilized 30-month tour, a Marine will serve 15 months with one of the battle-famed regiments of the 1stMarDiv and 15 months with a 3dMarDiv regiment.

Ch 1 to MCO 1300.17 gives details; also, instructions go to post offices, movement reporting centers, etc. Details were worked out in conference among HQMC, FMFPac, and divisions. To make it work smoothly, in Sept 1962 there's a slight reshuffle: the then 3/5 become 1/7 and then 3/7 becomes 2/5, both for a short period at end of a normal CamPen tour.

Pro-pay

Here's the promised info on P-2 pay:

Who: 1,444 Cpls, Sgts, SSgts w/critical MOS, serving in their MOS, and who've been getting P-1 for past six months.

What: $60 a month. When: As soon as possible. How: See MCO 7220.12C.

Why: Congress and DoD authorized it, it gets right Marines into critical skill jobs. Example: Pro-pay uncovered qualified legal clerks, filled billets without added school quotas in what looked like a shortage area.

Why not other ranks? LCpls and below can't qualify technically; MarCorps does not want a pay "inversion" in upper ranks.

P-2 Critical MOS

0847	2731	2761	6614	6661	
1161	2732	2771	6621	2571	(2536)
1444	2741	4009	6631	2639	(2631)
2191	2751	6611	6641		
2533	2752	6613	6651		

Dependents & Dollars

Word as we went to press, don't worry about the dependent cutback overseas. DoD lowered Navy quota; Marines will be hardly affected. Official word was reported pending via ALNAV.

Good Marines, Cont'd

Rifleman. He *does* want Joe to be able to fight. (Over 50% of post and station troops were in Korea inside the first 30 days.) Post "A" CO *should* make up own special training schedule, give Joe what he needs and excuse him from subjects he knows. HQMC will make tests available to CO to measure progress by rank and subject area.

IG Inspections: IG will give a similar test to check CO's progress, measure Joe's proficiency. Passing score in each area is 65. MCI will grade tests and return a "profile" to CO. This tells him he may be overtrained in some subjects, needs more work in others.

General Military Subjects Test: These will be set up like Election Day, Labor Day as such a day of such a month. Best bet: Friday for regulars, Sunday for Reserves. Likely months: Aug, Dec, Apr. GMST will look like local and I.G. tests. If Joe can pass one, he should pass them all. They'll be graded and COs given a report. As you can see from below chart, passing

CHART 2

Promotion Area	Measure of Mil Subjs Proficiency	Measure of Technical Proficiency	Measure of Promotion Potential
E-8 to E-9	———Consideration of entire record only———		
E-7 to E-8	———Consideration of entire record only———		
E-6 to E-7	Pass GMST	Fitness Repts	Entire Record
E-5 to E-6	Pass GMST	Fitness Repts	Entire Record
E-4 to E-5	Pass GMST	Fitness Repts	Entire Record
E-3 to E-4	SRB*	SRB*	Composite score plus CO's judgment
E-2 to E-3	SRB*	SRB*	—do—

*Included in composite score.

his GMST qualifies Joe to get his name before the Selection Board, provided he's otherwise eligible. The Board will look at his whole record, judge his proficiency as a Messkit Repairman by his fitness reports, other material in his service jacket.

Naturally, there'll be waivers for sickness, TAD, maneuvers, etc. The "passing score" idea gives a break to Joe if he's a better practical Marine than a book Marine. If Joe is the type who knows his stuff, but can't pass a written test, he can expect a provision for his CO to recommend a waiver.

Behind this major development: a rash of paper work, much of it not yet completed. Last January, CMC called for less reliance on written tests. G-1 and G-3 planners grabbed the ball and ran. A G-1 study set the guidelines for promotion. G-3 prepared a new basic training directive (MCO 1510.2B & 1510.1B for WMs), the new test, is now working on new I.G. checklists and the proposed training guide. DivRes is now staffing a revision of MCO 1430R. (Reserve hopes to make some delayed E-8 promotions in late FY 61, begin E-9 promotions in FY 62.)

Big chore went to Personnel Department. Two directives set up promotions to Sgt (A1Mar 30: MCO 1418.8D & MCO 1418.11) for the 10 Jan and 21 Feb periods. Now staffing, a revision to MCO 1418.1A—all 52 pages of it. (Planners hope to slash it to just 8-10 pages.)

Summing up: In 1961, Marines must know their general military subjects to be promoted; they needn't know them backwards. It's up to their leaders to train them enough, but not too much. HQMC will make it simple, give COs help in measuring progress. And don't clutch. HQMC planners point out that these subjects aren't very tough—after all, they're taught in boot camp. USMC

Thanks, Patricia Clutz

Early this month five Navy ships plus Co "G," 6th Mar, and a detachment of HMR-264 (MAG-26) begin a goodwill tour of South American and African ports.

Long highly classified, the project has the code name: SOLANT AMITY.

How did the GAZETTE penetrate security wraps? By way of a press release from *Jack and Jill* magazine, courtesy of *Miss* Patricia Clutz. Seems the Navy Department asked for, and got, a thousand copies of the children's magazine to distribute on the tour.

Thanks, DoD

1) In a routine summary of 1960 activities, DoD officially pointed out that the Marine Corps is keeping *three* BLT's afloat: one in the Med, one in the Far East, and one in the Caribbean with Second Fleet.

Caribbean BLT activity was rather obvious, but had been kept hush-hush, listed as routine training.

2) On 16 December the JCS announced that two carriers and a Marine BLT were deployed in South China Sea (near Laos). Communist Viet Nam charged they were "poised for intervention." Carriers were *Bennington* and *Lexington*. BLT was LtCol Harry Painters 1/7/9 aboard *Paul Revere* and *Monticello*. The Seventh Fleet afloat BLT was announced in July, has been in routine training since.

Fitness Reporting Revised

MCO 1611.3A cancelled! Relax. New order spells out past changes to marking fitness reports, adds a couple of new ones, wraps up in one package detailed instructions for grading officers and SNCOs. Along with PRAM, MCO 1611.3B is all the administrative guidance needed for preparing reports. A couple of changes:

- Starting 31 Dec and annually thereafter end-of-year reports on lieutenants must include small arms proficiency. Same for captains beginning 28Feb61, annually thereafter. Entry goes in space provided for "Additional Duty" (Item 7).
- Officers reviewing SNCO fitness reports no longer need sign them. Proceed as for officer reports, stamped or typed name and title of reviewing officers, signed initials.

Reserve Field Medics

Along with missiles (MCA-Newsletter: Dec '60), Marine Reserve will also have its own medical companies. BuMed has okayed CMC's request to form two field medical companies (60-bed hospitals). Recruiting members will be a joint USMC/Navy affair. Cities getting the medical companies: Cleveland, Ohio, and San Bruno, Calif.

Marines at Work

Ed: Each month we tell how the Forces-in-Readiness keep their trim fighting edge. Space doesn't let us report on all working Marines, but if your outfit is omitted there may be another reason: We just didn't hear about it. Your ISO can do something about that. You tell him, he tells us, we tell the rest of the Corps.

A roundup of recent doings we heard about:

• Forty-eight hours after he got word to move out **LtCol D. G. Saunders** had his 1/7 aboard ships of PhibRon Seven tied up in Long Beach, 50 miles away as the crow flies. The BLT hied it overland, via Las Pulgas Road and Route 101. Reinforcements were from 11th Marines, 1stTkBn, 1stAntiTkBn, Recon Bn, AmTracBn, 1stMTBn, 1stMedBn, 1stSerBn, 1stFSR. After spending a day on the water the Marines came ashore over Red Beach via LVT and Navy landing craft.

• At 29 Palms, **Capt J. M. Vittitoe,** HMR-462 helicopter pilot, maneuvered his HR2S over a Terrier missile, hooked on, took off for a short flight over the desert. No new gear was bought, nor was it needed for the test. **Maj J. R. Aichele's** 1stLandingSupCo came up with homemade slings for lifting the missile.

• It took Marine drivers just seven minutes to off-load rolling stock of B Btry, 1stMAAB from *USS DeKalb County* at Port Hueneme, California. Loading at San Clemente Island took an hour and forty minutes for Marines and equipment.

• E/2/5 Marines tested new weapons and T/Os with live ammo, firing against electronically controlled pop-up targets at CamPen. In formations were conventional M-1 and BAR; other formations used M-14, M-14, modified, rifles, M-60 MG and the XM-79 Grenade Launcher (See MCA NEWSLETTER: Dec '60).

• 15 1stMarDiv outfits tested single CP concept during a five-day CPX at CamPen. An important test phase was moving the CP without interrupting command functions. It's done leapfrog style; a tactical command group of assistant staff officers moves up, sets up a new CP. Other command elements then move up to join it. HqBn's CommCo, operating under new T/O, provided communications for the Division CP. CPs were formed for three RLTs, H&S Bns, 11th Marines, a reserve element. Theme for exercise: "anti-guerrilla warfare."

• 150 1stMarBrig Marines were "shot up" during a full scale Combat Casualty Evac Exercise at Kaneohe's Bellow's Air Force Station. Brigade medics treated "wounded" Marines where they fell, if stretcher cases, carried them to aid stations. Set up in rear area was a surgical operating room, X-Ray unit, field laboratory, surgical wards and a messhall.

Marines on Parade

Commander-in-Chief-Elect John F. Kennedy reviews a sample Force-in-Readiness 20 January when **LtCol D. W. Price's** reinforced 2/8 moves in combat array down Pennsylvania during '61 Inaugural Parade. Conceivably, the Quantico Marines could keep right on going to dockside, board ship, sail for any trouble spot; they'll be carrying tools of their trade: a near complete panoply of fire power; Mechanical Mules, Mighty Mites. One incongruous note to steel helmets, marching packs, fixed bayonets: they'll be wearing new, starched utilities; bringing up the rear: an all-WM company.

Air Delivery

Capt T. D. Brooks, VMA-533, became the first operational Marine pilot to drop new air delivery bomb capsule (See MCA Newsletter: Nov '60) over water.

The Marine, flying an A4D, triggered the 500-lb-size bomb capsule containing mail, aerial photos for *USS Boxer* while travelling 400mph. Capsule landed scant 1000 feet from the LPH, was retrieved by helicopter. 2dMarDiv Delivery Platoon rigged the capsule to float by packing inside it several empty parachute cans.

Aviation Shorts

January rotation has **LtCol R. S. Rash's** VMF-312 swapping planes and fields with Atsugi-based VMF-251. **LtCol A. L. Clark's** squadron will return to MCAS, Beaufort.

VMA-242, one of two squadrons activated at Cherry Point last October, became operational last month. First flight was logged by squadron CO **Maj D. W. Hansen,** flying TE A4D2 aircraft.

Rabbit & Hat Dept.

Early this year Organized Reserve will gain five badly-needed new units (Communications, Engineer, Motor Transport) at bargain rates.

Trick is to be done by redesignating current five supply Cos (Charlottesville, Va.; Dayton, O.; Tucson, Ariz.; Stockton, Calif.; Huntington, L. I.). Basic reasons: need for new units, difficulty in training in supply at Co level in Org Res.

Rabbit-in-the-hat: OrgRes will *increase* total number of supply specialists, train them better by OJT in existing units.

Reserve Summer Training

Plans for Organized Reserve (ground) units are spelled out in MCO 1540R.15C for next summer. Also given: tentative plans for 1962 and 1963.

Training planned is similar to last summer's includes two air-ground exercises. One big change is grouping of field and AA artillery at 29 Palms. They'll work together, under supervision of FAG and AAG Hq.

Three Blades, or Four?

Navy has been named by DoD to coordinate a "tri-service program" to get a prototype VTOL transport. The fourth legal service—the Marine Corps—is also interested. USMC

The Symington Report



A committee headed by Senator Stuart Symington (D. Mo.) recommended defense changes to President-Elect John F. Kennedy, at his request. The President-Elect had not said at press time whether he would forward them to Congress intact, in part, or at all. New SecDef Robert S. McNamara was quoted as saying: "I will undertake no major reorganization of the Defense Department in the immediate future."

Major recommendations were: (see chart)

1. Create a Chairman of the Joint Staff, advised by a Military Advisory Council of senior officers, and enlarge and strengthen the Joint Staff.
2. Break up the JCS, make service chiefs not a part of the Joint Staff or Military Advisory Council, have them report directly to SecDef.
3. Do away with the Army, Navy and Air Force departments, their secretaries, undersecretaries, and assistant secretaries; also seven assistant SecDefs.
4. Give SecDef a deputy and two undersecretaries—one for Weapons Systems, one for Administration—also, a special assistant for arms control.
5. Set up unified commands directly under the Chairman of the Joint Staff as follows: Strategic, Tactical, Continental Defense, National Guard & Reserve (and Civil Defense), and area commands as required.
6. Give SecDef full budget control. He'd have to justify all missions and operations; R&D funds would be for more than one year at a time.

Spokesmen at HQMC and OPNAV had no comment on the proposal. Actually, comment would be difficult as the plan doesn't say what would happen to the Marine Corps. USMC

Carrying a Load

Multiple bomb racks (MCA Newsletter: Aug '60) are growing up. Weapons planners successfully tried three racks carrying 18 bombs on an A4D during recent 3dMAW firepower demonstration (JCOC '61). Total bomb load: three tons. GP bombs were spread six on each wing (250-lb each), six 500-lb bombs on middle rack. Next step: add two more wing racks, load each with Bullpup.

What They Say

Strategic value of Polaris mobile deterrent draws new interest. (See Adm Burke's remarks, p. 18.) *Newsweek's* copyrighted "Periscope" (12 Dec) reports JCS are amplifying the idea, want a mobile command ship—maybe a submarine.

* * *

Same date (12 Dec) *Missiles and Rockets'* "Countdown" reports Army planners' concern over control of Davy Crockett. With the man-carried nuclear weapon in hands of front-line troops, there's no quick answer to keeping "positive control."

* * *

Veteran Washington *Post* military correspondent John G. Norris had this to say (6 Dec) of the Symington Committee report, as he predicted "powerful opposition on Capitol Hill":

"In essence, it is the same proposal for 'merging' the armed forces under a single chief of staff that has been advanced many times . . . actually it has been proposed since WWI and rejected by Congress after WWII and several times since."

Names & Addresses

When Weapons Training Facility moves from Camp Matthews to CamPen's 31 Area, new location will be known as **Camp Stuart Mesa.** Following marksmanship training, recruits move to planned new home of 2d ITR at **Camp Mesa Loma.** Other name changes: **Camp Portola** for 12 Area home of Staging Rgt and Dental Clinic; a planned new **Camp O'Neill** for ForTrps (14 Area). New names for 22 Area and 24 Area, respectively: **Camps Chappo** and **Pico.**

It will be a longer trip to the Top of the Mark for officers waiting out overseas transfers to the Pacific. New San Francisco reporting address for *all* Marines travelling without dependents: Treasure Island. Officers sans dependents formerly reported to downtown 100 Harrison St.

CMC **Gen D. M. Shoup,** profiled in December *Esquire* under title *Return of the Old Breed,* turned 56, 30 December, 1960. His C/S **LtGen W. M. Greene** observed his 53rd birthday three days earlier.

Club News

Big factor in getting hard liquor approved for sale in upcoming NCO clubs was CMC's pitch that Marine corporals and sergeants have stability, can shoulder responsibility along with their M-1s (or Seagram 7). SecNav agreed—replied, "Corporals and sergeants are the backbone of Marine Corps small unit leadership," stroked his signature to a special dispensation allowing NCO clubs to dispense mixed drinks. More proof of NCO maturity: average age of corporals is 24.6 years; sergeants, 30.2 years. More proof of stability: 59% of Cpls, 87% of Sgts are married.

Approval to serve hard refreshments was a case of putting the White Horse before the cart. HQMC reports only four bases have asked for permission to set up separate NCO clubs. They are CamPen, Quantico, CamLej and El Toro. CamPen has best chance of opening first; each regimental area already has Quonset huts set up as NCO clubs. Quantico will partition space in Daly Hall, restrict entry to NCOs.

Other posts and stations: See Chap 19, MCM, for how to go about getting your NCO club.

Latest Experimental Meteorological Satellite on Course, Thanks to Bell Scientists — to Aid in Weather Forecasting

THE DAY of operational weather satellites is one step closer with the orbiting of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration's Tiros II.

An on-the-job, working satellite, the TV-equipped Tiros II will take pictures of cloud cover and transmit them to earth for limited, experimental use in forecasting weather.

But despite its many instruments—TV cameras, tape recorders, solar cells and antennas—Tiros II would not be as useful if it were not in a nearly perfect circular orbit, made possible in large measure by the Bell Telephone Command Guidance System.

To provide accurate weather data, the satellite must be at an almost uniform distance from the earth at all times. Tiros II's orbit varies within extremely narrow limits as it constantly circles the earth.

Our Command Guidance System for the Tiros launching vehicle is a result of research and development by Bell Telephone Laboratories and production by Western Electric. This amazingly accurate system has scored many other successes in America's space program.

It has guided the successful Air Force Titan ICBM firings, and it helped make possible the first nose cone recoveries after flights of ICBM range. It also guided NASA's Tiros I and Echo I into their carefully planned orbits, and will be used in other forthcoming space probes and satellite launchings.

This Command Guidance System is one of a number of ways the Bell System is participating in the nation's space effort. The skills and knowledge called for in this pioneering activity are important assets in the country's defense.



More than 9000 solar cells—an invention of the Bell System—ring Tiros II and provide power for its instruments.

BELL TELEPHONE SYSTEM

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Marine Corps Gazette

Professional Magazine for United States Marines

Published by the Marine Corps Association in order to provide a forum for the expression of matters which will advance knowledge, interest and esprit in the Marine Corps.

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

"MIDAS" REPORTS

through communications equipment by Philco

MIDAS II, the experimental "sentry in space," is the forerunner of a series of satellites that will detect the launching of ballistic missiles anywhere on earth and instantly relay the warning. Its entire communications system was designed and produced by Philco's Western Development Laboratories for the U.S. Air Force, as associate contractor with Lockheed.

This is another example of Philco's leadership in advanced electronics that is contributing to our national defense . . . in satellites, missiles, weapons systems, communications and data processing. For vast capacity, facilities and experience, look to the leader . . . look to Philco.

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Measure of Boots: Feet

. . . When I bought my first pair of combat boots five years ago I didn't think very much of them. Two years in the field confirmed that opinion. More recently I became thoroughly convinced of their complete inadequacy.

Three ex-Marines and I went pheasant hunting in Iowa. I wore my combat boots. They wore different types of inexpensive leather boots. We walked through the same cornfields. We walked through the same swamps, almost in each other's footsteps. Guess who had to change socks at 1200?

And guess who had wet feet again at 1600?

I can tell you it wasn't any ex-Marine.

This was my first venture at field testing uniform items of equipment and comparing them to similar items. Our combat boots finished clearly a poor fourth.

Now I hear we're going to start using the Army's combat boot. Why? To save money? To pacify Congress? Or are they really a better boot than ours? Surely they could be no worse. But have they been tested and compared to determine that they are the best combat boots available? Or are we only paying lip service to all the stress placed on proper foot care?

I leave you with this final thought: "A little neglect may breed mischief. . . . For want of a nail the shoe was lost; for want of a shoe the horse was lost; and for want of a horse the rider was lost."

And for want of a rider a war was lost.

Capt J. J. Chmelik

MCRS, 225 S. Clark St.
Chicago, Ill.

Ed: G-4 General Supply Branch says the new combat boot now in Phase II of strenuous field testing (see MCA Newsletter: Jul '60) does not belong to any one service but is a careful blending of the best ideas of Marine and Army researchers and the boot industry. Hence, the optimum combat boot will be a hybrid article stemming from the polygamous marriage of these three agencies.

A Hit w/Wives

. . . Capt Wisely's attack upon the "New GAZETTE" has fostered considerable comment. I would like to add mine.

I have watched the GAZETTE shake itself and finally admit that it *was* a stodgy, Victorian publication with an atmosphere similar to that of a retired-officers' club. The chill, intellectual calm of it was broken only by the colorful layouts of the advertisers. About four years ago the Marine Corps Association canvassed members and potential members for ideas to improve the GAZETTE. I am pleased to note that several of my ideas, no doubt in concert with many others, were adopted. Following the early improvements came more sweeping reforms which today make the GAZETTE a publication which is actually *read* by Marines.

Perhaps I am not a typical reader of the GAZETTE; however, let me outline my reactions to it over the years:

For me membership in MCA has traditionally been a professional duty to which I rendered learned lip-service and little else. Upon receipt of the GAZETTE it was my custom to leaf through it quickly, checking the list of authors to see whether there might be an acquaintance among them. If not I yawned my way through the illustrations and advertisements and quickly placed the magazine in my "GAZETTE-file." This is a file which I maintain in a prominent place to impress my guests with the professional status of their splendid host.

Then one month there appeared several Marine-anecdotes. I read them delightedly and entertained my wife with them, *then* put the GAZETTE in its chronological position in the file. Soon my wife took to grabbing the GAZETTE out of the mail and sniggering over the anecdotes, reading them to *me*, and otherwise stealing my thunder.

More recently there appeared, in addition, a section listing transfers, promotions and so forth. This was an immediate hit with my wife. "Joe Blow is going to Junior School . . . Don't we know Maj Hoople from someplace? . . ." and so on. It was a hit with me, too. By this time the GAZETTE was lasting for as long as an hour. Then you added the "news-and-notes-from-all-over" section.

I developed a new feeling for the GAZETTE. I read the letters and now and then I even read an article or two. I followed controversies and looked eagerly for matter which I might attack with dripping fangs or support with shining ardor. I WAS INTERESTED.

My subscription just ran out and the check with this letter is a clear indication of my haste to renew. Please don't fail to send the December issue.

Maj W. D. Chapman

USN #830
FPO, San Francisco

Button, Button

. . . First, a word of thanks to Sgt Phaneuf for passing on the labor-saving tip on removing "QM" from buttons (OBSERVATION POST: Sept '60).

Capt Greer's subsequent remarks (MESSAGE CENTER: Oct '60) on the new style gold plated buttons deserve some comment, however. The new buttons are supposedly designed so as to have all buttons in the Marine Corps looking alike. As a Marine who for four years of independent duty spent 10 to 12 hours a week shining "blues brass," I am resentful of any attempt to reduce military appearance to the lowest level for the sake of uniformity. Let's look upon the new button—and any such item—not as *the "standard,"* but as the *minimum* standard. I hope never to see a Marine criticized because his shoes are too shiny, his creases too sharp or his buttons too bright . . . uniformity be damned!

GySgt W. C. Hickey

HqCo. ForTrps
FMFPac, 29 Palms, Calif.

Historical Amphibious File

. . . Please don't discard that dusty old document. If it relates to amphibious warfare (tactics, techniques, equipment), it is possibly a good candidate for the Historical Amphibious File at the Marine Corps Educational Center.

This type of material is needed to properly preserve, in one place, documents which help trace the evolution of amphibious warfare. The documents will be preserved in the donor's name. Please write: The Director, Marine Corps Educational Center.

BGen J. C. Miller, Jr.

Director, MCEC
MCS, Quantico, Va.

Guarding the Net

. . . We have completed a cycle! When the new enlisted rank structure came into effect one of the main reasons for the creation of the LCpl was that he would be a nonrated man and there would be more "braves" available for mess duty, guard duty and working parties. With the new change in T/O as reported in the GAZETTE (MCA Newsletter: Nov '60) we once again have a Cpl (E-4) as a fire team leader and a Sgt (E-5) as a squad leader. The same ratio of NCO to nonrated as before the new rank structure. We didn't solve a problem; we created one and then solved it. When thinking of new T/O's let's look at the small picture.

Presently we have two runners per platoon. One is normally retained at Platoon CP and one sent to company CP. The company commander normally uses his runner to guard the company tactical net with a PRC-6. The platoon commander does the same with his runner. The other runners are normally used to augment this all too unreliable piece of communications gear. When Bn calls for two runners to report to the BnSgtMaj (and what Bn doesn't?) you must once again drain the rifle platoons. The voice radio operator who mans the PRC-10 to guard the BnTacNet is normally one of your messengers from the weapons platoon and he can't guard the net 24 hours. The Bn radio operators always seem to be busy at the Bn CP guarding specially activated nets. Let's give the company commander two voice operators to activate and guard the BnTacNet. Make them organic to the company. It seems that the rifle company always has to carry the 292 (tree top antenna) so let's have the men to do it with.

GySgt J. J. Blank, Jr.

Reception Desk,
Main Lobby, HQMC

ZsaZsa's Diamonds

. . .*Let's Perk Up the Reserves* by Capt C. R. Venditto (GAZETTE: Aug '60) presents a serious problem. Marine reservists in his unit are not being entertained when they attend reserve meetings! The captain has supplied his own solution to this perplexing problem: he suggests reserve meetings be pepped up by lectures by police vice-squad detectives, trips to nearby museums, and speeches by newspaper reporters.

These ideas are fine for a beginning, but

Question of the Month

A change to MCO 3574.2 authorizes pistol shooters to use at their option the two-handed grip described in FM 23-35. With the shooting season over, most Marines have had a chance to try the new grip. Many of those who did reported a big jump in scores. Is the two-handed grip here to stay? Why? $25 for best answer by 10Mar61.

what will Capt Venditto use to fill the dull voids of the next quarterly training schedule? After careful consideration I offer the following items to be included in his next training schedule: 1) A lecture by a Zen Buddhist pilgrim. 2) A static display of Zsa Zsa Gabor's jewelry. 3) A field trip to a dance studio where all hands will receive a free Cha-Cha-Cha lesson.

I'm certain that other readers can offer subjects which are equally as entertaining. One big question arises, however. Assume that a reserve unit receives such a training program over a period of months. All of a sudden, M-DAY! No one could send such a unit to the FMF. Think of the boredom they would encounter . . . night problems, tactics, weapons training, inspections. No, the FMF would never do. In fact, the only place they would feel at home would be Disneyland.

Capt J. B. Wilkinson

1st ITR,MCB,
Camp Lejeune, N. C.

Red, White and Blue

. . . I say the Marine Corps needs a standardized Color Code in the field of personnel administration. The requirement for the use of colored tabs on the IRC to signify a certain status of the Marine and the use of Color Codes selected at random by units for unit roster boards, etc., is at present left to the discretion of the units.

The following Color Code is recommended for adoption by the Marine Corps as SOP. This could easily be promulgated to the field by use of a PRAM notice if adopted.

BLUE . . . . . on leave
BLACK . . . . . confined
YELLOW . unauthorized absence
BROWN . . commuted rations
GREEN . . . . . sick
GRAY . . . . . TAD
RED . not working in primary MOS
WHITE . . . . . on mess duty
ORANGE . . . . . on pro-pay

MSgt Robert C. Coleman

156 Matanikau St.
Tarawa Terrace, N. C.

Morituri Te Salutamus

. . . I quote:

"The Marine under orders is no longer a man, but an arrangement of wheels, a well-oiled and well-muscled machine, ready for anything, even to die 'by mistake'."

This is what a movie critic, writing for the Paris *Le Monde*, said about a French-produced film dealing with Marine Corps training programs at Parris Island.

I'm a drill instructor and interested in a movie that causes a critic to call me "no longer a man" ready to "die 'by mistake'."

SSgt P. E. Champagne

L Co, 2dRecruit Trng Bn,
Parris Island, S.C.

Single Sheet Rapped

. . .In the GAZETTE of November 1960, under "Marines at Work" (pp. MCA-3), there was mention of the "single sheet" loading plans for use with TAK.

I believe amplification of this remark is in order lest too many be misled into believing a change is in the offing.

First, the proposed "single sheet" loading plan was intended and tried for not only TAK but also APA and AKA.

Second, so far as the aviation squadron, MAG, naval amphibious squadron, and individual ships' Embarkation Officers and Combat Cargo Officers were concerned it was a total loss. During the unloading phase TacLog and Naval Control Group were unable to locate items such as C-rations and sleeping bags from the "single sheet" plans.

Having been both Amphibious Squadron CCO and Naval Control Group Officer for the operation, I have no doubt that the "old" loading plans will be with us for a long time to come.

Capt L. F. Ison

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FPO, San Francisco

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
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

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PROFESSIONAL SCRAPBOOK

This department aims to present briefly ideas of wide or lasting use. We want: professional tips, quotes, reprints, digests of articles from professional journals, translations—all of interest to Marines. We'll pay for your help in finding old, new or original material of professional value.

GEM vs Helicopter

An aerodynamics research engineer notes current interest in ground effects machines, compares relative merits of GEM types and helicopters in *Journal of the American Helicopter Society,* Oct '60.

Are the machines directly competitive? Only in some cases, says E. A. Fradenburgh, head, Sikorsky Aircraft's Rotor and Aerodynamics Research Section.

"It is well known that the helicopter experiences an increase in its lifting capabilities within ground effect, but since the 'augmentation ratio' for a helicopter near the ground is lower than that for an annular jet at the same height-diameter ratio, it might be concluded that the annular jet represents a more efficient hovering machine."

He adds the conclusion is not foolproof since many factors other than augmentation ratio are involved.

Significance of ground effect in terms of payload is shown in Figure 1. Model test data have been applied to the Sikorsky S-60 flying crane prototype, having rotor diameter of 72 feet. Machine has 8,000-lb payload for a typical mission of 100 nautical miles. With ground effect, however, payload can be approximately doubled. Even with wheels 20 feet off the ground, hovering payload may be increased by nearly 50 per cent.

At a GEM height-diameter ratio of 0.05 optimum GEM has theoretical hovering performance superior to the helicopter in or out of ground effect, although power loading is only about one-third higher than helicopter in ground effect.

If five feet is considered a useful minimum height for clearing fences, hedges, or other obstacles, a height-diameter ratio of .05 requires a 100-ft. diameter machine. Use of such a machine over land would be restricted to very flat areas where trees, poles, houses, other tall objects are no closer to each other than 100 feet.

For GEM diameters of 50 feet or less, the helicopter in ground effect is better, is not restricted to staying close to the ground.

A 20-foot GEM, operating at five-foot height sounds like a compact, desirable recon vehicle, but a helicopter with the same power will out-perform it in every respect, hover better, fly faster due to lower parasite drag. (A lateral acceleration of 1 "g" in forward flight is accomplished by simple expedient of a 45-degree bank; a GEM would need auxiliary thrust equal to its gross weight.)



FIGURE 1 EFFECT OF HEIGHT ON HOVERING PAYLOAD OF S-60 HELICOPTER

For large machines operating close to water, the ground effect machine may be able to perform missions which the helicopter can not. Even in the large sizes, the GEM designer may be faced with difficulties. They may be too heavy to "fly" economically.

The helicopter can derive benefits from ground effect, including increased payload when the other performance penalties are not objectionable. Benefits of ground effect will apply chiefly to large machines. The helicopter retains the capability of operating out of ground effect in forward flight. The peripheral jet ground effect machine doesn't. A comparison shows that the ground effect vehicle cannot compete with the helicopter in the missions that the latter performs routinely, and that the ground effect vehicle will be confined to specialized application where the inferior capability is a secondary consideration.

A Better Way . . .

To Store M-1 Rifles

By SSgt N. M. Radel

THE PROBLEM OF THE SMALL ARMORY as in the case of most company armories is the limited space available in the storage of the M-1 Rifle. Most armories have requisitioned rifle racks to alleviate this problem but they have been found too large and cumbersome in the storage of these weapons. Enclosed is a sketch of a metal hook which may be placed on the wall of the armory to help solve this problem. The weapon is placed with the stacking swivel attached to the hook. In this upright position the number of the weapon may be easily checked, the weapon stored within the limited confines of the armory in a more suitable way than that of in a rifle rack and it doesn't collect as much dust as it would have in the rifle rack. These hooks may be produced at a nominal cost.



US MC

H&S Co, Camp Smedley D. Butler
c/o FPO, San Francisco, Calif.

Comm Costs on the Rise

By LtCol Luther E. Johnson, Signal Corps

Condensation from *Military Review,* Aug '60

If the trends of the past 15 years continue, in 1970 the cost of signal communication equipment for a 1958 Type Field Army could be one and one-half times the entire current Army budget.

Important and essential as they are, signal communications per se afford little deterrent to a would-be aggressor. They cannot be used to kill the enemy.

Although you may agree with the latter statement and doubt the former, both are true. The question: *What are you going to do about it?*

The US Army Electronic Proving Ground (USAEPG) study advances the theory that military communications will vary in some proportions to three basic factors:

1) Man's total basic knowledge.
2) The speed at which a man can travel.
3) Distances over which projectiles can be hurled.

(Directly affects dispersion, and hence the length of communications circuits.)

These factors point toward an increasing demand for signal communications.

Due to the current state of technology, and the obvious need to eliminate radio direction finding and jamming by the enemy, USAEPG study recommends the development of a system for '70 which would provide a capability of transferring information equivalent to 100 times the '58 capability with:

- No increase in weight,
- Elimination of direction finding and jamming by the enemy, and
- No increase in personnel.

A great deal, however, depends upon you, the commanders and staff officers. The following are areas where it is believed you should take positive action.

- Be ready to submit to, and permit, drastic changes in equipment and techniques.
- Make full use of common user service (the area communication system).
- Decentralize, don't just talk about it.
- Make full use of SOP.
- Train to operate in emergencies with little or no electrical communications.
- Be willing to move the signal officer up to the general staff level.
- Properly orient your thoughts about automatic data processing.
- Limit the use of electrical communications to matters which require immediate action or to essential matters that cannot be handled satisfactorily by other means.
- Do you ask for enough communications equipment to cover any eventuality, or are they realistic?
- Follow and require such administrative practices as the following:

1) Maintain a continuing program to educate personnel in proper use of communications.
2) Brevity in message consistent with clarity.
3) Assign the lowest precedence and classification required by the urgency and contents of messages.
4) Limit addresses to those required and use a non-electrical means to the maximum for information addresses.
5) Keep telephone calls brief and concise and organize your material in advance when time permits.

Quote of the Month

On Defense Reorganization

"We might have to rearrange some of the superstructure, or even effect a minor overhaul.

"However, I don't believe we should put back into port, before finishing our shakedown, and start dismantling and rebuilding the ship according to an untested blueprint that appears attractive on paper.

"We must also consider the consequences if an enemy warship were to steam into port at a time when our ship was only half-rebuilt."

—*Gen George H. Decker*
Army Chief of Staff

Soviet Military Justice

By Leo Gawjesky

The Soviet Disciplinary Regulations authorize a commanding officer to impose the following punishments without intervention of a court-martial: reprimand; restriction for a period of one month; five details of extra duty or extra work; confinement for a period of 20 days; confinement on bread and water for a period of 15 days; reduction of a corporal to the rank of private.

The Disciplinary Regulations classify the following as the most serious military offenses: desertion; absence without leave; insubordinate conduct; and drunkenness.

Desertion is punishable by imprisonment for a period of from 3 to 7 years; in wartime, death before a firing squad or imprisonment for a period of 5 to 10 years.

Absence without leave for a period over three days is punishable by imprisonment for a period of 1 to 5 years; in wartime, imprisonment for a period of 5 to 10 years.

Absence without leave for a period over 24 hours but not over 3 days, or for a period less than 24 hours if it is the second offense, is punishable by transfer to a disciplinary battalion for a period of 3 months to 2 years; in wartime, imprisonment for a period of 2 to 10 years.

IT ISN'T IN THE BOOK, BUT...
by Sherman & Crook
REST CAN ON LIPS
CANNED HEAT
GOODBYE TO "FIELD CHOW BLUES". YOU NEEDN'T WORRY ABOUT INGENIOUS FEATS OF CONSTRUCTION IN ORDER TO BALANCE YOUR CHOW OVER CANNED HEAT. GET YOURSELF THREE MACHINE GUN LINKS, SNAP THEM OVER THE RIM OF THE CANNED HEAT ABOUT AN INCH APART. MAKES A STEADY SUPPORT FOR YOUR CAN OF CHARLIES WHILE WARMING UP.
Thanks and Flies to...
Capt. J.W. Hanker

PROFESSIONAL SCRAPBOOK



Duty Officers Are For Duty

By Col W. F. Prickett

It's a well known fact that a military organization thrives on initiative and becomes hidebound and inefficient when initiative is either throttled or lacking. It's also well known that nothing stifles initiative so much as giving an individual a job to do and telling him exactly how to do it.

In theory, a command writes orders for a Staff Duty Officer because it recognizes the fact that things will happen outside working hours that require the command to take action immediately. Further, the command recognizes that the action taken must be the result of mature judgment and consideration.

Most orders for duty officers start out fairly general in nature. As soon as one individual standing the duty exercises bad judgment, and who amongst us doesn't once in awhile, a mistake is made, and a couple of paragraphs are added to the instructions. Before long, the duty officer's hands are tied. He has such voluminous instructions that he considers his orders a check off list. Whether or not he's right in considering his orders a check off list is not the point. His attitude is completely understandable.

If a situation arises for which there are no instructions, the duty officer calls the exec or the CO. A private could do the same. The duty officer receives no training in shouldering responsibility and exercising judgment. He has absolutely no chance to employ initiative.

If your outfit has a duty officer, keep his orders general. Don't tie his hands with voluminous explicit instructions. Encourage him to employ initiative and exercise judgment. Some day he'll be in command and will be forced to. It'll be too late to learn then.

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New Books

THE JUST WAR—A STUDY IN CONTEMPORARY AMERICAN DOCTRINE. R. W. Tucker *(John Hopkins Press, $5.00)*

Provides a penetrating commentary on the nature and limits of a defensive war and on the moral issues even a defensive war must raise.

THE ULTIMATE DECISION. Edited by E. R. May *(George Braziller, Inc., $6.00)*

Enables us to judge for ourselves whether the Constitutional provision for the President as Commander in Chief has proved sound in the record of our wartime presidents, and whether a potential usurpation of power may lie hidden in that provision.

THE GREAT ADVENTURE—AMERICA IN THE FIRST WORLD WAR. P. G. Fredericks *(E. P. Dutton & Co., Inc., $4.75)*

A complete and memorable story of America's participation in WWI, the forgotten war.

HITLER CONFRONTS ENGLAND. W. Ansel *(Duke Univ. Press, $7.50)*

A detailed and definitive study of the projected invasion—for readers interested in the German side of WWII.

UNITED STATES ARMY IN WORLD WAR II —THE WAR IN THE PACIFIC—CAMPAIGN IN THE MARIANAS. P. A. Crowl *(Office of Chief of Military History, Dept. of the Army, $6.50)*

Deals with the military services joint effort to capture the Marianas, along with the strategic and tactical planning preceding the fighting, plus supporting operations by sea and air.

GOLDEN WINGS. M. Caidin *(Random House, N. Y. $10.00)*

A pictorial history of the U. S. Navy and Marine Corps aviation in war and peace.

FIELDS OF GLORY. W. H. Nelson & F. E. Vandiver *(E. P. Dutton & Co., Inc., $10.00)*

An illustrated historical narrative of American land warfare and how the US soldier evolved with the times.

THE EDGE OF WAR. J. D. Atkinson *(Henry Regnery Co., Chicago, $6.00*

Men have feared "war" and cherished "peace." Today, says the author, both terms are obsolete.

WHITE ENSIGN—THE BRITISH NAVY AT WAR 1939-1945. Capt. S. W. Roskill, RN, *(USNI, Annapolis, $4.50)*

The story of the Royal Navy during WWII, telling how it hunted and destroyed the enemy beneath the sea, on the surface, and in the air.

Problem: Selecting a Bivouac Area

By Carl H. Strandberg

Assume that you are leading a small unit overland along a small stream through an area in which guerrillas have been reported.

Opposition has not been encountered, but you expect it.

The time is now 1700 EENT (Ending Evening Nautical Twilight) will occur at 1835.

Other than choosing a general area, you have not selected a bivouac area.

The terrain is rolling, partially wooded. There are a few cultivated fields. The rest of the cleared land is covered with grass.

You have a topographic map on the back of which an aerial photographic mosaic is printed.

You consider cover, concealment, and defensibility of terrain prime factors for your selection.

But how do you select areas possessing these attributes?

From the contour map alone, assuming a small enough contour interval, areas affording adequate cover and defensibility can be selected.

Small closed contour lines with hatchures pointing inward indicate sinks and hollows. If you are in an area in which limestone is the predominent bedrock, there may be several of these shown on your map. They may also be present in glaciated areas, and sometimes in desert or former desert areas.

These sites may meet your requirements.

Other good areas might include small draws and valleys cut into sides of flanking hill masses.

These features are indicated by V shaped contours. The apex of the V's point uphill.

Concealment can sometimes be deduced by reference to the mosaic printed on the back side of the map.

Only marginal results can be obtained from maps and single aerial photographic views, however.

Maps alone can rarely show sufficient detail about the ground. The most important features to you are probably those classified as microrelief features.

A ten-foot contour interval, for instance, excludes all terrain features less than ten feet high. Those smaller than ten feet, in this case, are classified as microfeatures.

The mosaics printed on the backs of maps are obviously old by the time they are in the user's hands, and further, have probably been made from photography taken at some other season of the year than that existing at the time they are being used.

The only truly satisfactory substitute is recent, large scale overlapping aerial photography, used with a stereoscope.

When viewed through a stereoscope, recent large scale aerial photography enables users to study a "terrain model" possessing infinite detail. None of the microfeatures are lost.

But for general use—aerial photography should be considered neither a map substitute or replacement, but as a map supplement.

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ADMINISTRATIVE TIME

Being a few words by the editors about the magazine you write

GAZETTE's new punched-card circulation gives us a few problem sometimes, but it's real uptown. Here's how it works:

1—Rapid coding. No more wait of a month or more to get a new subscription. Before the 15th of each month we rush the current issue; otherwise, the next issue which should reach US addresses by the 15th of each month. It helps if you tell us which issue you want to start your membership.

2 — Automatic expiration notice. Special cards are bound right into your last three issues. Two and three-year memberships are sustaining, don't expire. You'll be billed automically.

3—Change of address. Your GAZETTE is mailed the 1st of each month. We can't call it back (or replace it). But we can make a change of address for the next issue right up to the 20th. Notify us in time, and we believe we can give you better service than most magazines. Caution: Post Office requires a complete military address; "c/o 3d Mar Div" is not good enough.

One thing our data processing won't do: tell us when you move or lose a magazine in the mail. Let us know, please. We'll bust a gusset to keep your magazine coming.

Faithfully,

Mike McCorps

WORDS & PICTURES

• In this issue...

...You'll find the first of several planned special issues built around a theme. That theme is NATO and its requirements for strategically-mobile Marines. Sergeant C. J. Bernard's strategic chessboard on the cover symbolizes the problem.

• In months to come . . .

...more special issues will appear. Also, REPORT FROM THE READY FORCES will continue. One air-ground team is to report every third month. With these reports will be such additional articles about doings in specific FMF outfits as we can lay hands on. Generally, we plan a varied menu we hope will interest officers and SNCOs of all ranks and MOS fields. In particular, a number of articles by Marine aviators are at last on hand.

• In brief...

...we hope you'll find continuing progress. The credit goes to your enthusiastic support of the 1960 GAZETTE, which doubled membership. It cost 61.6¢ a copy to print the magazine in 1959. With twice as many members in 1960, more costly printing, engraving, and articles averaged only 51.5¢ a copy. We're holding our breath to see how stopping Troop copies works out. It should improve membership rate (50% for officers on active duty, 5% for SNCOs). If so, we can implement some plans we think will show you real progress.

• In person...

...the GAZETTE officially welcomes Managing Editor Capt O. D. Newton and Art Director SSgt Bill Tipton. Together, they honchoed the 1961 "look" you'll note in the typography and art of this issue. Speaking of new looks, we've regretfully lost the yeoman services of MSgt John DeGrasse and GySgt Bob Fleischauer who did so much to develop the 1960 format. Out on 20, MSgt DeGrasse left behind some covers you'll be seeing. We hope GySgt Fleischauer can find time in his Pentagon lair to provide some more of his inimitable cartoons, including your friend next door—Mike McCorps.

WRITER'S CORNER

• Feedbin special for January
We never get enough company/squadron level articles.

On a general subject, your article will be better if you show how your idea affects all our readers: air & ground, regular & reserve, officer & SNCO, junior or senior.

• Writer Incentive Awards for October
$100.00 monthly prize: Malaya Jungle Patrols by Maj B. F. Meyers (Also eligible for annual $500 prize)

Nominated for annual $100 prize: Reach for a Rifleman by Capt P. R. Clapper

This month's *Gazette* concentrates on NATO and the need for strategic mobility that US backup of NATO demands . . .

NATO & Strategic Mobility



. . . Capt B. H. Liddell Hart paints the strategic background. On the tactical side, we examine French offensive use of helicopters in Algeria.

But readiness is more than sound strategy and tactics. How do Marines get to the battlefield? This issue examines air mount-out, the fast amphibious task force, the new LPH, and the use of MSTS shipping.

And here on this page is the reason why—the massive, modernized Soviet Army, snapped as it paraded in Red Square 7 November 1960.

The Soviet Threat:

A CNO Appraisal

MANY GOVERNMENTS IN THE WORLD TODAY ARE PRE-occupied mainly with their own internal interests. Not so the Soviets. The Kremlin rulers continuously scan the Free World for organic weaknesses which might provide opportunities to expand their area of influence or control.

As a result of notable technical achievements, the Soviets are experiencing an intense burst of confidence. This is the true reflection of their ICBM capability—and it has far-reaching implications.

The Soviets are now liberated from the one-sided threat of our enormous nuclear capability. For people long afflicted with a deep feeling of inferiority, this is extraordinarily important.

Through their possession of an "equalizer," they are enabled to pursue policies of relaxation without fear of appearing to be supplicants. The powerful can afford to appear benign.

Soviet policy may also be far more menacing at times—as has been demonstrated. In either case, it is likely to be free-swinging and hard to handle. The Soviets now undoubtedly believe that they have virtually eliminated the risk that massive nuclear retaliation would be triggered by a localized Communist aggression—except possibly aggression against a NATO country.

In their view, the day may not be too far off when the freedom of Berlin, Turkey, Iran or Korea will not be deemed automatically worth the destruction of American cities. In any event, in their minds all that might be needed is a brief period of fatal indecision.

To foster this view, the Soviets have deliberately nurtured the desire for peace everywhere. Fear of nuclear war, pacificism, and a yearning throughout many nations for a respite from world crisis, all give the Soviets a chance to throw their weight around internationally with reduced danger of armed resistance.

But they continue to act with calculated caution.

In events like the Anglo-French invasion of Egypt, for example, the Soviets made their threats only after it had become clear to them that the Western powers were about to refrain, desist, or not follow through.

Thus, the Soviets fostered the impression—actually accepted in many areas—that their threats saved Egypt. You will think of other examples of equally empty bombast.

In no instance has the uttered threat been an actual threat to the United States—it is a psychological gambit to make the nations of the Free World lose faith in the United States and choose at least a "safe" neutralist stance.

Throughout all this psychological activity, the Soviets have never given any indication that their bid for world domination is being made at the physical risk of the Soviet Union.

They are most unlikely—suddenly on some quiet day—to seek quick fulfillment of their ambitions in a single gigantic gamble, knowing that the odds for complete success are virtually nil—and that the potential losses are catastrophic.

At the same time, we can be certain that they are testing the degree to which they can extend their control without provoking the United States into nuclear reaction.

Barring the remote possibility of war by miscalculation between the United States and the USSR, the power struggle in the coming years will be in the underdeveloped areas—from the Asian periphery, through the Middle East and Africa into Latin America.

The Soviet approach in these areas is not necessarily the quick take-over of a country by Communist power. They appear satisfied first to foment, abet, or exploit discord between the United States and a specific country.

Without losing sight of their goal of eventually super-

imposing Communist regimes on these new nations, the Soviets recognize that there are advantages in fostering a neutralist status. They gain prestige. They break established ties with Western sources of supply. They roll back US military influence and US bases. By enlarging the "zone of peace," they render less possible the gaining of new allies by the United States. Most important for them, they condition the Free World to take for granted a Soviet stake in the Free World.

Soviet efforts in these areas are principally economic, political and psychological—but always backed up by powerful and *highly diversified* military capabilities. There is great need for economic, political, and psychological countereffforts by the United States—but they must also be backed up by powerful and highly diversified military capabilities.

Our present and programmed retaliatory capability includes a broad spectrum of forces: SAC bombers, Tactical Air Forces, Attack Carrier Striking Forces, POLARIS submarines, ICBMs and IRBMs. Many elements of these forces are deployed overseas—afloat and ashore.

Such diversity greatly complicates the problems of an aggressor planning to strike first. Obviously, he can't destroy them all by surprise. How many will he miss? He doesn't know. He can only estimate because such diversity prevents precise calculations.

While it would obviously be foolish to ignore the possibility of a surprise nuclear attack, it is time to recognize that overemphasis on protection against such an attack tends to inhibit original and constructive thinking on the *overall* Soviet threat—particularly in the limited and cold war fields. These are the fields in which the Soviets will feel more and more at liberty to probe. It is entirely to their advantage to have the United States judge each such Soviet move in terms of only one solution—massive nuclear retaliation—for they may believe that such a response is less and less likely to come about.

We, in turn, must recognize that a proper strategic concept cannot be rooted in the concrete of a Fortress America. We cannot permit ourselves to view all Soviet actions in terms of the nuclear destruction of New York, Chicago or Washington. If we do, we are likely to develop greater and greater reluctance to use force of any kind.

Implementation of a viable foreign policy is severely handicapped if we lack certain military capabilities—if we are not able to provide the right degree of the right kind of force at the right time. A diversified and flexible conventional weapon capability is highly important from the standpoint of time-phased reaction to certain types of Communist probes. As was demonstrated at Quemoy, Lebanon, and Suez, tranquilization can be achieved by a rapid on-the-scene build-up of conventional weapon strength—until the degree of risk to the Communist aggressor is greater than he is willing to accept.

If we lack conventional strength, we may be faced with the impossible choice of withdrawal in the face of Communist advance—or immediate resort to nuclear retaliation without the advantage of time in which graduated military, plus diplomatic and psychological measures, might prove effective.

Without question, we must maintain a survivable deterrent force sufficiently powerful in nuclear retaliatory strength to convince the Soviets that the initiation of general war would be suicidal. However, our national security demands that we also have *other* forces more responsive to the growing need for military strength which can be applied *quickly* and *selectively* to defeat Communist political and military objectives *throughout their broad scope of possible application.*

The deployment of GEORGE WASHINGTON (now at sea) should signal the approaching end of an era of national preoccupation with the threat of Soviet surprise attack. As more and more United States retaliatory capability moves to sea, the probability of success for a Soviet surprise attack becomes less and less.

In this new situation wrought by mobile SEAPOWER, we should be able to release our thoughts, our energies, and our resources to counter the Soviet threat all across the board. Otherwise we will have mismatched our activities to the intentions of the Soviets, of whom it has been correctly said, "They cannot succeed in any of the practical purposes that they have today unless they can avoid war." By the same token, they cannot be stopped unless they are faced by situations of strength—political, economic, and moral as well as military strength—throughout the Free World.

/s/ ARLEIGH BURKE



DANGER ON THE

By Capt B. H. Liddell Hart

WHEN NATO WAS BORN, IT WAS CONCEIVED PRIMARILY with the idea of covering the west of Europe against a Russian invasion. The main military effort has gone into building up a shield force on what is called the "Central Europe" front. Subsequently, after Greece and Turkey became members in 1952, the second concern became to build up a shield for the southern front and flank of NATO, in the Mediterranean area. By comparison, little attention has been given to NATO's northern flank, although Denmark and Norway have been members since the start. Very little has been done towards creating a shield force in this area.

This northern flank is NATO's weakest spot in Europe—in every sense. It is the weakest in actual forces available for defense, the weakest in strategical vulnerability, and the weakest in organization. Such a combination of glaring weaknesses is enough to make any realist shudder.

It carries a grave danger to the Central Europe front, which could be outflanked in this way. But the southern members of NATO in the Mediterranean would also suffer from the effects of a penetration and collapse of the northern flank. For Denmark and Norway cover the ocean outlets of Soviet Russia's large force of fast and long-range submarines, the major part of which is stationed in the Baltic and Arctic ports.

This does not necessarily mean, as is still commonly assumed by many admirals of the older school, that Russia's submarines would be used for a blockade similar to what was seen in the last two world wars—an "unlimited" sink-at-sight campaign. The very fact that such a blockade would be a vital threat—particularly to Britain, because of her dependence on seaborne supplies for feeding her population—makes it unlikely that Russia's rulers would venture to launch a campaign of this kind unless they were prepared to risk all-out war. For in that event a submarine campaign would be superfluous, since it is inherently a slow way of producing decisive results. But Russia's submarines could be used, in a more subtle way, for a "hindrance" campaign of great nuisance effect—imposing costly precautions and an exhausting strain on NATO sea-traffic, military and mercantile.

The Russian submarine forces in the Baltic are at present strategically restricted. Except by slow passage along internal waterways, they can reach the high seas

E FLANKS OF NATO

Our main NATO effort has gone into the defense of western and southern Europe, but we are weak, says the author, on the exposed flanks leading to control of the Atlantic and Middle East

With the Baltic uncorked, all the ocean routes to western and southern Europe, even the American coast, could become happy hunting grounds for Russia's far-ranging submarines

only by passing through the very narrow straits (barely four miles wide) between Denmark and Southern Sweden—or between the Danish islands of Zealand and Funen—and then through the still narrow channels of the Kattegat and Skaggerak, between Danish Jutland and Southern Norway. In the course of the passage from the Baltic to the North Sea, they have to traverse 300 miles of restricted waters.

If this bottleneck were to be uncorked, the 90 or more submarines of Russia's Baltic Fleet would be able to get out onto the Atlantic and harass all the ocean routes to Western and Southern Europe. They could operate against any part of these routes, even off the American coast itself, or inside the Mediterranean Sea. For the possible range of action, or surface endurance, of what are now classified as medium range submarines, is from 4,000 to 8,000 miles, while that of the new "W" and "Z" classes is 12,000 miles and more.

The Baltic could be all too easily uncorked. Besides the weakness of the forces covering the Danish outlet, the defensive position there is inherently weak from a strategical point of view. That basic fact was impressed on my mind in 1933 when I visited Denmark just after Hitler came to power, and was consulted by the Danish Commander-in-Chief about the plans for the defense of Denmark against a German attack. After a survey of the strategical problem and the lines of approach, the most that seemed to me possible was a brief delaying action in the Jutland peninsula in the hope of gaining time until allied help arrived. Even that would only be possible if adequate preparataions were made. It was palpably impossible to hold Zealand, the main island, where Copenhagen lies. I pointed out how easily the capital could be seized by a surprise coup from the Baltic by seaborne and airborne forces. The planned defenses appeared so futile that I suggested it would be wiser to remove those which existed, drop their extension, and declare Copenhagen an open city.

Norwegian infantrymen—facing a hopeless task

The forecast and advice were regarded as unduly pessimistic by ardently patriotic Danes. Moreover, their optimistic view was shared, as late as March 1940, by members of the British Government, who argued that it would be strategically advantageous to take an offensive lead in this quarter, bringing Denmark and Norway into the war. Churchill was the foremost advocate of taking the initiative there and starting such a move. But when the threat provoked Hitler to forestall it, at the beginning of April 1940, the key points of Denmark were captured by surprise within a few hours, and resistance immediately collapsed. The keypoints of Norway were captured almost as quickly. Although part of the disjointed Norwegian forces held out long enough for British and French help to arrive on the scene, the rest of the country was overrun and occupied within a few weeks.

It would hardly be more difficult now for the Russians to repeat Hitler's coup. Only an 80-mile stretch of flat country lies between the Russian mechanized forces poised near Lubeck in Germany and the Southern border of the Jutland peninsula. Moreover, the sea approaches to the Sound, the strait between Zealand and Sweden, are just as accessible to the Russian naval forces as they were to the German in 1940. Russia also has much larger airborne forces than Germany had then. These could be used to seize by surprise both Zealand and Jutland.

For a seaborne attack, like that of the Germans in 1940, the Russian Baltic Fleet has available eight powerful modern cruisers and some 40 destroyers, apart from numerous smaller craft, as well as its 90 submarines. The Western forces for the defense of the bottleneck are much weaker. The Danish Navy consists of only two destroyers, six frigates, and four submarines. Most of this small force is obsolescent. The Norwegian Navy comprises six destroyers, ten frigates, and eight submarines, while the new German Navy will before long have twelve, six and twelve respectively. It is doubtful, however, whether either of these small Navies could effectively intervene in time to meet a sudden seaborne attack on the Danish islands that bar the exit from the Baltic.

Denmark has an army so small that its available forces are barely the equivalent of one division. Even these forces are not in the state of instant readiness for action that is needed to counter a surprise stroke. For such a stroke, Russia has available some ten airborne divisions and sufficient air transport to carry two of them



Red mobility—only 80 miles to Jutland Peninsula

in a single lift. Moreover, her advanced striking force in East German territory comprises 20 mechanized divisions. Part of these divisions could be used for an overland thrust into Jutland, while the rest warded off the intervention of NATO's Northern Army Group—which is numerically weaker, and less fully mechanized.

The difficulty of effective resistance is increased because responsibility for the defense of the Baltic bottleneck is separated from the main "Central Europe" front, although it covers the immediate flank of this front. The responsibility is entrusted, along with that of Norway's far-stretching territory, to "Headquarters, Allied Forces, Northern Europe." But in this high-sounding command the actual forces are tiny compared with those in the other NATO commands. The land forces of Denmark and Norway are under separate subcommands.

Moreover, effective support in emergency is hindered by the unwillingness of these two countries to allow other NATO forces to be stationed there, or bases established there, before an emergency occurs—in order to avoid provoking Russia. Such reluctance is understandable in the circumstances but it reduces their membership in NATO to the point of absurdity. Unless they are willing to accept the presence of NATO reinforcements, ready in reserve on the spot, it would be more sensible to revert to neutrality in line with Sweden. Their present attitude tends to combine provocation with temptation, which proved a fatal combination in the case of Poland 20 years ago.

Norway's land forces are no larger than Denmark's—equivalent to one division. They would have little chance of withstanding a Russian airborne pounce upon the south coast of Norway, bordering the Skaggerak outlet from the Baltic. Moreover, that strip, although the most important strategically, is only a small fraction of the immense coastline that Norway has to defend. This line is 1,600 miles long from its junction with Sweden in the Skaggerak to its northern extremity facing Russia's Arctic base in Murmansk. Despite the ruggedness of the country its defense with such small forces would be an almost helpless task against the strength that the Russians could deploy. The seizure of the northern stretch of Norway would ease the way for Russia's submarines to get into the Atlantic from their Arctic bases, while the seizure of ports on the Atlantic coast of Norway would enable them to operate more effectively against the NATO supply routes.

When account is taken of the vulnerability of NATO's northern flank, and the present defenselessness of Denmark and Norway, it is astonishing that so little attention should be given to the risks in this quarter. Complacency about the prospect and the problem is hard to understand.

In the past it has been too readily assumed that any Russian move into Danish or Norwegian territory would automatically produce nuclear retaliation against Russia by the NATO striking forces, and that this counter-threat is sufficient to deter any such move. But with the development of mutual nuclear power, and of long-range missile means of delivery, this becomes very questionable. If the Russians, on some convenient pretext, were to make a sudden pounce to occupy such points, and then immediately offer to negotiate a settlement on the basis of "free passage" rights to warm waters, would the major Western powers actually venture to bring on a suicidal all-out war with nuclear weapons rather than negotiate? No area so easily lends itself to, and invites, this kind of "24-hour pounce" as does the Scandinavian stretch on the northern flank of NATO, especially in its present state of acute weakness.

As Denmark and Norway are so reluctant to have troops from other NATO countries stationed on their



B. H. Liddell Hart continues his assessment of our current strategic situation. In this fourth article for the Gazette on the West's military position he takes a clear, hard look at defense capabilities as they are embodied in NATO. Earlier articles were "Small Atomics . . A Big Problem" (Dec '59), "Gas or Atoms" (Jan '60), and "Marines and Strategy" (Jul 60). These four articles appear in Capt Liddell Hart's latest book, "Deterrent or Defense," published 25Aug60 by Frederick A. Praeger, Inc. $4.95

soil, the best answer to the danger of such a surprise stroke would be a "floating fire brigade"—an amphibious force, based on the harbors in northern Germany or those in the North British islands, which could throw a strong and well-organized reinforcement of Marines ashore at short notice.

Besides Berlin and the Baltic there are other exposed outpost positions, on the flanks of NATO, which would be almost as difficult to defend. It would be wise to reckon with the possibility that they may become targets of Soviet politico-military strategy.

Combustibility in the Middle East

The most obvious of these precarious positions is Persia, whose territory forms the gateway to the rest of the Middle East. In recent years the situation in Persia has become better and firmer—on the surface, at any rate. Unhappily, conditions of instability and combustibility have spread, particularly to the west and southwest parts of the Middle East. This has naturally prompted intervention—direct or indirect—by outside powers. It has also offered opportunity to insidious trouble-making for political and strategical advantage.

Renewed Soviet pressure on Persia was ominously foreshadowed in 1959, when the Soviet government made a vehement public complaint that the Shah's government was pursuing a "double-dealing" policy which could have "grave consequences." This note stated that the Persians had made proposals for a treaty of friendship and non-aggression, but then had suddenly broken off negotiations under American pressure, while arranging a new military pact with the United States.

There is a long background to the present situation, and it is very important to see this in perspective. It has been a prolonged sequence of pull and counter-pull, with Persia as the rope in a veiled tug of war.

Thirteen years ago the Shah took a bold step, and a big risk, by clearing out the Communist puppet government in the frontier province of Azerbaijan. He also suppressed the left wing Tudeh party in Persia, which was a potential Soviet "fifth column." To the world's surprise, Stalin swallowed this double rebuff and took no open counter-action. But in 1950 the Shah's prime minister, General Razmara, was assassinated, and a wave of extreme "nationalism" brought Dr. Mussadek into power. The Communists and fellow-travellers cooperated with this Nationalist party, and fostered its clamor for taking over the British-owned oilfields. Under this cloak, their own influence revived and spread.

When the British were squeezed out, the Americans came to take an increasing hand in Persian affairs. Their military mission had already, several years earlier, been given exclusive rights to guide the organization and training of the Persian Army. Behind the scenes they now backed a counter-move by the Shah's supporters, particularly the Army leaders. In 1953 a military-royalist coup overthrew Mussadek's government and restored the Shah's power.

Then, in 1955, the Shah's government joined in the Baghdad Pact—the military alliance of Turkey, Iraq, Persia, Pakistan, and Britain—for joint defense of the Middle East. The Shah's desire for such a guarantee played an important part in producing this pact, and in overcoming the doubt felt in the West about its mili-

What could the United States do if Russia moved into Persia on the pretext of the 1927 treaty?

tary value and political wisdom—doubts based on the provocative effect of such a military alliance on Russia's southern border, and the tempting effect of its strategic weakness. The Shah's initiative was prompted by reports that British strategists were planning a defense of the Middle East along the line of the mountain chain covering the northern and western frontiers of Iraq, which implied abandonment of any attempt to defend Persia.

The Soviet government loudly protested against Persia's step in signing the Baghdad Pact, as a breach of its longstanding neutrality treaty with Russia. But it abstained, once again, from following up its warning by any direct action. Instead, it resorted to indirect counter-moves. The first of these was the arms deal with Egypt, which helped to develop a paralyzing distraction in the rear of the newly built northward-facing alliance —the "northern shield" as the Americans call it, or the "American spearhead" as the Russians regard it.

Nasser's subsequent activities in extending his sway, and undermining British influence in the neighboring countries, were most effective in serving Krushchev's disruptive purpose. That has been the result, too, of all anti-Western ferment. As has been aptly remarked: "Communism has adopted the language of Arab nationalism as its own."

Revolt in Iraq Upset Pact

Then, in July 1958, came the military revolution in Iraq, headed by General Kassem. This automatically disjointed the central link in the Baghdad Pact alliance. The US government, which had hitherto held back from full entry into the Pact, immediately reacted by pledging itself to defend the remaining Middle East members: Persia, Pakistan, and Turkey. It thus committed itself more definitely and deeply than ever before.

The formulation of a contract was not so quick, but by December was approaching completion. The Soviet government then sought to check it by a fresh warning to Persia that it regarded such an arrangement as "an immediate danger" to the Soviet Union. It stiffly reminded Persia that the Soviet-Persian treaty of 1921, amplified by that of 1927, gave it the right in case of such danger "to send its army into Persia in order to take the necessary military steps in its own defense."

Anxiety about this warning, and dissatisfaction with the initial American proposals, may have led the Shah's government to make its undercover bid early in 1959 for a fresh treaty with Russia, as a reinsurance. The way it broke off negotiations may have been due to the Russians asking too much, or to the Americans promising more.

But the crucial question remains: what could the Americans do if Russia moved troops into Persia on the pretext of the 1927 treaty?

Persia has a natural defensive shield in her mountainous northern frontier, facing Russia. The successive mountain chains that lie behind it form a series



Two lines of defense: natural barricades . . .

. . . tough fighting men. Neither could stop the Reds

of barrier positions which provide the basis for a prolonged defense in depth. But the effective value of such barriers depends on having forces strong enough to hold them firmly. They are not in themselves more than a momentary obstacle to mechanized forces. That was made clear in 1941 when the German panzer forces swept through the mountainous Balkans in a few days, overrunning the Yugoslav and Greek armies. Yet these were numerically large armies, composed of tough troops. The way they were so quickly pulverized showed that toughness is not enough, when up-to-date arms and equipment are lacking.

It is all too plain that the Persian Army is weak in all respects, compared with either of those armies. It numbers about 120,000 men, and a nominal 13 small-scale divisions. In recent years a small amount of relatively modern equipment has been provided from American and other sources, and American officers have helped with instructional guidance. But only four or five of these small divisions can be reckoned effective, and even in these the amount of modern arms and equipment is inadequate. Although three are called "armored divisions," their tanks are of obsolescent types. Worse still there is a scarcity of anti-tank guns. The pay of the troops is very low, and discontent on this score has made many of the soldiers and junior officers susceptible to Communist propaganda. Even if the solidity of the army could be relied on, it would be a very small force to cover the 700-mile stretch of Persia's northern frontier—250 miles to the west of the Caspian Sea and 450 miles to the east—as well as the 400 miles of her eastern frontier facing Afghanistan.

Under such conditions the best chance of putting a brake on a Russian invasion, apart from nuclear weapons, lies in well-placed demolitions on the roads through the mountains. But an extreme network of demolitions requires not only much skill but large resources—both of which are dubious quantities in this area. It is not surprising that some of Persia's own officers, surveying the problem of defense, should have remarked that the Russians would probably overrun the country within a week unless outside help arrived in the first few days, and on a big scale.

A Russian advance into the Middle East would most likely come through Persian Azerbaijan and could be continued into Iraq over the passes leading to Rowanduz and Kirkut. That is the shortest route, since it has little more than 100 miles of Persian territory to traverse before crossing the Iraq frontier. The Russians might use airborne troops to open the way and keep it open.

Afghans Equipped With Russian Arms

But we have also to reckon with the possibility of an outflanking thrust into Persia from the area east of the Caspian sea, by the Russians or by the Afghans, who have been well equipped with Russian material. If they quickly overrun Persia they might invade Iraq from other points along the 600-mile stretch of frontier between Rowanduz and the Persian Gulf. That is an immense stretch to cover, even though most of it is mountainous. Iraq, south and west of the frontier, is a wonderful arena for the maneuver of armored forces. An invader might pour in streams of them, once he had secured the mountain passage ways.

Behind Iraq, or on its rearward flanks, lie Syria, Lebanon, Jordan, and Saudi Arabia. None of these states has frontiers that are good for defense against invasion—though desert approaches might help to limit an invader's operational strength.

None of them has forces capable of offering serious resistance to Russian invasion of even such limited strength. Moreover, there is a serious risk that Iraq might serve as a Russian satellite or at least as a salient.

The only efficient army in the Middle East is that of Israel. In repelling the several-sided invasion from the

Arab countries in 1948, and again in its "Hundred Hours" campaign against the Egyptians in 1956, it proved its high quality. It is, clearly, the toughest fighting force in the Middle East, with leaders who are vigorous, militarily well-educated, and highly intelligent—a rare combination. But its strength and equipment are slender for meeting invasion by a Great Power such as Russia.

The Soviet Army has some 15 well-equipped, active divisions poised in the Caucasus, west of the Caspian, and a further nine or ten stationed fairly close. It could soon double that total with the aid of the three railway lines running up to the front of this strategic area. Thus it has a strength easily capable of overrunning Persia. While it might be difficult for her to maintain supplies to a force of more than 15 divisions in a prolonged advance to the Persian Gulf, such a force should amply suffice to brush aside the Persian Army and any Allied reinforcements that could be sent to its aid.

The Americans have a large military mission in Persia, but no combat formations anywhere near except the battalion of Marines with the Sixth Fleet in the Mediterranean. In the Lebanon crisis of 1958 they had to be supplemented by an airborne battle group flown there from the US Seventh Army in Germany. In the US, there is a strategic reserve of four divisions, two of them airborne, but Persia might be overrun before even one of these could arrive on the scene.

The British, since Suez, are little better placed than the Americans to provide early reinforcement, and their strategic reserve is much smaller. The most they could at present send to the scene quickly is the one parachute brigade which they dispatched to Jordan in the 1958 crisis. Its dispatch to such a remote theater as Persia would be a far more difficult problem, both initially and in the maintenance of its supplies.

There is another and numerically stronger piece on the board—Turkey. She stands on the left edge, and her location used to be described as the Near East. That term is still correct, geographically and strategically. Turkey's western frontier lies in Europe, adjoining those of Bulgaria and Greece, so that she is exposed to invasion from that quarter by the Russians and their Balkan satellites. But her eastern frontier lies in the Middle East, adjoining Persia as well as Russia's Caucasus frontier. Her flanking position in that area is of great strategic importance and influence, potentially.

Britain and France took the lead in making a treaty of mutual assistance with Turkey. That has been reinforced by America's backing, and developed by Turkey's definite incorporation in the framework of Allied defense planning. Nature has provided her land with strong barricades. These are backed by a standing army of nearly 400,000 men organized in some 25 divisions, of which about six are of armored type, although not yet fully equipped nor adequately modern. The Turks have proved tough fighters in the past, and have more recently shown that again in Korea. The Army is being modernized with American aid. It suffers from growing pains, but should be capable of holding its own in defense—which has always been its strong point.

Turks Can't Stop Caucasus Thrust

If Turkey could stretch out an arm quickly enough to help cover her neighbor, Persia, against a Russian thrust from the Caucasus, it would make a great difference to the prospect of initial defense, the most important phase. But whether it could develop an effective counter-offensive outside its own borders is very dubious.

Russia's forces available for use there are vastly larger than those which could oppose her. Her airborne divisions form a "can-opener" for quickly forcing mountain barriers, seizing keypoints deep in rear, and spreading panic. For meeting such a blow, the armies of the Arab states are little more than a paper-screen. While Turkey is more capable of self-defense, she lies "off the edge," and could not bar the path to the Middle East oilfields.

The present land defense of the Middle East all too aptly recalls Hans Anderson's fairy-tale, *The Emperor's*

Israeli soldiers 25 miles from Suez Canal—"clearly the best fighting force in the Middle East"

New Clothes. That was the story of how certain impostors, who knew human weakness, pretended to weave for an Emperor a new suit which, they alleged, had the property of being invisible to everyone who was unfit for his office. The Ministers and the Emperor did not care to admit they could not see it—until a little child exclaimed: "But the Emperor has nothing on at all."

In sum, there seems no chance, or way, of defending Persia against invasion except by the American Air Force in the Mediterranean area and their use of tactical nuclear weapons. That would carry a heavy risk of developing into all-out nuclear war, and thus into mutual suicide. So there might well be more hesitation in taking the decision to unleash such action than there has been in giving Persia an assurance of protection. Western policy has moved fast in extending its protective embrace to the Middle East. But it has, unfortunately, moved faster and further than the strategic possiblities.

No Polish Guarantee for Persia

The Polish Guarantee in the spring of 1939 had near-fatal consequences for all countries concerned. The consequences of a Persian Guarantee in the nuclear age could be far worse. It can only be hoped that Khrushchev will be more conscious of this basic fact than the givers of the guarantee, and that he will resist the inclination to exploit its weaknesses better than Hitler did when confronted with the combined "provocation and temptation" of the Polish Guarantee.

Khrushchev may well reckon that there is more to gain by pursuing an indirect policy and strategy of subversion than through any direct action in the Middle East by the Russian Army. For it is all too clear that he has abundant scope there for "fishing in troubled waters." A fresh turn of the revolutionary wheel could bring Communist-dominated parties into power in Iraq, Syria, and elsewhere—or in Persia itself. Such governments might be prompted to call for Russian support, and protective reinforcement, in the same way that the British were called into Jordan on King Hussein's appeal and the Americans into Lebanon by President Chamoun's.

The Russians have the strongest airborne force in the world—some ten airborne divisions and sufficient air transport probably to carry two of these in a single lift. The sudden arrival of two of these divisions in any of Middle East country, at the invitation of its government, would place the Western Powers in an extremely awkward situation.

Other danger-spots in the Middle East are the Aden Protectorate and the oil-bearing states in Southern Arabia, along the Persian Gulf, that are linked with Britain by treaty or directly under British protection. In the spring of 1958, and twice the year before, the British troops at Aden went into action to repel incursions from the Yemen, which has revived the old claim that the Aden Protectorate is part of its historic territory. In 1957, too, a British force was called in by the Sultan of Muscat and Oman to quell a dangerous revolt in his domains, after his own forces had been defeated by the Imam of Oman. The Aden situation has become more precarious since Russia has been supplying tanks, self-propelled guns, and other arms to the Yeman. Two years ago it was arranged that Russian engineers should start building a harbor on the Red Sea coast of the Yemen, for the establishment of a naval base there.

Trouble might flare up afresh any time, and we have to reckon with the possibility that the Yemenis might be prompted, on the pretext of British "aggression" to call on Russian help to "protect" them. The British in Aden would have a shock if they woke up one morning to find that Russian "volunteers" had been dropped by air behind the disputed frontier, and were manning the Russian tanks and guns already shipped to the Yemen.

The most essential, while least provocative, precaution against such emergencies would be the offshore presence, on the seas girdling this troubled area, of an amphibious force capable of putting a "fireguard" or "fire extinguisher" ashore quickly. The US Sixth Fleet, with its independence of land bases or airfields, provides such maneuverable but unprovocative aid for the eastern end of the Mediterranean—the Near East. It could be more effective still if the scale of its Marine component were increased. But there is at present no such amphibious aid available in the Red Sea and Indian Ocean for the Southern Arabia and Persian Gulf area. This is a need which the British could meet if they developed an adequate amphibious force for the purpose.

USMC

★ ★ ★ ★

Don't Call Us

When leathernecks of the 3d Marine Division received the word that Allied Artists was producing "Beyond the Call," a movie about Marines on Saipan, and that they needed Marine extras, the ISO office was deluged with aspiring actors.

To weed out the Barrymores from the multitude of would-be stars a special phone watch was created to answer all in-coming "movie" calls. It was standard procedure to ask what acting experience the local hopeful had before he started on a useless tirade.

When one "John Wayne Marine" mentioned that he had been a sunflower in a grade school operetta, the ISO thought he had the classic. But, two days later, an NCO called and put the icing on the cake.

"What acting experience have you had, sergeant," the phone watch said.

"Well," the Hollywood hopeful replied, "I've been an acting Gunnery Sergeant for about six months now . . . . how's that?"

$15.00 to Lt C. P. Roberts



The LPH: Teamwork in *Action*

By 1stLt John A. Maxwell

To land a sizeable force of Marines via helicopter in an amphibious assault has been a Marine Corps dream for many years.

The smooth cooperation of the Navy-Marine Corps team has once again paid handsome dividends, judging by the operations in which LPH have participated. In these amphibious operations, the troop commander has had a helicopter-lifted BLT at his disposal to employ as the situation required. Never before has the amphibious assault had such mobility and flexibility in the ship-to-shore movement, plus the advantage of the availability of helicopters after the units are ashore.

Proper planning is essential in an amphibious vertical assault. The desired number of aircraft is 32 to 36 HUS helicopters and about six HR2S helicopters to transport the embarked BLT to the landing zones. The HUS helicopters are assigned primarily as personnel transports. The bulk of the cargo is handled by the HR2S. Twenty-eight HUS carrying nine-man heliteams are normally used in the initial assault waves. These personnel transports are augmented by the six HR2S which carry radio jeeps and vehicles armed with anti-tank weapons such as the 106mm recoilless rifle.

Maintaining the aircraft in flying condition is of course the responsibility of the embarked squadrons. The ship's aviation supply office is able to provide excellent service to the squadron. It is manned around the clock while the squadrons are aboard. On one operation, demands for 68 items were filled from stock. These items ranged from complete engines and rotor blades to nuts and bolts. The squadrons have required as many as five engine changes during a single operation.

At the planning conference prior to an operation the ship's operations officer must insure a large operating area off-shore. An area 20 miles long and five wide is desirable. This affords the LPH sufficient area in which

Our Sunday punch, the new LPH, can off-load a 1,000-man BLT, 100 tons of heavy equipment, in about three hours. Here's how—and why.

to steam into the wind so the helicopters can be safely launched.

The enormous gasoline storage tanks on an Essex Class LPH may solve the critical problem in gasoline supply during early stages of the amphibious assault. The HR2S transports 500-gallon cylindrical rubber barrels filled with gasoline from the ship to the landing zones. This rubber-barrel capability takes up the slack in petroleum supply until a tanker can be brought close enough to the beach. The most desirable means of fuel supply is the tanker sitting at anchor just off the beach, with lines rigged ashore.

Once plans are formulated, the next step is loading the LPH.

LPH initially experienced some difficulty in embarking cargo from the pier to the ship. On one operation, a crane on the dock was used to load 24 tons of troop cargo, eight 105mm howitzers, eight mechanical mules, five radio jeeps, and 15 jeeps and trailers. This required six hours—obviously unsatisfactory.

Again the headwork of the Navy-Marine Corps team was put into play. On the next operation, the Navy had an LSD ramp available. This was placed between the ship and the dock. It took 20 minutes to put the ramp in place. Four hours later, 140 tons of cargo and 15 vehicles were loaded aboard and ready for the operation. Troop vehicles were used to shuttle all cargo from the dock to the storage area on the hanger deck. The mechanical mule proved to be highly satisfactory for moving the cargo. A thousand troops were loaded across the ramp during the same time the cargo was loaded. Plans are now being made for installation of a lightweight ramp to be carried aboard Essex Class LPH at all times.

When pier facilities are not available, embarkation is accomplished with landing craft from other ships. This method is considerably slower than pier loading.

Six HR2S are used to bring in the heavy gear

Among the many advantages of using the Essex Class carrier as an LPH are the three huge elevators that lead from the hanger deck to the flight deck. The aft elevator is used for transporting cargo from the storage area on the hanger deck, leaving the two forward elevators available for transporting aircraft to and from the flight deck.

Most of the immobile cargo—ammunition, water cans, and rations—is staged in assembly areas on the flight deck prior to D-Day. This immobile cargo is loaded on pallets or in baskets which are easily handled by the ship's forklift trucks. The pallets or baskets can be transported by helicopters either externally in slings, or inside the aircraft. HR2S carry most of their cargo internally, while HUS helicopters use slings.

The mobile cargo is brought to the flight deck under the supervision of the ship's combat cargo officer. As with personnel loads, cargo is always on the flight deck and ready to load prior to the aircraft landing. As soon as the HR2S lands, opens its doors, and drops its loading ramp, the cargo is carried, pushed, or driven into the belly of the aircraft. If, for example, the cargo is a jeep and trailer, the trailer is pushed on first and the jeep backed in to provide for expeditious off-loading when the helicopter reaches the beach. If the aircraft is an HUS, the cargo is placed on a loading spot on the flight deck for fast external pickup.

The loading of troops in the helicopters from the embarked BLT is accomplished in this way: The heliteams are called away from their berthing spaces over the ship's general announcing system to a previously assigned assembly area on the hangar deck. As a flight of eight aircraft approaches the ship, returning from a previous landing, the heliteams are directed to the flight deck and are at their debarkation stations before the aircraft land. The eight heliteam group is then divided. Navy men meet each heliteam at the top of the ladder and escort them to the correct aircraft. When refueling is not required, the helicopters are loaded and airborne in less than a minute. Refueling is required about every third trip depending on the distance from the ship to the landing site.

Movement to the objective follows the loading phase.

During an operation, the LPH is augmented by a detachment from a Navy tactical control squadron which operates the Helicopter Direction Center on board the ship. With radio and radar, the HDC controls all helicopter assault flights.

The time required for the helicopters to reach the landing zones and return to the ship is never constant, since the ship continually maneuvers to keep sufficient

Twenty-eight HUS carrying nine-man heliteams are normally used in the initial assault waves

wind across the flight deck. Fifteen knots of wind across the ship's port bow is desirable to assist the pilots in lifting their heavily loaded aircraft from the flight deck.

The HR2S can transport 22 combat loaded Marines or approximately one and one-half tons of cargo. A forthcoming operation using 15 of these HR2S aircraft should realize the full capability of this versatile aircraft. Such an operation would indicate how well the new LPH Class (Iwo Jima) will operate with its planned complement of 20 HR2S helicopters.

Unfortunately, there are no slings capable of handling the heavy loads carried by the HR2S. As a result, cargo such as 105mm howitzers and jeeps must be transported internally. Loading of this type of cargo in the HR2S now requires from six to ten minutes. An external loading method would be far more desirable, since an external pickup would require less than one minute. Considerable time would also be saved in the off-loading process at the landing zone.

Refueling of the aircraft is one of the more pleasant considerations involved in the LPH concept. Upon their return to the ship, the teamwork so vital in the amphibious vertical envelopment concept swings into action. The Navy gasoline crew and the Marine Corps flight deck crew have developed a system to "top off" the tanks of a flight of eight helicopters in less than four minutes. During this short period, the troops are loaded. Also, engines and rotors on the aircraft are stopped and re-started. During refueling, activity on the flight deck is similar to that in the pits at the Indianapolis Speedway during the Memorial Day classic.

The landing of the helicopters at the objective completes the cycle of the amphibious vertical envelopment.

Using all aircraft aboard, it takes approximately three hours to off-load a 1,000-man BLT and 100 tons of cargo consisting of 105mm howitzers, mechanical mules, radio jeeps, rations, ammunition, medical supplies, jeeps, and their trailers.

Pathfinders parachute into the landing zone prior to the first wave of helicopters landing. They assist the pilots in locating the landing zones with radio and visual devices.

Darkness or reduced visibility provides the best answer for the vulnerability of the helicopter to aircraft and ground fire. Prior to 31 December 1959, helicopter pilots were not required to hold instrument ratings. In the past, helicopter assault operations have usually been conducted in daylight under optimum weather conditions. Planned rigorous instrument training and night flying in the squadrons, and future night amphibious operations, will advance the vertical envelopment toward perfection.

In actual combat, the LPH would not normally be held in the assault area longer than actually necessary to put the embarked troops ashore. The squadron would move ashore for additional support of the ground forces. The LPH would return to a rear area for an additional BLT. Upon the LPH's return to the assault area, the squadron could re-embark and continue moving troops ashore. Squadrons must therefore plan to sustain themselves ashore without the support of the LPH.

There are additional areas in the LPH concept to be explored and improved upon before the concept can be termed entirely successful. The few rough spots remaining, however, will be readily smoothed out by the same Navy-Marine Corps teamwork that has been demonstrated thus far. USMC

Lt Maxwell tackles a provocative subject in his first try at writing for pay: LPH and the vertical assault as played by the Marine/Navy team. He spent 18 months aboard USS Princeton (LPH-5) observing this team in action. He was aboard during Operation Seahawk (May '60), watched a smooth helilift of nearly 3,000 Marines. He graduated from Basic School in Dec '55, has been a Plt Comdr, Series Comdr, and Asst S-3.

BATTALION AIR MOUNT OUT





By Maj Bruce F. Meyers

"YOUR BATTALION IS DESIGNATED TO MOVE BY AIR to . . ."

These alerting words are being heard more and more of late by Marines of the FMF. Operational situations of the Venezuela, Lebanon, and Laos type are arising that require rapid deployment to trouble spots throughout the globe.

The Marine Corps' stock in trade is "force in readiness." Never has the phrase meant more. Speed of movement is essential for the survival of our country and our Corps.

Just what can you do, Captain and Lieutenant, to prepare for air mount-out? What lists, manifests, loads and other time-consuming jobs can be done *now* to

At any time, any Marine infantry battalion may be alerted to move out by air. When the bell rings, speed is vital. Here are some ways to shorten load-out time.

speed your movement? By no means is this a panacea for the troop leader who is to move by air. (I leave that for the manuals!) Rather, this article will describe some of the more common staff and troop problems arising in a battalion air mount-out. These were the experiences of a transplacement battalion serving with the 3dMarDiv. Since any battalion of today's FMF has to be prepared for air mount-out, some of the lessons learned may be of help.

"Air movement," as such, includes both administrative and tactical air transport. LFB-19 (*Interim Doctrine for Air Movement*) covers the methods for more routine air movement. "Air Mount-Out," as used herein, refers to the fire brigade type of deployment. This usually is in response to a tactical mission generated by the world situation.

No Time to Move Out—By the Numbers

In air mount-out, you don't have time for preparation of the five copies of passenger manifests. (These are required by LFB-19). Nor is there time for all of the detailed planning and other niceties of an LFB-19 type air mount-out. Once alerted for air mount-out, and after basic load computations, any Marine battalion should be able to start loading within hours. To meet this requirement, there must be a complete streamlining of procedures and admin requirements. This business of prior planning isn't only on the battalion staff level. It requires lots of work on the part of your NCO's and young troop officers.

As in amphibious planning, actions and preparations are conducted concurrently at all levels. Both the battalion staff and "the troops" are busy.

When the battalion receives its stand-by alert, the battalion staff will receive loading data for the aircraft. This usually consists of the number of aircraft, type, characteristics, and load limitations. The useful load of any aircraft varies with the distance flown, weather, speed, possible turn-around, refueling, etc. Consequently, only a limited amount of prior planning as to "type-loads" can be done beforehand.

Our battalion received word that we would have six C-130's and two C-124's for the first day's lift. We were given load limitations of 27,000 pounds for the C-130's and 30,000 pounds for the C-124's. Supply and equipment requirements (Class I through V) were also given. Simultaneously, the adjutant was called on to provide names of personnel having to be transferred out of the battalion (sole surviving sons, short-timers, etc.).

Officers and staff NCO's were summoned to a hasty briefing. Available information was given to commence troop processing. This processing included making up packs, packing seabags and personal gear to be left behind. In addition, last-minute shots, Geneva Convention Cards, and dog-tags were checked.

To load the battalion, our staff formed and worked on the team concept. The S-3, Assistant S-3, Air Officer, the S-4 and Embarkation Officer all commenced work around the clock. Our move was to be made by a US Air Force Troop Carrier Wing. Shortly after receiving the alert, an Air Force captain and his assistants arrived on the scene. They were a loading team from an Aerial Port Squadron. Their function was identical to that of the Combat Cargo Officers from an APA in an amphibious movement. Armed with cargo department dimensions, and seating variables, this team was able to assist immeasurably in making up aircraft loads. Their technical knowledge, plus the battalion's tactical "know-how" on who and what gear had to land in particular aircraft, made loading plans firm up rapidly.

Let's briefly go through the staff sections of your battalion and examine some of the requirements you will find.

The S-1 and adjutant, working with the company first sergeants, transfer non-effectives. These include sick and hospitalized, TAD's, personnel on leave or requiring emergency leave, UA's, etc. If necessary, intra-company transfers were made to bring initial mount-out companies to strength. More desirably, Division may transfer in personnel to fill shortages. Pay requests are made. The companies prepare last-minute allotment changes or requests.

An officer and the Administrative Chief are desig-

To get troops aboard—fast—requires smooth teamwork by battalion staff, company officers, and NCO's

nated as rear echelon. Embarkation rosters are consolidated for the battalion (more on this later). Secret and Confidential files are either left with the rear echelon or turned in to higher authority. Field desks are checked and publications and records are boxed as necessary. (This may be unwieldy. Every effort should be made to hold off securing boxes until the last moment.)

Simultaneously, the Intelligence Officer is busy requisitioning and distributing necessary maps and other intelligence on the objective area. Intelligence briefings are framed from pertinent National Intelligence Folders. The API kits, the jelly reproduction set, etc., are checked. Requests are made for interpreters and interrogators. Recon and photo needs go in. Security checks are made continuously.

After the initial push to prepare loading data (aircraft landing tables, and flight manifests), the S-3 Section starts the warning and frag orders. Arrangements for necessary familiarization and test firing of weapons are made. Section gear is packed and coordination of necessary processing functions such as shots, legal matters, etc., is arranged.

S-4 Section Plays Big Role

The S-4 Section is one of the busiest of the staff. Coordination of movement and embarkation starts here. Supervision of all supply, motor transport, and ordnance requirements is a time-consuming task. Arrangements are made for turn-in of camp property. The UP&T tables and cargo manifests are consolidated by the embarkation lieutenant, supervised by the S-4 (with help from the S-3 and Air Officer).

Our Motor Transport Officer found several short cuts for his problems. Yours will find the same. Since weight was critical, vehicular weights had to be accurate. Vehicles were stripped, tops and bows were stowed. A vehicular scale was used and the "bare" weights were chalked on the sides. The "book" weight given in field manuals was off as much as 200 pounds. Trucks have to be steam cleaned (caked mud is heavy, freezes at altitude and drops off in the aircraft). Fuel tanks are filled half full. Basic weights are taken. As additional gear (fording kits, water cans, windshield covers, etc.) is loaded, weights are added. These basic weights can be kept with each vehicle for future use in mount-outs.

Battalion Supply is busy turning in unserviceable gear and picking up items repaired at Force Service Regiment. Requisitions of all supply shortages are walked through on an emergency priority basis. Baggage tags and necessary last-minute supplies are issued to all companies. Continual and frequent materiel readiness inspections help reduce overall mount-out supply problems.

The communications lieutenant has final operational checks made on all comm equipment. Frequencies, call-signs, and authentication tables are issued. Communications Platoon gear is boxed and stowed for embarkation. Finally, arrangements are made for comm guard with higher authority.

Inoculations will occupy some of the time of the medical personnel. Requisition is made for special vaccines and other medical supplies peculiar to the objective area. In stabilized units (transplacement battalions) shots can be so programmed that the battalion is virtually ready for instant mount-out. This is most desirable. Organic battalion aid station gear is packed and stowed for movement to the airfield.

The Legal Officer's last-minute work on wills and powers-of-attorney, etc., can be reduced by continual, regular screening in the companies.

During the battalion's rather hectic period of staff planning, the rifle companies are hard at work processing the troops.

First priority is to make-up prescribed packs and equipment. Our battalion found that the Field Marching Pack with the knapsack tagged and attached to the bottom was the best solution. At the arrival airfield, the tagged knapsacks (with name and unit) are dropped in company dumps.

Haversacks contained the following items:

Poncho

Towel

Toilet articles
Weapon cleaning gear
Underwear
Two pair socks
One assault ration
Short blanket roll
Mosquito head net

Knapsacks contained:
2 sets utilities
2 sets underwear
2 pr. socks
Mess gear

After the packs are made, weapons and 782 inspections are held. Crew-served weapons and pistols are drawn at this time.

All personal clothing, equipment and unprescribed uniforms are packed into two seabags (officers and staff NCO's have one seabag and one footlocker). One seabag contains articles the individual Marine desires to have follow him. This is for possible use in a combat reserve area (extra clothing, guidebooks, shoe polish, etc.). This follow-up seabag is locked and tagged to follow by surface or air. The second seabag (footlocker) contains articles the individual can't count on having until return from the operation. These are also locked and tagged (including both home address and FMF address). Seabags and footlockers are stowed with battalion supply or in company supply areas.

Company offices are busy preparing and checking embark rosters. Necessary transfers of non-effectives are made. Office gear is packed and stowed. SRB's and other records to be carried are put in boxes. At the last minute, the boxes need only be secured and loaded. In the meantime, the boxes are kept in the company office and serve as file cabinets. The Unit Diary is prepared one day prior to departure of the aircraft (when known).

Mess personnel check all galley field equipment. Perishable stores and condiments are turned in to the Battalion Mess Sergeant.

Virtually all of the above processing steps are simultaneously being conducted at each of the units furnishing attachments to the BLT. Attached personnel move in, and live, eat and sleep with the BLT upon issuance of an alert.

Preparing for embarkation can be expedited tremendously by having processing check-off lists for all personnel. Troop leaders at all levels use these lists to furnish a check on details of processing. Platoon sergeants are busy conducting dog-tag, shot-card, and Geneva Convention Card inspections. Final "showdown" inspections are made for all gear.

It would be difficult to say too much in favor of the effect of stabilization of personnel on air mount-out. In every area of troop handling incident to mount-out, benefits of unit transplacement were evident. Shots, personnel rosters, SRB audits, physicals, are but a few. Perhaps the biggest effect was in preparation of personnel manifests. With all hands joining the transplacement unit at the same time, there was no requirement to transfer any "short-timers." (This will be the same in CONUS as far as personnel eligible for overseas duty). At a certain point of time, the entire battalion reaches a cut-off date and will not be mounted-out except in emergency.

At such time as use of the embossed metal plates becomes standard, time delays for air passenger manifests will become a past problem.

The Force Service Regiment delivers requisitioned supplies to the departure airfield. Here, a provisional unit, the Departure Airfield Service Group, logistically runs the airfield. The Service Battalion furnishes personnel and equipment from its Headquarters, Landing, and Light Support Companies. They coordinate stowage of mount-out supplies, establish loading bays and load the aircraft under air-crew direction.

Mount-Out Gear Should Always Be Ready

Experience of the 2dMarDiv in recent mount-out for Venezuela showed the strong requirement for having requisite mount-out supplies stored and available for immediate loading and movement. Some units went so far as to issue a complete second set of 782 gear. All men could then have complete mount-out packs made up and left in the barracks for instant readiness.

After several run-throughs, our battalion saved several hours by having mount-out ammunition, rations and water cans in storage at the airfield. No lost time was experienced in requisitioning and movement to the departure airfield. High-explosive ammunition storage at most airfields is a considerable problem and must be worked out locally.

After a number of practice air mount-outs, many of the above described techniques can be reduced to an SOP. Companies can work out SOP's or priority-of-work schedules before the first battalion drill (or for-real alert).

Air mount-out can provide a vehicle for fruitful effort on the part of all hands in your battalion. Ingenuity and imagination pay off in time saved. That time may some day save the lives of fellow Marines by permitting an earlier departure for some distant airfield. USMC

Maj Meyers, a graduate of the Univ. of Washington, was commissioned under the PLC program in Feb '45. As CO, H/3/5, he earned a Bronze Star in Korea's Punchbowl sector. During 1960, he contributed two feature articles, "Princeton Landing" (GAZETTE: Aug '60) and "Malayan Jungle Patrols" (GAZETTE: Oct '60). "Operational situations of the . . . Lebanon, and Laos type . . . require rapid deployment," says Maj Meyers. He feels we must speed up infantry battalion air Mount-out capabilities. Present duties: G-3 Officer, Organization Section, Operations Branch, G-3 Div, HQMC.

COMBAT HELICOPTERS



RS IN ALGERIA



With the rebels cut off at one end of the valley, the French commander needed to block the other end in a hurry. He did it with helicopters. How else?, asks the author

By Maj Hilaire Bethouart

THE BEST WAY TO EXPLAIN FRENCH USE OF HELI-copters in Algeria is to discuss some typical examples where helicopters were a determining factor in the issue of the battle. In such a war the need for fast, accurate information is vital. When a few troops are scattered in a very large country, it is necessary to know when and where to find the enemy. Helicopters can be and are used in securing this information. In a zone where finding rebel troops is highly probable, small helicopter-borne units often perform sallies to obtain or to confirm their location.

Having first-class information, the company commander can set up a plan of battle in which helicopters, when available, will always play the main role because they can reach almost any point quicker than the rebels. Here are four typical types of helicopter operations:

(1) Enveloping and maneuvering by air.
(2) A quick, unplanned change in the area of maneuver.
(3) Speedy action when using helicopters.
(4) A full airborne action in desert areas.

Example 1 (enveloping and maneuvering by air—see map page 36):

On 3 January 1958, the commanding officer of the 22nd Infantry Regiment received information that a company-size rebel element was located in the Chantgouma valley, living in caves. The CO decided to circle the suspicious area the next morning and to search the valley with all available means. The valley is about five miles long and two miles wide. The floor is at 4,000 feet. The top is 7,000 feet. The terrain is rocky and broken.

The commander had eight companies carefully comb the area. The action started at 0800 with the landing



Figure 2

of three companies on the crest of the Djebel Faroun to block the enemy's northern escape route. At the same time, three companies started to climb the right side of the valley and one company began climbing the left side. Another company was in reserve with the helicopters ready to join the battle when needed. At 1000 the elements on the right side located and opened fire on the rebels.

The rebels fled down the valley to the west. Immediately, the CO sent his helicopter reserves to the heights west of the valley. The rebels, surrounded in a shrinking area, tried to fight their way out of the net. Unfortunately, this was in January. The day was short, and the combat could not be called off before nightfall. The companies tried to maintain contact during the night by using aerial flares. This was not completely successful, however, and the remainder of the enemy unit vanished during the night. The success of the operation, though not complete, was due only to the helicopters which allowed the commander to block quickly the road the enemy wanted to use.

Example 2 (unplanned change in the area of maneuver—see Figure 2):

Simultaneously, 80 miles east in an area near Tebessa, the CO of the sector received word that a rebel unit



Figure 3

coming from Tunisia was resting for a while in the rough mountainous area called Hamimat Guerra. He immediately decided to undertake an operation to mop up this area. About nine companies, two armored squadrons, and an H-21 company were involved in the operation. The area is about six miles wide and 10 miles long. After having circled the suspicious zone, using only land means, the Hamimat Guerra was completely combed without finding anything but small rebel elements flushed out five miles NW by the incoming troops earlier in the morning.

At noon, after the search was over, the CO decided to make a company-size reconnaissance in the hills five miles SW. Around 1500, this unit met head-on with an important rebel element. Immediately, the commander jumped into his helicopter and flew towards the fight while he alerted helicopters and reserve troops. At 1700 four companies were already transported by helicopter, circling the rebel position. The assault force was landed and the rebels destroyed before darkness.

What means, other than helicopters, could have permitted the commander to catch up with an adversary who was not found in the planned battle area?

Example 3 (speedy action when using helicopters—see Figure 3):

In a remote area on the very rim of the Sahara desert, the commander of the Ain Beida sector received accurate and timely information that a transient rebel unit coming from Tunisia was due to rest in the Djebel Tarf during the second week of January. The information specified the exact valley where they were supposed to stop.

Tarf Mountain, standing like a mushroom in the



Figure 4

desert, is isolated. It is 10 miles from the nearest point where French elements are stationed, 30 miles from the first important French post. It is, moreover, a beautiful observation post.

The CO decided to set up a fast, combined helicopter and motorized infantry operation which was scheduled to start at 1500 on 10 January. The unusual schedule was intended to take maximum advantage of the element of surprise. At 1430 the first echelon of a paratroop company was picked up by helicopter at La Meskiana, 30 miles SE of the Tarf, and landed at 1500 on a prescribed spot.

At 1455 a two-company size convoy left Canrobert, 10 miles north, and rushed down towards its predesignated objective. The first paratroop elements were engaged, immediately after landing, in hard fighting against strong opposition. The second shuttle of helicopters could not land at the previous location, and was directed towards dominating heights one mile NE. Two more companies were successfully landed in this area, while the first elements held the rebels on their position.

At 1600, all elements, airborne and motorized, were on the spot and started crushing enemy positions. Three assaults were delivered during the next hour. At 1815 the fight was over. The rebels all were killed or taken prisoner. Various armaments, including 13 machine guns, 19 submachine guns, and a tremendous amount of supplies and equipment were captured.

Speed was the keynote of this operation. Only three hours and 15 minutes were necessary to destroy a strong rebel unit detected 30 odd miles from the French main position. During the fight, Air Force and Navy fighters gave the ground forces very close and strong support.

Example 4 (full airborne action in desert area—see Figure 4):

Now let's go further south to a desert area where oil fields were found a few years ago.

One day during the winter of 1958 two teams of oil drillers and their light escort were slaughtered in an area which was supposed to be rather quiet. A few days after this action was reported, further information indicated a rebel unit of about 200 men was strolling along a desert sand area about 200 miles long and 150 miles wide.

There was no possibility of ground reconnaissance in this area. The mission was assigned to an aerial reconnaissance team. Meanwhile, a task force made up of a paratroop battle group, a helicopter company, various types of cargo planes, and a fighter squadron was set up and based on the main airfield of Timimoun.

The reconnaissance mission was rather difficult. To find several platoon-sized units in an area covering 20,000 square miles was just about like finding a needle in a haystack. Navigation was a problem, too. Nothing is more like a sand dune than another sand dune.

L-19's were organized in teams of two coupled with an Air Force twin-engine reconnaissance plane. The L-19's acted as hunting dogs, flying at low altitudes around the sand hills trying to find clues of enemy activities. The Air Force plane was the big brother, doing all the navigating and directing the L-19's like a hunter would direct his dogs. The aircraft acted as a radio relay, and was equipped with many rescue devices in case of emergency.

When one L-19 did find a clue, big brother called for the helicopters, which landed a two-platoon ground reconnaissance unit on a specified landing zone. At the same time, from the main base, Air Force cargo planes took off loaded with paratroopers and were waiting over the area. If ground reconnaissance did find the enemy, then the paratroopers were to be dropped. As the battle developed helicopters were used again to pick up ground forces and to land them on places better located. This allowed the commander to envelop the rebels tightly and to speed the fight.

Combat of this kind is long and hard for both men and material. Nearly five weeks were necessary to search

Maj Bethouart, French Ln Off at Ft. Rucker, Ala., deals mostly with airborne matters. It hasn't always been that way. In WWII he was a tank platoon leader, fought from Belfort Gap through Alsace, the Vosges Mts, Black Forest, across Germany to Arlberg Pass. In '48 he used tanks against guerrillas in jungle and mountain areas of Cambodia and Laos. While comanding an infantry unit (Foreign Legion) in Algeria, he learned how helicopters can help ground commanders.

carefully the 20,000 square miles. Two major fights occurred. Several helicopter-borne ground reconnaissances were conducted prior to each major fight. Two-thirds of the rebel force were destroyed, the remaining third vanished in the desert. Soldiers scattered individually, trying to join a rest camp set in Morroccan territory at Figuig, some 130 miles north.

These few examples do not provide a complete picture of the missions assigned to helicopter units in Algeria. They are, however, typical of routine operations carried on daily. They illustrate some of the lessons we learned from previous operations.

Although any type of combat unit can be helicopter lifted, the best use of transport helicopters will be achieved if they are used for the lift of specially trained and equipped troops. Very often, soldiers landed by helicopter close to the rebels are immediately involved in local, sometimes uncontrolled fire fights of the guerrilla warfare type.

In Algeria, transport helicopter units are very often coupled with an infantry unit that is well trained and adapted to this kind of fighting. These are usually airborne troops. Paratroopers are familiar with shock action, well equipped with light, powerful armament and all sorts of radio sets. Officers and NCO's are numerous and their basic training is perfectly adapted to use of helicopters.

When the same helicopter company works frequently with the same battle group, new and invisible bonds are cemented for the benefit of all. Mutual understanding, and a commander experienced in employing helicopters, are of utmost benefit when the battle reaches its climax. Achievement of the objective is facilitated because the commander can give his orders in a few simple words over the radio with assurance that he will be understood.

Helicopter units in the kind of war fought in Algeria must not be tied down by a preplanned schedule. Nor must they be required to ask higher comand echelons for authority to take off.

The best team for Algeria is a battle group of paratroopers coupled with a helicopter company. Helicopters give the Battle Group CO essentially the mobility and flexibility he needs to cope with varying situations he may have to face at any moment.

It was generally found that helicopters, except for particular reasons (such as blocking action in a broken terrain), should not be used at the beginning of an action when information about the enemy is still vague. Rather they should be kept in reserve for further decisive action. Before using his helicopters, the commander should try via ground forces and aerial observation to verify and augment information. When he knows the approximate position and number of the enemy, and after having studied the terrain carefully, he can then commit his helicopters according to the same basic principles that an armored infantry battalion commander would have used in 1944.

Using helicopters in a ground maneuver requires from the commander and his subordinates some indispensable qualities. These are:

- speed of decision
- keen understanding of the situation
- boldness
- imagination

Lack of one of these qualities will cause immediate disorder and loss of time, men, money, and efficiency.

In using helicopters in Algeria, many problems were encountered. The major ones were liaison and safety. In a relatively small area there were L-19's carrying out observation missions or adjusting artillery fire; light helicopters for staff liaison or medic evacuations; H-21's carrying troops; H-19's carrying resupply; T-6's from the Air Force for light close support; Corsairs from the Navy and Air Force jets for heavy close support; sometimes B-26's for very heavy close support; and last the Broussard from the Air Force for leading fighter strikes.

Though everybody is supposed to fly at a prescribed altitude, coordination is quite often difficult. The aircraft belong to three different services and therefore are not fitted and used the same way.

To solve the problem, the Alouette was equipped for use as a flying CP by the commander. This was successful to a degree. The Alouette is a little too small to hold everything and everybody needed. The Alouette III, however, should make a suitable command helicopter.

But the true solution is to have all the aircraft involved in the ground fight belonging to the same service, and therefore fitted the same way and having the same channel of command. The French Air Force,

◄— Navigation was a problem . . .

. . . a dune is a dune is a dune

though, is very reluctant to give up aircraft. Army Aviation was developed only as a result of the wars in Indochina and Algeria.

Safety in using helicopters in the battle area is a great concern. When landing behind the enemy line, you never know whether or not your landing zone will be clear of enemy forces. Your observation airplane may tell you that the area is clear when it isn't. Arabs are very good at camouflage. When artillery and air force fighters are available, you may request some kind of neutralization fire prior to landing, but you don't always have these means. Sometimes speed is of primary importance and you don't have enough time for such preparation. Even if you can use all these means, a gap always remains between the end of neutralization fire and the first landing of the helicopters. This is enough to allow our adversaries to shoot down helicopters while they land.

The first solution thought about was to arm the first helicopter to land. H-21's were fitted with four machine guns and thirty-eight 68mm rockets. During the final approach prior to landing, this helicopter was supposed to sweep the landing zone with machine gunfire and rocket blasts and to unload his troops "in the smoke of the explosions." This was reliable but when so equipped the H-21 could not carry anything but the pilots. Therefore, we were missing our goal and wasting a cargo helicopter. So we looked for something else.

The next solution was to arm the Alouette helicopter. It is a good, rugged and powerful aircraft. It was armed with two containers, each one having 18 or 36 rockets of 37mm according to the mission. The 37mm is a new kind of rocket—very reliable.

Another problem was safety for the plane itself and the crew. We tried to improve it. All the H-21's are now fitted with automatic sealing tanks. They are often necessary. We adopted a regulation making it mandatory to have two qualified pilots even in the small helicopters. In case one is killed the other can bring back the aircraft. That has happened. Crews are required to wear flak suits and their seats are now armored. This particular feature saved many lives.

All these solutions (to which were added a few regulations concerning rules of flight) proved very successful. Despite a steady increase in hours of flight, our losses decreased regularly during the past three years:

In 1957, 56,000 hours were flown by helicopters in combat operataions and 62 helicopters were hit. Nine crew members were killed and four wounded.

In 1958, 64,000 hours were flown by helicopters and 50 were hit, but only five crew members were killed. In 1959, 66,000 hours were flown by helicopters, 35 were hit, six crew members were wounded, and none were killed.

It is interesting to compare losses which occurred during the same time to the fixed wing observation airplanes.

In 1957 roughly 120,000 hours were flown by army fixed wing over the battlefields and 158 were hit. Eight crew members were killed and 11 were wounded.

French H-21 helicopters and rugged Algerian terrain

In 1958, 145,000 hours were flown and 201 airplanes were hit. Nine crew members were killed and 17 wounded.

In 1959, 150,000 hours were flown; 106 airplanes were hit, seven crew members were killed and nine wounded.

Analysis of this data shows that for the same number of hours of flight, two helicopters were hit as compared with three airplanes. This is the explanation:

Helicopters in Algeria are highly vulnerable during the approach and landing. Compared to the length of flight, this is a very short period of time. The solution we worked out to improve security in this phase proved successful.

On the other hand, observation airplanes are often obliged to fly over enemy troops to control their movement and to give the commander the latest information available. Many planes are hit while marking targets with smoke devices. Therefore, it is true to say that light airplanes are more vulnerable than helicopters in warfare of the type fought in Algeria.

We have learned many things in Algeria as far as Army Aviation is concerned. Part of this experience would not apply in another theater of operation. Much of what we learned, however, will be valid in any situation. One thing is clear: helicopters used by a keen commander in an appropriate situation are a determining factor in the achievement of a mission. USAMC



Embarkation Via MSTS

By LtCol F. A. Long

Navy amphibious shipping is limited. In emergencies, FMF units may need to use MSTS for low priority troop and cargo lifts. You'll find here a step-by-step rundown on MSTS embark planning, loading

"Navy to mothball more ships."

Such headlines invariably include amphibious ships. The dwindling amphibious lift capability of the Navy is of tremendous concern to both Marine and Amphibious Force commands. Losses in amphibious shipping may be compensated for, only in part, by obtaining vessels from the Military Sea Transportation Service (MSTS). MSTS is not, however, exempt from budgetary cuts. Such cuts invariably effect reductions in MSTS organic shipping. This fact plus routine commitments requires MSTS to rely on the merchant fleet. In requesting shipping an amphibious corps can expect to get mostly merchant ships. MSTS ships are not acceptable substitutes for amphibious types. This means both organic MSTS and merchant chartered ships. Void of landing craft, hatch crews, etc., MSTS ships are suitable for lifting only low priority troop units and supplies.

USS and USNS MSTS cargo ships normally maintain current Ship's Loading Characteristics Pamphlets. These pamphlets are available for troop use during the embarkation planning and execution phases. Such pamphlets are not, repeat not, available in the case of merchant cargo ships.

This is only part of the bleak picture which faces a troop commander forced to mount-out his organization in merchant ships.

"Brush fire" wars normally call for a rapid mount-out.

Time available for the development of embarkation plans is all too frequently not enough.

Time problem is compounded when faced with merchant ships. Indeed, the brief interval between 1) the procurement by MSTS of a merchant vessel, 2) its arrival on berth and 3) its scheduled sailing date, demands that outloading begin almost simultaneously with its arrival dockside. Troop officers have little time to get to know their ship, record its characteristics.

Visualize an embarkation officer as he watches his merchant cargo ship dock. In lieu of a Ship's Loading Characteristic Pamphlet he holds a blank tablet of writing paper. He has 72 hours in which to both plan and outload his merchant cargo ship. The Corps has officers who through no fault of their own have experienced such a dilemma.

I am currently developing a series of pamphlets entitled "Cargo Ship Characteristics for Amphibious Planning." It is hoped these pamphlets will remedy to a great extent the deplorable situation which now exists. A word of explanation concerning these pamphlets is in order. An analysis of our merchant fleet reveals that between eight and ten classes of hulls (C2, C3, VC, etc.) dominate the scene. A landing force of any size can expect to draw heavily on these classes. To date pamphlets covering the C2, C3, VC2, EC and C4 (Mariner) class hulls have been completed. Navy-Marine Corps distribution has been made for purposes of test and evaluation.

Each pamphlet consists of four sections. Section I (Instructions) provides guidance for the development of embarkation/individual ship loading plans. Section I is presented in detail in this article. Section II (Ship's Plan & Cargo Capacity) provides the Team Embarkation Officer with the basic ship characteristics. Section III (Vehicle & Cargo Loading Plan—V&CLP) is a briefed composite of a Vehicle Summary & Priority Table and a Cargo & Loading Analysis. Section IV "Profile Landing Plan (not shown) conforms to the format shown in LFM-11. It reflects, by type hull, the cargo compartments available for troop usage.

Let's examine the use of these new pamphlets in a typical situation. The outline which follows begins at the Embarkation level:

Group is to be combat loaded in MSTS procured ships.

Recommended Embarkation Plannning and Execution Procedures

Embarkation Group Level

Step 1—Collect personnel and tonnage data from each troop unit in the Embarkation Group. Check and recheck this data for accuracy and completeness. Re-

cord this data in the first two columns of the Assignment to Shipping Annex (Figure 2-1, LFM-11).

Step 2—Determine the number of Embarkation Units to be formed.

Step 3—Assign personnel, supplies and equipment to each Unit (See Figure 2-1, LFM-11). Prepare as a supporting document a Consolidated Vehicle List. This list must itemize, by Embarkation Unit, vehicles whose gross weight exceeds five tons. This figure is critical due to so many five-ton booms in the merchant fleet.

Step 4—Obtain if possible the services of an MSTS area representative. With his assistance determine the quantity and type of ships necessary to lift each Embarkation Unit. This determination includes hull types. If an MSTS representative is not available, compute merchant shipping requirements by Embarkation Units. Procedures/factors enumerated in Steps 3 and 5 should be used.

Step 5—Early in the planning phase individual ship combat load capacities may be estimated as being:

Square footage of cargo compartment x 75%
Bale cube x 50%

Embarkation Unit Level

Step 1—Maintain continuous liaison with the Embarkation Group staff during its planning.

Step 2—Subdivide the Embarkation Unit into Embarkation Teams and designate Embarkation Team Commanders. Record the composition of the teams and the ships by hull types to which assigned as indicated in Figure 2-2, LFM-11. Recommendations of subordinate commanders should be requested concerning team composition. Maintain strict accountability concerning the allocation of vehicles to individual ships with emphasis on vehicles whose *gross* weight exceeds five tons.

Step 3—Estimate individual ship combat load capacities as indicated in Step 5 above.

Embarkation Team Level

(A merchant cargo ship of known hull size has been assigned to each Embarkation Team. Team EmbO has been furnished a "Cargo Ship Characteristics for Amphibious Planning" pamphlet of the type hull assigned.)

Step 1—Compute the combat load capacities of the various cargo compartments as follows:

VEHICLE & CARGO LOADING PLAN

USS SAIL ON
Name of Ship

UT Deck #2 Hold Hatch Opening 23'0" X 17'4"
Combat Load Capacity Sq Ft 2,800 Cu Ft 12,600
Boom Capacities 2.5 Ton

			BULK CARGO					VEHICLES						
PRIOR. NO.	DESCRIPTION	UNIT	TYPE CONT.	NO of CONT.	Cu Ft	Sq Ft	WT S/T	LENGTH	WIDTH	HEIGHT	GROSS WT S/T	Sq Ft	Cu Ft	NOTES
13	Trk, 1/4T, Cargo	1/5						11'5	5'5"	4'7"	1.33	62	284	
	"C" Rations	1/5	B	200	960	160	17.1							
	Gasoline	1/5	D	30	360	60	6.6							
	TOTALS				2132	314	37.6				98.7	2475	10,207	GRAND TOTALS Sq Ft - 2,789 Cu Ft - 12,339 S/T - 136.3

LEGEND: B - Boxes D - 55Gal Drums P - Pallets C - Concertina R - Rolls (Barbed Wire)

Vehicles Stowed Adjacent to Bulk Cargo

- *Vehicle Capacity*—75% of the square footage which is to be used for vehicle stowage.
- *Bulk Cargo Stowage*—Square footage of deck space allocated to bulk cargo stowage times the height of stow.
- *Cube capacity of cargo compartment*—Approximately 50% of the compartment's bale cube.

Vehicles Stowed Over Bulk Cargo, Same Compartment

- This technique in combat loading is restricted to lower holds. Head room of at least two feet should be provided for above vehicles.
- *Cube capacity of cargo compartments*: Approximately 80% of the compartment's bale cube.

Bulk Cargo Stowed Alone in Compartment

- In combat loading this technique is restricted to lower hold and deep tanks.
- *Cube capacity of cargo compartments*: Approximately 80% of the compartment's bale cube.

Step 2—Prior to the ship's arrival complete, in pencil, a V&CLP for each cargo compartment. Use the capacities computed in Step 1 above. "Bulk Cargo" Section pertains solely to loose stowed bulk cargo. Mobile loaded bulk cargo is accounted for solely in the "Gross Wt" column under "Vehicles."

Step 3—Board the assigned merchant ship at the earliest possible time. In company with the first mate check actual characteristics with those shown on the Ship's Plan & Cargo Capacity form. Make appropriate changes to the latter where necessary. Reflect such changes in previously prepared V&CLPs.

Step 4—If time permits, draft individual compartment stowage diagrams to the scale $1/8'' = 1'$. If not, indicate on the Ship's Plan & Cargo Capacity form:

- The location within each compartment of bulk cargo stowed therein. Include the class(es) of supply(ies) and their cube.
- The debarkation priority numbers, e.g. fifteen, sixteen, seventeen, of vehicles to be stowed therein. These numbers when checked through the V&CLP will identify the types of vehicles and the units to which they belong.

Step 5—Initiate loading from previously staged vehicles and cargo and from the previously prepared V&CLP. Since time will not normally permit the preparation of cargo stowage diagrams ($1/8'' = 1'$), the loading of the respective cargo compartments may require some adjustments. V&CLPs must be brought in line to reflect the final loads fitted into each compartment.

Step 6—Complete the Profile Loading Plan.

Step 7—Include in final loading plans for distribution purposes:

- Deviations from actual ship characteristics and those indicated on the "type" Ship's Plan & Cargo Capacity form.
- A complete set of V&CLPs.
- A Profile Loading Plan.

Fleet Marine Forces must be prepared, in part, to outload in merchant ships. Conventional loading characteristics pamphlets are not available for individual merchant ships. "Cargo Ship Characteristics for Amphibious Planning" pamphlets are offered as a workable substitute. These pamphlets, in combination with the above recommended planning procedures, do this:

- Eliminate a vacuum which has previously existed in this field.
- Provide the means for detailed embarkation planning *prior* to the arrival of assigned merchant shipping.
- Simplify documentation and reproduction requirements.
- Will produce acceptable loading plans if attention to detail and accuracy is demonstrated in their usage.

USMC

LtCol Long is currently far removed from the subject of his article. He's CO, MB, NAD, Hawthorne, Nev. Though a long way from the sea (no pun intended) he's still a patron of what he considers a lost art—embarkation planning. He has dealt with logistics and embarkation during much of his career. His last assignment was Combat Cargo Officer, ComPhib Lant. In an earlier article he wrote about embarkation in general, "Signposts on the Royal Road" (GAZETTE: Apr '60). In this one he discusses specialized loading—aboard merchant ships.

C-4

(HULL TYPE)

SHIP'S PLAN AND CARGO CAPACITY

(NAME OF SHIP)

C-4





Fast Amphibious Force

By Capt R. A. Stephens

THE TRADITIONAL CONCEPTS OF AMPHIBIOUS WARFARE are changing. Responsible for many of these changes is the doctrine of vertical assault with its inherent speed and flexibility.

Gone is the picture of massed shipping, milling landing craft, and concentrated beach dumps of WWII and Korea. Today, with the threat of nuclear attack, such concentrations would constitute a vulnerable and inviting target.

Our answer to this threat, pioneered and developed by the Marine Corps and Navy, is the Fast Amphibious Force (FAF)—utilizing the concept of vertical assault.

The conventional amphibious operation exploits the element of surprise, capitalizing upon enemy weaknesses through application of the required type and degree of force at the right place at the right time. To this capability the FAF adds speed—speed to the objective area and speed in the assault through vertical envelopment, thus avoiding the limitation of an impassable beach.

How long must we wait for this capability? We have it now on the Atlantic coast, formed and ready with 18 months of training behind it. The FAF is Amphibious Squadron Ten, the Navy's newest PHIBRON. Originally this squadron was composed of USS BOXER (LPH-4), a converted CVS, and four fast Thomaston Class LSDs: PLYMOUTH ROCK (LSD-29), FORT SNELLING (LSD-30), SPIEGEL GROVE (LSD-32), and HERMITAGE (LSD-34). All are capable of maintaining a sustained speed of 20 knots.

Commissioned in October 1958, the FAF underwent intensive training from January to June 1959 with three different provisional Marine brigades. The pace slowed long enough for BOXER to receive certain shipyard modifications necessary to enable her to carry out her new role as an amphibious assault ship.

Practical experience has necessitated various changes to former methods, resulting in special adaptations of communications, serial requesting and reporting procedures. This has centralized control functions aboard the flagship, which is the LPH. In addition, the primary control vessel and subordinate controlling agencies have been abolished due to the limited amount of surface transportation involved in vertical envelopment.

Two of the controlling agencies through which the FAF commander exercises over-all coordination are of particular importance. These are the Helicopter Direction Center, rather self-explanatory, and the Movement Direction Center. This is an innovation which controls all logistic support, both surface and air. It is composed of representatives of the embarked TACLOG and of the amphibious task force commander.

The primary mission of the FAF is to conduct an amphibious assault, taking advantage of its speed and flexibility. Because of its relative small size (at present), this Force may be expected to act as an independent attack group or as an advance force for the purpose of achieving surprise, seizing a specific objective in preparation for further operations by conventional forces, or seizing a subsidiary objective appropriate to its size.

Further, the FAF is well suited to certain operations in support of national policy such as evacuation of US and designated foreign nationals, rendering assistance to disaster victims, and landing Marines as a "police force." Under prevailing conditions, the latter may be the most probable mission. Speed in execution could prevent further conflict.

As an example, PHIBRON TEN, in an unopposed landing, can put approximately 2,500 Marines ashore (with equipment and supplies to sustain them for 15 days) in about 20 hours.

January of last year saw the FAF embark in its second specialized training year, with five major Navy-Marine operations scheduled. At this writing PHIBRON TEN, with a provisional Marine brigade embarked, was well



arines fast." This is the motto of the Atlantic Fleet's PHIBRON 10, which is capable of maintaining a sustained speed of 20 knots

into its third operation.

New methods and ideas are constantly undergoing application and change. The newest has been reduction of the force to an LPH, three fast LSDs and an AKA. This maintains the Fast Amphibious Force concept, but adds an immediately-ready, follow-up shipping capability.

As now organized, PHIBRON TEN embarks a brigade staff, PROVMAG staff, and a marine infantry battalion reinforced with LVTs, tanks, Ontos, helicopter liftable 4.2" mortars and "Mule"-mounted 106mm recoilless rifles. The Marines and their assault equipment are spread-loaded over the LPH and LSD. The AKA is available for non-assault, follow-up equipment and supplies.

During each BRIGADELEX operation conducted during the past year and a half, Marines have received invaluable training in embarkation and debarkation from LPH and LSD, by helicopter, boat and LVT. Each brigade staff received equal opportunity for comprehensive joint-planning and loading and unloading of troops and cargo.

Although basic loading plans and concepts varied, the end result was and is training, as part of the FAF, for approximately 9,000 Marines.

This accelerated program has been highlighted by training in joint planning personnel indoctrination, use of flight deck gear, use and further development of the "LPH ramp," helicopter lift equipment and load indication methods, as well as the development of the Movement Direction Center.

Due in no small part to PHIBRON TEN and the brigades of Marines, the amphibious force of the future may well consist of primarily four types of major assault ships: LPH, amphibious assault ship; LPD, amphibious transport dock; LSD, landing ship dock; and the large, fast AKA.

Our first true LPH, Iwo Jima, is scheduled for launching in 1962. She will carry approximately 30 helicopters and 1900 Marines at 20 knots plus. The LPD, which is similar in appearance and characteristics to the Thomaston Class LSD, with smaller well deck but larger helicopter platform, will be capable of transporting 12 helicopters, 900 Marines and 2,500 tons of cargo at speeds in excess of 20 knots.

Although there is now only one FAF, the forces in the Pacific have the capability to form another with PRINCETON (LPH-5), four Thomaston Class LSDs, and the new AKA, TULARE.

PHIBRON TEN's motto is one which could well become the motto of future amphibious forces: *"We land fresh fighting Marines fast."* USMC



USS *Boxer* provides the vertical assault punch



KAMOV Ram-jet Helicopter—Still in experimental stage, this helicopter is already reported as a successor to the KA-10. It will probably be used for reconnaissance by highly mobile forces.

KA-15 HEN—Two-man helicopter is claimed to have set a world's speed record of 106.5 mph over a 312.5 mile closed course. Fully operational, its reported range is 312 miles; gross weight: 2,889 lbs.

Mi-6 HOOK—Size of this 70-passenger giant is accented by HO-type Mi-1 HARE (foreground). Some Soviet claims for HOOK: a top speed of 140 mph; a 435-mile range. About 75 are believed in service.

WHEN RUSSIA PUTS A SATELLITE INTO orbit the whole world knows. Its missile power has been discussed in books, magazines and newspapers. The man on the street is sure to know of Soviet claims for its ICBMs. But little note has been taken of one area of technology on which Russia has put great emphasis—the helicopter. One recognized source on military weapons says "the evidence is conclusive that the helicopter has number two priority in Soviet aviation.'

Many observers believe Soviet helicopters are nothing more than copy jobs of US models. Are they? Let's take a look.

Mi-4 HOUND—A medium HU-type. Soviets claim three world's records: altitude vs payload, 19,472/two metric tons; 19,842/one metric ton; speed, 116.3 mph. Estimated number in service: 270. A civil version carries 10.



Yak-24 HORSE—A real workhorse, Soviets claim it can carry 42 fully equipped troops or up to 18,800 lbs over short distances. Reported top speed: 1?5 mph. Other uses: crane, platform for camera.

SOVIET HELICOPTERS

Civil version of Yak-24 HORSE in 1955, set a class record by lifting 4,409 lbs to an altitude of 16,673 feet. Built-in ramp allows loading of vehicles and bulky cargo in 33-ft compartment.

By Maj. George J. Geiger, [illegible]

Mi-3 HARE—Same as M-1 HARE (opposite page) except for four-bladed rotor. Extra fuel tanks or litter pods are attached to fuselage. Three passengers may be carried inside cabin. Range: 700 miles.





KA-10 HAT—(top left) This flying "motorcycle" is used for recon in battle areas. Reported range: 93 miles at a speed of 72 mph. Inflatable float-type landing gear is used on land and water. On hand: 750.

M-6 HOOK — (left) Soviet-claimed load-to-height lift record: five-ton payload to altitude of 18,207 feet; ten-ton load to 15,090 feet. It is equipped with clam-shell doors, portable ramps.

Photo (top right) shows Yak-24 being used as a flying crane, lifting a heavy truck, transporting it by air.

SOVIET HELICOPTER PERFORMANCE DATA

Code Name	HAT	HEN	HOG	HARE		HOUND	HOOK	HORSE
Designer	Kamov	Kamov	Kamov	Mil	Mil	Mil	Mil	Yakovlev
Designation	KA-10	KA-15	KA-18	Mi-1	Mi-3	Mi-4	Mi-6	Yak-24
Power Plant	Ivchenko* Ai-4G	Ivchenko* Ai-14V	Ivchenko* Ai-14V	Ivchenko* Ai-26V	Ivchenko* Ai-26V	Schvetsov* ASh-82V	Solovyen* TB-2 BM	Schvetsov* ASh-82V
Engines	One*	One*	One*	One*	One*	One*	Two*	Two*
H.P.	55 HP	260 HP*	260 HP*	575 HP*	575 HP*	1,700 HP*	9,400 SHP*	3,400 HP*
Rotor Diameter	20 ft 1 in	32 ft 7 in	32 ft 8 in	46 ft 10 in	46 ft 11 in	56 ft 6 in	115 ft 0 in	49 ft 0 in
Length	12 ft 9½ in	23 ft 0 in	23 ft 2 in	39 ft 10 in	39 ft 9 in	45 ft 4 in	180 ft 0 in	57 ft 5 in
Height	8 ft 2½ in	10 ft 9 in	10 ft 10 in	14 ft 10 in	14 ft 10 in	15 ft 4 in	UNK	17 ft 0 in
Rotor-Disc Area	499.8* Sq ft	832.4* Sq ft	832.4* Sq ft	1,717.4* Sq ft	1,717.4* Sq ft	3,694.3* Sq ft	10,289* Sq ft	7,201* Sq ft
Empty Weight	UNK	1,819 lbs	2,222 lbs*	3,927 lbs*	3,953 lbs*	6,995 lbs	UNK	8,818 lbs*
Gross Weight	840 lbs	2,889 lbs	2,895 lbs	4,950 lbs	5,180 lbs	13,999 lbs	66,000 lbs	35,275 lbs
Payload	250 lbs	500 lbs	440-661 lbs	1,000 lbs	1,212 lbs	4,510 lbs	13,200 lbs 17,600 lbs*	18,800 lbs
Maximum Speed	72 mph	93.2 mph*	99 mph	107 mph*	124 mph*	125 mph*	140 mph	125 mph*
Cruising Speed	68 mph	78 mph	81 mph	86 mph*	93.2 mph*	109 mph*	124 mph*	112 mph
Ceiling	8,250 ft*	9,900 ft*	11,480 ft	16,500 ft*	14,756 ft	16,100 ft*	7,900 ft	18,000 ft*
Range	93 mi	312 mi	248-435 mi	238 mi*	700 mi#	295 mi	435 mi*	497 mi
Crew	1*	2*	1*	1*	1*	3*	5*	3*
Passengers	None	None	3*	3*	3*	10-14*	70-80*	42*

*USAF Reported data. #With Aux Fuel tanks. All other data from Soviet sources.

Extension School CHALLENGE

BASIC

1 The interrelationship of logistics and tactics is such that:

a. Tactical plans are usually governed by logistical plans and are prepared after logistical plans are completed.

b. Logistical plans are usually governed by tactical plans and are prepared after tactical plans are completed.

c. Maximum logistical capability is determined and the operational plans formed within this capability.

d. Logistics must be considered operational in nature, and tactical planning and logistical planning are done concurrently.

2 Which statement regarding mine clusters is *NOT* true?

a. A cluster may consist of only one mine.

b. Clusters are laid only on the enemy side of strip centerlines.

c. Within a field, clusters may vary as to types of mines.

d. Within a field, entire clusters may be omitted.

JUNIOR

3 Even under ideal conditions it is seldom possible to determine:

a. Enemy courses of action.

b. Enemy intentions.

c. Enemy capabilities.

d. The relative probability of the adoption of enemy capabilities.

4 When engaged in their primary mission, the M-50 (ONTOS) should be:

a. Attached to the forward units.

b. Employed in the greatest possible mass and echeloned in depth.

c. Employed as armored spearheads in a counter-attack mission.

d. Used in frontal engagements with hostile tanks.

5 Information collection tasks appropriate to Marine Corps tank units are:

a. Essentially concerned with information on enemy tank and/or armored units.

b. Routes of communications, terrain intelligence, and information on obstacles and mines.

c. Essentially similar to infantry collection tasks.

d. Essentially concerned with gathering technical intelligence.

SENIOR

6 The powers and limitations of the Secretary of Defense are delineated by Congress in the National Security Act of 1947 and its amendments. Among the limitations imposed upon the Secretary are: (Select those applicable).

a. He must obtain the consent of the Joint Chiefs of Staff prior to issuing directives that affect the functions of the respective services.

b. He must obtain congressional approval of acts that are designed to consolidate service functions.

c. He is not permitted to establish a military staff other than that provided within the Act and its amendments.

d. He is limited to specific duties enumerated within the Act and its amendments, and those duties not so enumerated are reserved to the Secretaries of the respective services.

WHAT IS IT?

(Answers on page 64)

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Commenting on the *Junior Extension Course*, A Marine captain says:

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

MONEY and MARINES

By Capt Walter W. Grant

MONEY IS THE MOST IMPORTANT COMMODITY THE Marine Corps uses. Yet most of us tend to take it pretty much for granted—too much so.

Maybe you think that people or weapons are more important to the Marine Corps than money. But let's face it—we don't have many people in this business just for fun. Most of us have to make some money out of it. And we don't get many weapons donated to us by charitable institutions. We buy them with good old US dollars.

Since we need money to hire people and buy guns and equipment, let's take a look at where this folding green stuff comes from and how we spend it. It is vital that all of us have a sound knowledge of this money business. The success of the Marine Corps, maybe even its continued existence, depends to a great extent on how well we use this commodity to serve our needs.

And don't think that only the people in the fiscal office or the supply office are concerned with this subject. All of us in our day-to-day activities make decisions and take actions that cost money. All of us—from the Commandant, who approves the adoption of a new weapon, to the messman who discards a worn-out swab.

Intelligent leadership in money matters is essential at all levels of command to insure that the Marine Corps spends its money in the most effective way possible. This means buying only the things which are essential to the accomplishment of our mission and by insuring that we get the maximum benefit from the services of the Marines and civilians alike on our payroll.

The number one source of all government money is Mr. John Q. Taxpayer himself. But Congress decides how much money he will pay into the Treasury each year.

Congress also controls the outflow of funds from the Treasury. Each year the lawmakers pass a series of appropriation acts which give various government agencies the authority to spend the dollars which have been gathered into the Treasury.

Each year the Marine Corps gets four such appropriations.

The largest is entitled "Military Personnel, Marine Corps." It provides for the pay and allowances of all active duty Marines, including reservists on extended active duty. This appropriation amounts to some $600 million a year, or about 60 percent of the Marine Corps' annual $1 billion spending program.

Another appropriation, "Reserve Personnel, Marine

Know where the money comes from to buy mess gear for Marines serving at air stations? If you said BuWeps, you're dead wrong

Corps," provides for pay and allowances of reservists who are on short periods of active duty for training and for pay of reservists who attend drill periods or other equivalent duty. This appropriation amounts to about $24 million a year.

The appropriation "Operation and Maintenance, Marine Corps" amounts to about $170 million a year and provides the dollars needed to cover the cost of operating all Marine Corps ground units, including both the FMF and the supporting establishment. This appropriation also covers the cost of maintaining the equipment and facilities used by these units. (Prior to 1 July 1959 appropriations for this purpose were entitled "Marine Corps Troops and Facilities." Only the name has been changed; the purposes and uses of the appropriation remain the same.)

Marine Corps aviation units and air stations get the bulk of their money from a different source. The Navy's Bureau of Weapons furnishes such funds from the appropriation "Operation and Maintenance, Navy." In addition to this, a relatively small amount of money is provided by the Marine Corps, mostly to buy certain military items which are not common to other naval aviation units. (Example: 782-gear.)

The fourth appropriation Congress gives the Marine Corps is "Procurement, Marine Corps." It covers the purchase of major items of equipment, such as missiles, tanks, ordnance, and motor vehicles.

The first three appropriations above are known as annual appropriations. Funds are granted by Congress to cover the expenses of a single year only. The fourth appropriation is known as a "no-year appropriation," since it is not limited to a single fiscal year. Once Congress grants money in this appropriation it may be spent in the then current year or in any succeeding year.

The government, incidentally, uses a fiscal year which begins on 1 July and ends on 30 June. The fiscal year is designated by the number of the calendar year in which it ends. Thus, fiscal year 1961 begins on 1 July 1960 and ends on 30 June 1961.

It is important to remember that Congress does not actually give this money to the Marine Corps in the form of a big pile of thousand-dollar bills or even in the form of a check. It merely grants us the authority to enter into business transactions which will sooner or later require payment of funds out of the US Treasury. Such transactions, when they are entered into, are known as "obligations."

When a disbursing officer settles one of these obligations by a cash payment (or by writing a check drawn on the Treasurer of the United States) the transaction is called an "expenditure."

Thus, Congress directly controls the total dollar value of obligations we can enter into. This, in turn, controls the amount of money that will actually be expended.

Most of the money in the appropriations "Military Personnel, Marine Corps" and "Reserve Personnel, Marine Corps" is divided into a number of "open allotments" held by HQMC.

This money is considered to be obligated day-to-day as we earn it. It is expended when we walk up to the pay table and draw our cash or check.

No dollar limitations are placed upon unit commanders or disbursing officers to govern the amount they may draw against these open allotments. The amount depends upon the number of people paid, their rank, their longevity, and whatever allowances they may draw in cash.

The cost of subsistence, whether furnished "in kind" by the messhall or paid to the individual by the disbursing officer, is also charged against one of these open allotments. The same is true for costs of permanent change of station transfers and the costs of transporting reservists to summer training.

Most of the money in the appropriation "Procurement, Marine Corps" is actually spent by HQMC. Field activities rarely incur charges against this appropriation, therefore no open allotments are set up.

The control of funds within the appropriation "Operation and Maintenance, Marine Corps" presents a different picture, however. Some of the money is placed in open allotments and some is given to unit commanders in the form of "field allotments."

One open allotment is set up to cover the costs of Marine detachments afloat. The commanding officer of each detachment may incur charges against the open allotment to cover the costs of operating his unit. But Headquarters places a ceiling on the amount each unit may spend in the form of an "operating target."

The detachment is required to keep only a simple set of records which will show how many dollars they

Mr. Grant, a field auditor for Republic Steel Corporation, has learned how important careful spending is to industry. An ex-Marine captain, he knows, too, that USMC squeezes a lot of firepower out of its annual appropriation—roughly $1 billion. He thinks more Marines should know how this money is spent. He handles a complex subject with the kind of easy style readers appreciate when wading through financial reports. And that's what his article is all about—a report on money and Marines, how improved dollar management is an all hands job.

have been granted and how many they have used up. All formal allotment accounting is done at HQMC.

Another open allotment is set up at Headquarters to cover the costs of small posts and stations. Here again operating targets are used to control the amounts that each of these units may spend.

Several other open allotments are available to all types of Marine Corps units for such purposes as freight transportation, the Marine Corps' share of off-duty education payments, and the purchase of "BCD suits" for dischargees who have earned them. Congress, incidentally, limits the costs of these suits to $30 each ". . . including an overcoat when necessary." So don't feel slighted if you never get one.

Field allotments are granted to commanders of all large stations, recruit depots, bases, supply centers, reserve and recruitment districts, etc. Thev are also granted to the commanding generals of FMFPac and FMFLant.

When the Commandant grants a field allotment, he in effect delegates some of the obligational authority he received from Congress to the commander of the unit involved.

The CO of the unit which receives the allotment must then set up a complete set of formal accounting records. Generally, he delegates this duty to a staff member—the comptroller at our largest units or the fiscal officer at those which don't rate a comptroller in their T/Os.

These formal accounting records are set up in such a way as to control the amount obligated and expended. When an allotment becomes either over-obligated or over-expended a federal law has been violated.

Not only is the commander held responsible for such a violation of the law but also any subordinate who might also be involved in the transaction. Such an error hasn't put anybody behind bars to date. Then again it hasn't exactly helped anybody's career either.

The commanding generals of FMFPac and FMFLant are authorized to further delegate their dollar authority to the commanders of their divisions, wings, and force troops units. This is done through the use of sub-allotments. The commander who receives a sub-allotment must, in turn, set up his own set of formal accounting records.

Commanders of units other than FMFPac and FMFLant are not permitted to sub-allot to their own subordinates. However, they can—and do—use a very effective fund control device known as a "planning estimate."

The use of a planning estimate can be best shown by an example. Let's say the CG of a base grants a planning estimate to his motor transport officer to cover the planned and estimated costs of operating and maintaining the vehicles and related equipment.

The motor transport officer may then incur charges against the general's allotment up to the dollar ceiling set forth in the planning estimate. But all the formal accounting is still done by the base comptroller's office.

The motor transport officer is not required—in fact he isn't even permitted—to maintain any formal accounting records. He keeps only a simple record of charges—just like the ship's detachment or the small post, except that in this case all charges are paid out of the base's allotment rather than an open allotment held by HQMC.

In addition to obligating and expending funds, a unit which has a field allotment may also create another condition known as a "commitment."

A commitment is the act of setting aside a certain amount of money so that in the near future this amount may be obligated.

Another example: The base motor transport officer sends a request to the base contracting officer asking him to buy some truck tires. This creates a commitment. The amount committed is the estimated cost of the tires requested.

A few days later the contracting officer issues a purchase order for the tires. This act obligates the funds which had been committed for the purpose. After the dealer has delivered the tires (and his bill) he will receive a check from the disbursing officer; and the funds are thus expended.

All this, then, is the framework for financial management within the Marine Corps.

The present system has been set up over a period of about six years by a combination of shrewd planning plus a little trial-and-error. As it stands today it is ideally suited to serve our needs.

But no system is perfect and no system can be any better than the people who make it work. The only foolproof way to improve our dollar management is to start with the people.

Here's how: First, we can all use more knowledge in these money matters. Second, we should all be constantly aware that most of the things we do cost money in one way or another.

And finally, we must all use initiative and imagination in finding new ways to make the dollars the Marine Corps gets go farther and do their jobs better.

As Mr. Eisenhower once said (when he was still a general), ". . . every positive action requires expenditure. The problem is how to expend assets . . . so as to achieve the maximum in results." USMC

★ ★ ★ ★

Supply Discipline

A MESSMAN WITH A meat cleaver chased a truck driver into the company storeroom. The truck driver grabbed an axe and, in turn, chased the messman down the company street.

Without a moment's hesitation, the property man took out after the truck driver—waving his 734-book and shouting, "Stop, stop. You got to sign for that axe."

$15.00 to Capt W. W. Grant

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

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

By Col W. E. Barnes

NEVER BEFORE HAS THE POWER OF THE SPOKEN WORD been so apparent. As long as we have cold war, the battle for men's minds will be conducted for high stakes in international forums. The cold war is mainly a word war, and the most important part is vocal. Within our own country, the stiff competition of the technological age makes it necessary that each major organization in our society have representatives who can speak out persuasively in its behalf. Lobbyists, lawyers, public relations men and other professionals have full-time jobs speaking for their employers.

The conditions under which we live have made all of us in the military services more conscious of our responsibility to be able to speak in public. To meet the challenge, many of our officers take public speaking courses. Thousands of officers and NCOs join Toastmasters Clubs and similar organizations.

Recently the Marine Corps considered a new fitness report form for officers which would include these items:

- Power of oral expression (Presents ideas effectively before small or large audiences)
- Personal Relations (Accepts and discharges military and civilian social and civic obligations of his rank)

The essential talents of every modern officer include the ability to present ideas effectively in public. More than ever before, the Marine Corps needs advocates who can successfully present our story to the American public.

Can you honestly say you have accepted the civic obligations of your rank? Have you ever made a speech to a civilian group? Or are you among the few who accept every opportunity to speak in public?

Most of us haven't faced up to our obligation in this respect. Many of us still aren't doing anything about it.

For the officers and senior NCOs who have not already begun to work at the job of public speaking, now is the time to get started. If you can get formal instruction, that is best. If you join a speaker's club, you are

certain to learn through experience. If you do nothing to meet the challenge, you may find in a few years that you are being penalized in your promotions and duty assignments because of a lack of this ability which most people around you will have.

When circumstances prevent you from getting formal instruction or joining a speaker's club, how can you get started on your own? This article will show you how. It will let you in on an old trade secret about public speaking. It will tell how you can do an effective job on the first attempt, and how you can improve with practice.

This method has proven effective through years of practice. It is used by many people, civilian and military. In special presentations to audiences of 300 to 700 reserve officers and civilians, one of our top military schools has been employing these techniques with great success for over ten years. The only limitation on this method is that it may not be used for extemporaneous speaking. It is adaptable only for prepared talks. This limitation shouldn't disturb you, because you normally have adequate time to prepare for any speech you make in public.

In addition to time to prepare the speech, you will need only such basic tools as good knowledge of your subject, a voice loud enough to be heard by your audience, and an enthusiastic feeling for the job at hand. A little imagination and practice will take care of the rest.

The method involves the use of a complete manuscript containing what you intend to say, word for word. Armed with such a document, you will stand up in front of your audience with confidence that you will always know what to say. Thus armed, you can never draw the wordless blank that novice speakers fear. You will not ramble either, because you have carefully drafted exactly what you want to say in your own words. and have it right there in front of you.

You are off to a good start.

But wait a minute! You know you can't *read* the speech. You wouldn't want to *memorize* it if you could. These two methods have produced some of the world's most boring speeches. You know, because you've heard them. You will not read the manuscript nor memorize it. You are going to "speak" it. And here's how you do it.

Take that carefully prepared manuscript and start breaking it down into short sentences and phrases, each of which your eye can pick up in a split second.

For example, here is a paragraph from your manuscript before you start breaking it down.

"We believe our doctrine has produced the most versatile, most powerful amphibious assault force ever conceived. To make it work, we depend on the individual fighting man . . . the Marine rifleman. The type of fighting we foresee demands trained professional troops. It can't be carried on by hastily mobilized conscripts. We require each individual private to possess the initiative and qualifications of the noncommissioned officer of the past. They get the fundamentals of this training in our boot camps at Parris Island, South Carolina . . . and San Diego, California . . . now producing the best trained Marines we have ever sent to the Fleet Marine Forces. We are proud of the Marine Corps today. I think justifiably so. And we're proud to assure you that during peace or war the Marine Corps is a force always in readiness."

After you finish your job of breaking this paragraph down for easy pick up by the eye, it will look something like this:

"We believe our doctrine has produced the most versatile, most powerful amphibious assault force ever conceived.

To make it work,
we depend on the individual fighting man,
the Marine Rifleman.

(Show Slide)

The type of fighting we foresee demands trained professional troops.

It can't be carried on by hastily mobilized conscripts.

We require each individual private
to possess the initiative and qualifications
of the noncommissioned officer of the past.

(Slide Off)

They get the fundamentals of this training
in our boot camps at

Parris Island, South Carolina . . .
and San Diego, California . . .

now producting the best trained Marines
we have ever sent to the Fleet Marine Forces.

(Pause)

We are proud of the Marine Corps today.
I think justifiably so.

And we're proud to assure you that,
during peace or war,

the Marine Corps is a force,
always in readiness."

Note that while you were redrafting for this new form, you did two more things helpful to eye contact. You double spaced and you inserted parenthetic guides for later use.

Now, when you have the entire manuscript in the new form, sit down in a quiet place and read it through two or three times. Get your eye accustomed to it. Take time to do a thorough job of studying your script. The

better you eye knows it, the less you will have to look at it as you read it.

Next, you will want to rehearse it aloud several times. During these rehearsals, stick to the manuscript. Don't worry about the subject matter. You licked that problem when you drafted the manuscript. Work at the task of keeping your eyes away from your manuscript as much as possible. Remember that you will want eye-contact with your audience. As you practice and become more and more familiar with your manuscript, you will be pleased to find how much of it your eye can pick up at a glance.

Finally, for dress-rehearsals, get several people to act as your audience. Ask them to seat themselves in different parts of the room. As you "speak" your manuscript, work hard for eye contact with your audience, and for natural voice inflections. Avoid a monotone of reading.

When you are through, get your audience (murder board) to critique your speech. Then try to improve your manuscript. After one more rehearsal, you should be ready.

Give your speech. As in other things, the first one is toughest. When you gain experience and confidence in this method of speaking, you will want to use little tricks for finesse. As you progress, try these:

- Keep your manuscript completely out of sight of your audience. Never turn your pages; slide them, flat on the lectern, and not always with the same hand.
- Pick a part of your manuscript that covers some of the subjects with which you are most familiar. Delete this part of the manuscript, and replace it with a note which, at a glance, will remind you to leave the lectern and ad lib. Plan to get back to your manuscript in time to "keep going."
- Prepare visual aids of the type that will take you away from your manuscript from time to time. Always leave the manuscript and talk from your visual aid.

Here's a way guaranteed to make the audience believe you are working from notes, not a manuscript.

When you speak (read) your manuscript up to the place where you have a quotation, avoid the usual stereotyped "quote-unquote" technique. Instead, simply state that you want to give an exact quotation. Pause, pick up a 3 by 5-inch card on which you have typed the quotation, (let the audience see it) and read it deliberately. Lay the card down, and then continue to speak (read) your manuscript.



Col Barnes doesn't buy the expression "Tell it to the Marines." He thinks Marines ought to be the ones doing the telling. Here he offers tips on how YOU can learn to speak effectively. More important are his tips on helping you feel at ease while holding the attention of your audience. The author came into the Corps from North Carolina State Univ. via NROTC. He commanded 1st Marines in Korea (1954-55), has served with Joint Staff (1955-57), was Director, 12thMCRRD (1957-60), and is now C/S, MCB, CamPen. A previous GAZETTE article "No Compromise" was published in the February '59 issue.

If you want to go all out on this last trick, here's how to do it. After you have indicated you want to give an exact quotation, pause, take out a pair of glasses, and put them on. Then proceed to read the quotation from the card. When you have finished the quotation, lay down the card, take off the glasses—and continue to speak (read) the manuscript.

Crooked, you say? Deception?

Well, perhaps. This last gimmick with the eye glasses may be going a bit too far. But the deceptive technique of "speaking" a manuscript is pleasing to the audience. No one who has been reasonably clever in its practice has ever been accused of being dishonest with his audience.

One word of caution about deception, though. Repeated use of this method may cause some self-deception. After using these techniques a few times, you will feel more relaxed in front of your audience. Then you'll feel a desire to use a manuscript less and to do more ad libbing. Later on, you will not only be looking forward to the opportunity to speak, you'll actually be volunteering. By that time, you will realize that you have deceived yourself—into being a pretty good public speaker, with or without a manuscript. USMC

★ ★ ★ ★

In Case He Forgot

TRANSFERRED TO HQMC AFTER 20 years at posts around the world, a hard-charging master sergeant solaced himself with this six-point reminder posted prominently on his desk: 1) Five-day week, 0800 to 1630. 2) No extra duty. 3) Four-bedroom house. 4) Chance to get it from the horse's mouth. 5) Chance to make connections for retirement. 6) Good schooling for the kids. Pencilled in as an afterthought was a seventh point: 7) I got no choice.

$15.00 to Capt P. R. Clapper

Spoken Like a Veteran

THE YOUNG RESERVE OFFICER, not the brightest in his class of OCs at Quantico in 1944, had been called on to explain a certain platoon tactic just covered by the instructor. He approached the platform determinedly. In the best approved manner for instructors he adjusted the mike, tapped it to make sure it was on, then asked, "Can you hear me in the back of the room?" The class waited expectantly while their colleague scuffed his feet, apparently in deep thought. Finally, he said: "Gentlemen, I've been asleep and haven't the faintest idea what to do in this particular tactical situation." With that, he about faced and marched smartly from the platform.

CWO G. J. DeCaro

BASEPLATE

Mc GURK

Baseplate is shook no end when Bertram-the-bar-keep suggests his platoon may be slipping back into civilian habits

BERTRAM KERNOODLE HAS FEW PEERS AS A BAR TENDER. He is melancholy, homely, and normally minds his own business. Just to look at him gives your morale a charge. You say to yourself, "Yourself, at least you're better off than Bertram-the-bar-keep."

And with that and a couple of deep sighs, you very much enjoy your first quaff. But there are days. And today was one of them.

"Mr. Kernoodle," I said (I am formal when displeased), "I've had a hard day and that uncomely smirk lurking around the corners of that sad puss displeases me more than somewhat. Although I know better than to ask, go ahead and tell me what is so funny. Then, please, kindly revert with alacrity to your old dear, unpleasant self."

"Well, Mr. Baseplate," answers Bertram-the-bar-keep, "I chortle because it looks as if 'The Man' has finally caught up with you. I suppose you'll not be patronizing this restful retreat as regularly forthwith and from now on?"

"Mar Corps Order 6100.3B?" I guessed.

"Mr. Rhodes showed it to me at noon," Bertram said.

Slipping a side look at my profile in the mirror, I resentfully opined, "Well, maybe my hip pockets are farther apart than some, but it isn't because of that watery beer you serve."

"Not you, Mr. Baseplate," he quickly assured me, "But I got a stern view of that platoon of yours on my way to work today. My, oh, my! 'The Man' says 'Commanding officers are responsible for Marines under their command being physically fit.' The next time I.G. comes by you'll be out selling hush-puppies."

"Oh, relax," I said, suddenly enjoying this rare bull-fest with Bertram. "Maybe my men are a little pudgy. However, I'll have them in shape by the time I.G. comes around next spring."

"That's just the point!" Bertram replied, dramatically jabbing his finger in the air and displaying the first agitation he has shown since the time he overheard a WM E-7 referred to as 'Gunny.' "The order concerns physical fitness and weight control not just one time a year but all the time. Now you're not doing your job, Lieutenant! You're letting those people slip back into their civilian bad habits. You let them sit around all day and spend every night in some Slop-chute filling up on geedunk and goodies."

"You're right," I admitted, "but higher headquarters hasn't spelled out anything. If my people are a bunch of blubber-butts it's battalion's fault, not mine."

"Their only fault is figuring that maybe some people down the line use their heads once in awhile," Bertram growled. "Now here's what you do. Weigh every man every day in whatever uniform you choose so long as it's the same for all weighings. Make a deal with the mess sergeant or whoever has a scale. Arrange to have them checked by a doctor and determine what their weight should be. Enter both figures on a platoon chart—where they are and where they're going to be. After that enter their daily weights—in red if they're not making progress! Institute daily exercise periods twice daily, 20 minutes each time. Run all men through all five tests once weekly without fail. Make a game out of it! Once they get into it they'll think it's 'number one'!"

"Anything else, sir?" I asked sarcastically.

"Yes, sir, there is," he replied unabashed as he turned away." When you get a man down to weight, note it as a temporary entry in his service record book. Whether the man is transferred or you are, his next CO will know that you carried out the spirit and not just the letter of the order." USMC

Baseplate McGurk, an old favorite, returns to the GAZETTE with this issue. With him is the same crew of spirited sages who delighted readers a dozen or more years ago. Time has been kind to McGurk and his friends, Mr. Kernoodle, Tex O'Reilly, Dusty Rhodes, and many more. We hope you'll make the Ale and Quail Club your favorite hangout.

OBSERVATION POST

This department is for new, constructive ideas. They may be controversial; they must be short. Payment at regular rates on publication.

A Kind Word For Bullpup

By LtCol M. C. Dalby

I THINK IT WAS THE LETTER BY LTCOL Steinkraus (Message Center: Sept '60) that finally did it—the one where he told us how the "boys in Washington" work.

It didn't bother me when my old friend Moose Traynor said in his opinion Bullpup has no tactical application. (Message Center: Jan '60). Matter of fact, I was impressed with his ability to analyze the Bullpup program with so little knowledge about the capabilities of the missile.

And I agreed with Capt McCracken (Message Center: Apr '60), who observed that BuWeps thinks Bullpup is a good missile and Maj Traynor thinks it is no good. Capt McCracken points out that one of these two agencies has to be wrong. Now you can't disagree with that!

Bullpup in action—it's no dog

Then I was interested to read further analysis by Maj Traynor (Message Center: June '60). There, he said the missile could not do the ground commander one lick of good and that it was, after all, a little bitty bomb attached to a tremendous boondoggle.

There is nothing wrong with that. Every man is entitled to his own views. I understand there were plenty of folks who got a real belly laugh out of that funny looking thing Orville and Wilbur Wright were building.

But then LtCol Steinkraus told us about his theoretical study proving a 250-pound bomb couldn't do much good, no matter how delivered. The "boys from Washington" agreed, he said, but the program was out of control. Well, that sort of stuck in my craw.

As one of the "boys from Washington" in the aviation weapons business, I feel entitled to get into this exchange of fearless estimates.

I would like to discuss the points of criticism one by one. But to keep this short let's talk about just two that seem to be the main points. These are: (a) accuracy (". . . woefully inaccurate"—Traynor) and (b) warhead size ("little bitty bomb"—Traynor, Steinkraus).

First, even the best pilots drop their bombs in a pattern, not all on a pinpoint. The better the pilot, the smaller the pattern. As a measure of the size of the pattern, we usually use "CEP" or Circular Error Probable. In other words, a 90-foot CEP means that about half the bombs dropped will fall within 90 feet of a pinpoint.

Now it is obvious that, for any given target, we can do the same job with fewer bombs, *if* we can cut down the CEP. But here is something that is not so obvious:

Let's say our pilots have a 60-foot CEP. If somehow we can cut that CEP down to 45 feet, we can do the same job with 250-pounders, *bomb for bomb,* that we can do with 1000-pounders. In other words, in this case, cut down the CEP by 25%—and you can reduce the warhead by 75% and get the same effect.

Here's another one: Against a tank, *one* 250-pound warhead delivered with a CEP of 15 feet gives about the same assurance of killing the tank as *three* 1,000-pounders delivered with a 30-foot CEP. In this case we can do essentially the same job with 12% of the bombload, if we can reduce the CEP by 50%.

Now these numbers mean just one thing: you can double, triple, or even quadruple the warhead size and you don't increase lethality much. But improve the CEP, *even a little bit,* and lethality shoots up out of all proportion.

Let's make a quick comparison of 250 and 2000-pound bombs against very soft and very hard targets. Probably the softest target would be exposed troops. The generally accepted lethal radius of 250-pounders against troops in the open is 70 feet. With 2,000-pounders against the same troops it is 98 feet. Not much gain for an eight-fold increase in bombload!

And hard targets? Against heavy tanks, the lethal radius of a 250-pounder is about 16 feet. With a 2,000 pounder it is 21 feet!

Now, what about the statement that a 250-pound warhead will not do much, no matter how it is delivered? Search as you will, I don't think you will find very many targets a 250-pounder won't kill, *if* you can hit it.

And that big *if* gets us right back to CEP. If we can make the CEP's even a little better, 250-pounders will do most jobs very well.

I know a number of pilots flying around these days who are getting CEP's at least twice as good with Bullpup as they ever got with bombs. It wouldn't mean much to state this in feet. That's not the point. The point is whether or not we can *improve* what we are doing now. The particular gents I am talking

about first learned all they could about the Bullpup system and then gave it a real conscientious try. It paid off for them!

To wind up, maybe we ought to get one more point straight. Like any new weapon, opinions about Bullpup are sharply divided. I know a number of experienced combat pilots (with advanced engineering degrees) who firmly believe this weapon is the answer we have been hunting for years for the all-round CAS weapon.

And I know others, like Steinkraus and Traynor, also experienced combat pilots, who feel just the opposite. It might be of interest here to tell what the "boys in Washington" think about it.

On one side, we do *not* believe we know everything there is to know about what Bullpup can do. We do not believe this is the ultimate CAS weapon. We do not intend to junk our GP bombs, Zuni rockets, fire bombs, or any other time-tested stand-by's.

We most assuredly do intend to keep right on putting maximum effort toward developing more accurate and more effective CAS weapons of all types. And there are a number of really fine ones coming along.

But at the same time that we stick up for our old stand-by's, we realize it would be foolish to say "Bullpup can never be of benefit to the ground commander" or that it was all a big boondoggle shoved down our throats.

This is a new weapon that is going to take training, skill, and a lot of "can-do" at first on the part of the CAS pilots. That's the only way we will ever realize the full potential of the weapon.

Let's not whip Bullpup for bad manners until we have tried to teach him to go outdoors. USMC

1024 Terrace Dr.
Annandale, Va.

Fit to Fight?

By Maj Samuel L. Eddy Jr.

"MIRROR, MIRROR ON THE WALL, AM I to fight or will I fall?"

What say you to the question?

Marine Corps Order 6100.3B is now in being and pretty well gives us an answer to that question. Such a constructive, continuing program has long been needed. Now that it's here what are we going to do with it? What's it going to do to us?

Will it go the way of some of those in the past? A sudden burst of effort and energy then slowly fade away, only to become an anual epidemic of sore muscles and aching bones each time the tests are taken.

6100.3B, for the first time in recent years, really gives us a program and policy to sink our teeth into, something to get into shape and condition for, plus the charge and responsibility of staying that way. Further, we can derive from it a solid basis for a new, constructive and beneficial type physical competition program that can be conducted at any level, any unit or organization. The Corps has long taken pride in its athletic and physical abilities and capabilities. We like to look back and admire the tanned, lean, square jawed and gimlet eyed Marine on the recruiting poster. I'm sure we'd like to be like him today. But let's face it—we aren't. Far from it! What can we do about it?

6100.3B opens the door to Marines to shape up and be fit to fight. To enhance the conditioning and physical readiness program we have been provided, let's set up a contest using the new physical readiness test as a basis. This can be done easily along the following lines:

We'll use a Marine Division for our example (this can be scaled to any size unit, barracks or base). The competition we are striving for would be along intramural lines. In the division, battalion sized units would be the basic competitive units.

1) **Course.** A standard, uniform, centralized testing area would be laid out for conduct of the five physical readiness tests set forth in 6100.3B. All participating units would use this course during competition.

2) **Teams.** Competitive teams would be organized and composed of 12 Marines each, i.e.: (team structure, rank, etc adaptable to any group or unit).

Two field grade officers
Two company grade officers
Two SgtsMaj/MGySgts or 1stSgts/MSgts
Two GySgts or SSgts
Two Cpls or Sgts
Two Pvts, PFCs or LCpls

3) **Competition and Scoring.** Each team will compete against time only. No shoulder-to-shoulder competition allowed except by or among fellow team members. Each individual competitor will be timed on each of the five test events. The total of his five separate test times would be his score. The twelve individual times of the team members would be totaled for team composite score time. Low team composite score would be the physical readiness champions with due honors to the 2nd and 3rd place teams.

4) **Individual Competition.** Also a time contest. Recognition would go to the low-time Marine in each event. The low-time two-man team in each rank category would also be recognized and honored.

It is easy to see that a program such as this can be scaled and conducted at any level from platoon to division, from the small barracks detachment to the largest supply depot on a Marine Corps Base. Competition between units and individuals will stem from 6100.3B; let's get it organized at the start and we won't have individuals trying to set new records via *Navy Times*, etc. as with sit up, push up marathons.

Grandmas will say such a program will cause Marines to overextend themselves, cause injuries. Not so! If conditioning is gradual, accelerated properly, any injuries or harmful effects will be minimized. 6100.3B covers the medical aspects of the program, weight control and the rest. This is adequate. Better to find out here through these tests and competition what the individual Marine is made of than at a later date when it might be too late.

The gains and benefits of the outlined program can be many. To mention a few:

- Better physical fitness and conditioning bringing with it increased mental acuity, emotional stability, stamina and endurance.
- Leaders at all levels can show visible, positive EXAMPLESHIP (Trim, slim and away we go!)
- Places rank against rank and relative age against age.
- Provides a morale factor by recognizing teams and Marines who exceed *minimum* standards established by 6100.3B.

Maybe we won't ever be models for recruiting posters. Some will, some won't, but we'll be ready if the gong sounds and there's another fire to be put out somewhere in our global backyard. We'll be physically hard at all times to meet any situation or demand that may come up. We'll be as the steel of the finest sword, sharp of edge, quick of point, true as light, with elasticity to return to true after any blow or strike.

We'll be able to answer the mirror on the wall "Aye, not the fairest of them all but fit to fight and on the ball."

USMC

H&S Co, 3dAmTracBn
Camp Pendleton, Calif.

OBSERVATION POST CONTINUED

Strength From Within

By LtCol C. M. Johnson

THE I-I AND HIS STAFF ARE SUPPOSEDly highly trained and specially selected Marines assigned to *assist* the reserve unit accomplish its mission. Many I-I staffs are completely involved in functions normally accomplished entirely by unit personnel. This situation is fine for "getting the job done." However, it does not teach nor encourage independence of the unit. In fact, it does encourage *dependence* on outside personnel to accomplish unit functions. As long as this readily available assistance is so handy it is going to be used. Likewise, the I-I and his staff know that the work load requirements for the I-I Staff will be directly determined by the efficiency and state of training of the unit. This causes a definite eagerness on the part of I-I personnel to assist in keeping administration, etc., "right," which indirectly hurts the unit by depriving the unit of the responsibility it should rightly accept.

How can this be corrected? There are undoubtedly many answers. Positive and aggressive unit leadership? Encouragement of unit personnel? Individual instruction? Pressure to the limit? Give advice liberally and physical assistance only where absolutely necessary? These solutions are certainly possible and workable to a degree. A proposal, though appearing radical at first, is summed up in the following paragraphs as "food for thought."

First, let's question the basic concept of the command relationships between the Reserve Unit and the I-I Staffs. The I-I finds himself in the middle with practically no authority and a great deal of responsibility. His authority is primarily one that may be termed "command by persuasion." A solution to this problem would eliminate this "middle man concept" and place the full time assistants under the direct control and command of the Unit Commander during periods of active duty and active duty for training and directly under the District Director at other times.

In order to accomplish this, the I-I personnel would be drawn from the unit and placed on continuous active duty. One officer from the unit would be assigned as Inspector-Instructor. The officers most fitted in this case may be the unit commander, executive officer, administrative officer, or supply officer. Enlisted personnel would likewise be assigned in a similar manner on an "as required" basis for the particular type of unit. Due to the complications of supply functions it may be advisable to retain one billet (supply chief) to be filled by an NCO assigned to the unit from the regular establishment.

Some Marines will question this solution as unworkable, tried and failed, or too demanding on Reserve personnel time. There are many arguments to support such claims. However, it is believed this proposal has many advantages that far outweigh the disadvantages. Here are some:

Disadvantages:

1) The present close relationship with the regular establishment is decreased.

2) The general efficiency and state of training readiness may decrease initially.

Advantages:

1) A closer knit unit that is completely self sufficient becomes much more of a reality.

2) The continuous active duty personnel (now I-I Staff) would be under more positive control of the unit commander during non-drill and periods of active duty.

3) Most of the present I-I Staff could be released for duty with the regular forces where a definite need exists for these trained personnel.

4) The present vague situation the I-I is placed in could be eliminated.

5) Unit prestige and pride would increase. USMC

Base Safety Officer
Camp Pendleton, Calif.

Trained To Kill

By Capt J. R. Love

BLUNTLY STATED, THE OBJECTIVE OF all Marine training is to have our people trained to kill. This, of course, includes Marines who "man" the anti-tank weapons in our FMF. The weapon itself is no matter—whether it be the 3.5 inch rocket launcher, the 106mm recoilless rifle, or the LAW—the objective is the same. What we should strive for is an improved "anti-tank gunner" training system. We need a system that provides the gunner a chance to sharpen his eye and confidence in shooting at and hitting a moving target.

There is a solution that can be adopted by every FMF unit with very little expense. The resultant training proficiency should answer any S-3's prayers. The solution? A "home made" moving target.

For training purposes, a tank can tow the target with regular tank-towing cable across a firing range at varying distances and angles in order to give the training gunners a *realistic* target to shoot at. Towed target sled should be 50-75 yards behind the towing tank. The tank remains "buttoned up," allowing the training gunners to fire at the target sled with machine gun ammunition and practice rounds without fear of injuring the tank crew.

Anti-tank gunners (and tank gunners, by using the co-axial machine gun) receive realistic, challenging training in how to lead and hit a moving target. This training system was used in the Fourth Marines while in Japan in 1954. The training results were very satisfactory. The Marines who received this training — as yours will be — were TRAINED TO KILL! USMC

4 Tralee Lane
Triangle, Va.

Pass the Word and Keep Control

By Capt G. E. Spring

ALMOST UNIVERSALLY WE FIND "KEEP control" and "get the word out" in articles, speeches and what have you about tactics, handling of troops, morale, leadership and a wide variety of other topics. The fact that keeping control and getting the word are important is universally accepted. But the constant carping indicates that these facets of command are equally universal problems. This article, then, is intended to look at the mechanics of keeping control and getting the word to everyone. It's really old hat, but let's be specific about how to do it. Let's review it.

First, accept the fact that if everyone has the word, control is automatic. It's the last step in putting out the word that makes control automatic. The two, control and information, are linked together as are two links in a chain.

At some risk of over-simplification, here are the steps for using THE WORD to keep CONTROL.

1) Think before you issue an order or command. What is its purpose? What do you want done? What can affect your accomplishment—uniform, transportation, time for chow, Christmas leaves? Answer all of these questions first.

2) Call a "meeting." The meeting can be formal or informal. It can be the Regimental Commander calling a staff meeting at his CP for noon on Thursday, or the squad leader grabbing one of his fire team leaders at noon chow. Just make certain that everyone present knows that an order is to be issued and that his undivided attention is necessary.

3) Prepare your statement. This is usually done before or while the meeting is assembled. If it is done extemporaneously, you will wind up in trouble. Step One is for naught if you are not prepared to state your case.

4) Tell your "meeting" what you are going to tell them. "I am going to give you the plans for next week's training." "Your barracks was a mess this morning, and I want to tell you what needs to be done to straighten it up." "I will give you a variety of information. Among the topics are: ——."

5) Give them the word. Give them *all* of it. More about this in following paragraphs. Suffice here to say that Step One means there will be a lot to tell them. Be complete.

6) Ask for questions. If necessary, ask the personnel present, "Do you understand such and such?" if that particular phrase is complicated.

7) Supervise the carrying out of the word. Make certain that your subordinates are following the same seven steps. If they are, the job will get done, if you have done yours well. This means CONTROL is established. Supervision is the biggest failure of getting the word passed. By supervision we don't mean interference. Just make sure the job is getting done. Don't go on down the line with the word and do it yourself.

Lack of proper supervision is by no means the only failure in keeping control and passing the word. There are several more glaring flaws that crop up, with lack of supervision heading the list. Second on the list is an incomplete order. "Move out" is probably one of the most common Marine Corps expressions. It leaves an infinite variety of things to the imagination. Move out and do what? Use the six faithful serving men—who, when, what, where, why and how. "Take the first squad at 1300 and go to building 132 and pick up 31 mattresses for the platoon. See Sgt Small at 132. A 6x6 will be at the Company office at 1300 to take you to building 132. The driver and truck will be from Base Motor Pool. The 6x6 will bring mattresses back to the platoon barracks where they will be put in the rec room. The 6x6 has to go over to Bravo Co. You will probably have to march back from building 132 unless the 6x6 can make the trip back for you and be at Bravo by 1430. The second squad will unload the mattresses here. That squad leader will have the key. If you have any trouble, call the Company Exec at 461. Any questions?"

Confusing orders are a big problem. Lay it out in logical sequence. Don't publish the week's schedule of events by jumping from Friday noon to Thursday morning to Monday night and back to Wednesday, etc. Don't tell a rifle platoon to move out "that way." Do you mean in a line of skirmishers, the way they were headed, or crawling? Just what *do* you mean?

Assuming that the subordinate knows what you are talking about is dangerous. You may have gone into the details so thoroughly with the platoon commander that it is all as clear as a bell to you. Be assured that the fire team leaders probably don't even know you talked to the platoon leader, so you will have to be very careful to be thorough with them.

Lack of decisiveness is another problem. Be definite. Speak up, to begin with. Use a firm tone. Talk as though you know what you are talking about. If asked for a decision, give it. Say "Yes," not "Maybe we'd better do it that way." Be decisive.

Did your subordinates take notes when you issued an order? Can you, right now, remember all the details of picking up the mattresses—the building number, the man to see, the times and so on? Make sure that people do take notes, and don't brief them so quickly that they can't get it all down.

Don't be a hard charger. A hard charger is a hot cannon—it goes off before the breech is closed and blows up the whole program. A platoon led by a hard charging second lieutenant can get 1000 meters beyond supporting arms range and be wiped out if he's not careful. Hard chargers need the cooling off period of Steps One through Four.

Finally, if everything seems to go to pot, don't give up. Start again and reissue the order. The word changes, and the situation arises wherein the truck breaks down, etc. So what? Tomorrow's still coming, and the Corps will be here, and so will you. But if you have planned, issued and supervised your orders, it will be a better Corps than it was yesterday. USMC

3727 NE Couch St.
Portland, Ore.

THE SCHOOL SOLUTION

(Answers to questions on page 51)

Note: References designated as TIP (Tentative Instructional Precis), SM (Supplementary Material), and MCS (Marine Corps Schools Publication) are manuals written by the staff of Marine Corps Educational Center as texts for MCEC schools.

BASIC

1 d. Reference: SM-87A (1960), paragraph 1c. Logistical capability and considerations are major factors in the determination of the scope of operations. Logistical and tactical planning must be performed concurrently. It cannot be properly said that logistical or operational plans are governed by the other. While operational plans must be supportable, it would be unusual to ensure this by following the procedure given in answer c. The acceptance of logistics as being operational in nature will cause planning to be coordinated and concurrent, thus ensuring the proper integration of tactical and logistical considerations.

2 b. Reference: FM 20-32 (1959), paragraphs 22 and 23 and figures 16 and 17. Clusters are laid on both sides of the strip centerlines.

JUNIOR

3 (b) Reference: TIP (INT)1, Section 3, paragraph 1b. Except under the most unusual circumstances, enemy intentions cannot be anticipated. However, a thorough analysis of his dispositions, his doctrine, the weather and terrain, etc. will usually permit the intelligence officer to arrive at logical conclusions regarding courses of action available to the enemy, his capabilities, and the relative probability of the adoption of his capabilities.

4 (b) Reference: TIP (MZ)1, paragraph 21. When engaged in antitank missions, the M-50's should be employed in the greatest possible mass and echeloned in depth consistent with the situation. They should utilize speed, mobility, and firepower in the execution of their antitank missions and avoid frontal engagements with enemy armor.

5 (c) Reference: LFM-3, paragraph 503f(4). Tank units can acquire much of the same information as infantry units and in the same manner except for interrogation of prisoners to obtain identifications of enemy units. Because of their speed, mobility, and armor protection, they are, under favorable circumstances, capable of rapid penetration of enemy areas and can often obtain information over wider and deeper areas than infantry units.

SENIOR

6 (b and c) Reference: MCS 1-6, paragraph 125. Answers b and c are provided for within the Act as presently amended. In general, the Secretary of Defense has been granted increasing powers since the formulation of the National Security Act of 1947. At that time the Act spelled out the specific duties for which he was responsible and reserved to the individual service Secretaries those powers and duties not granted to the Secretary of Defense. Since that time this has been altered, by amendment, to give the Secretary of Defense much broader powers. The Act now merely states: "Under the direction of the President and subject to the provisions of this Act, he shall have direction, authority, and control over the Department of Defense."

With respect to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Secretary, under the President, works with its advice and assistance but not necessarily with its consent.

WHAT IT IS

This is a classic example of a 3 gun heavy AAA battery position. Location: North Korea.

Indicators are:

- Triangular array of revetted gun positions (may be open pits) covered with net or natural camouflage.
- "Birds-foot" array of fine line earth scars. These are covered cables leading from fire control bunker to guns.
- Paths between gun positions. Whole position crudely resembles a duck's track.

Places to look for this position:

- Along routes of communication.
- Protecting major installations, supply centers, or airfields.

A NEW HOME . . .



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- Checking Accounts
- Loans
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Marine Corps Gazette

THE 86TH CONGRESS

By Col John R. Blandford, USMCR

THE RATHER UNUSUAL 86TH CONGRESS, with its second session interrupted by a convention adjournment, became a part of legislative history at 2351 on 1 September 1960. Barring a special session, the next Congress will convene 3 January 1961.

Bills introduced in the 86th Congress which failed to become law must be reintroduced if they are to be considered by the 87th Congress. A bill dies when the two-year session of each Congress comes to final adjournment.

And even though a bill may have passed either the House or the Senate, it still must run the gamut of the next Congress if it has not been signed into law.

This means such bills also have to be re-introduced. In addition, from the standpoint of the Department of Defense, they also must have Budget clearance and must be processed through the respective departments and services.

The most significant action of the 86th Congress, insofar as the Navy and Marine Corps are concerned, was enactment of the so-called "hump" legislation, P. L. 86-115. This law provided for involuntary retirement of Navy and Marine officers before completion of 30 or 26 years of service, depending on grade.

Hump Bill Started in 85th

The complex hump bill was first considered in the 85th Congress. It finally became law at the end of the first session of the 86th Congress. Without it, many officers would have faced almost unacceptable attrition rates in promotions to commander, Navy captain, and Marine Corps equivalent grades.

There was also a technical error in the hump law. This consisted of a provision intended to assist the Marine Corps, but which could have had a serious effect upon both the Navy and Marine Corps with respect to definition of "total commissioned service."

Lieutenant commanders and majors who are passed over for promotion two or more times are required by law to retire on the completion of 20 years of "total commissioned service" as defined in Title 10 of the US Code. Twice passed over officers in higher grades also are subject to involuntary retirement after completing that amount of service unless selected for retention on the active list.

Total commissioned service is defined in law in order to give certain regular officers, who are non-Academy graduates, running mates for retirement purposes who have been regular officers for their entire careers.

The hump law amended the definition of "total commissioned service." It provided that each such officer would have as a running mate an officer who "has been continuously" junior to him instead of one who "is, or at any time has been, junior."

This complicated and somewhat bewildering change in the law was supposed to affect only a small group of Marine officers whose promotion could be accelerated under a temporary provision of the hump act. However, it was discovered, almost too late, that the words "has been continuously" would have delayed the involuntary retirement of seven lieutenant commanders many times passed over for promotion, as well as 154 commanders and 31 lieutenant colonels who were not selected for retention under the hump law. It was intended that they be retired on 30 June 1960. But it almost became necessary to continue these officers on active duty because of the error in law. While some of the affected officers might have preferred to remain on active duty for at least another year, most had made plans for retirement. The technical provision in the law, which had to be amended in order for them to be retired, might have adversely affected them.

At any rate, the law was changed back to its original language on the very last possible date. This still leaves the Marine Corps with the problem of what to do with certain majors when other majors junior to them are selected for accelerated promotion. The hump legislation still stands as the most significant, and most complicated, enactment in the 86th Congress insofar as Navy and Marine Corps officers are concerned.

Other bills were signed into law, while some proposals failed enactment although hearings were conducted. Others were not considered, although introduced.

"White Charger"

Army and Air Force officers will be subject to a new quality control law called "White Charger." This new law, P. L. 86-616, permits the Air Force, which is also granted authority to use it, to involuntarily retire during the next five years permanent colonels and permanent lieutenant colonels of the regular service who have three times or more failed selection to the next higher permanent grade. The first board that meets may "select out" as many officers as it desires to eliminate. Thereafter, not more than 20% of the officers being considered may be selected for involuntary retirement. In addition, if an officer is once considered for involuntary retirement and is selected for continuation—or conversely, has not been selected for elimination—he will not thereafter be subject to this temporary elimination authority.

The new law also makes permanent changes in the "show cause" procedure which now exists in the Army and Air Force for elimination of officers who fail to meet prescribed standards or who are charged with professional or moral dereliction, or who are security risks. This is a highly legalistic procedure. Under the old law, the "show cause"

The author of this report had special qualifications for writing it. He's counsel for the House Armed Services Committee

procedure was cumbersome and unreasonably time-consuming. The new law makes the "show cause" procedure more effective, more efficient, and less wasteful of time and effort.

The Navy and Marine Corps have no comparable procedure. Officers with less than 20 years service, however, can be selected out by selection boards for unsatisfactory performance of duty under existing law.

Amphibious Shipping Okayed

Another law of interest to the Marine Corps, P. L. 86-471, authorized the Presiden to undertake construction of 8,000 tons of amphibious shipping and landing craft. Actually, this new law authorizes another LPD, which is intended to carry transport helicopters and landing craft. The newly-authorized transport will combat load, transport, and land about 900 troops and their equipment by means of helicopter and landing craft. The transport will be capable of carrying six large transport helicopters, one large utility landing craft, and three small personnel landing craft. This is the third such vessel to be authorized. They are 20-knot ships designed for the Marine Corps. The first ship will join the Fleet in June of 1962.

Another new law, P. L. 86-454, removed the requirement that either the Chief or Deputy Chief of the Bureau of Ships must be specially qualified and experienced in naval engineering, while the other must be specially qualified and experienced in naval architecture.

This law, while not of particular significance to the Marine Corps, did affect BuShips in that it repealed the requirement that if the Chief of the Bureau was specially qualified and experienced in naval engineering, then the Deputy Chief had to be specially qualified in naval architecture. In other words, prior to enactment of this law, if the Chief was qualified in one field, the Deputy Chief had to be qualified in another.

The annual military construction bill, known as the "Military Construction Act of 1961," P. L. 86-500, contained authorizations for construction at various Marine Corps installataions.

Marine Corps facilities authorized construction projects included the air stations at Beaufort, S. C., Cherry Point, N. C., El Toro, Calif., and Kaneohe Bay, Hawaii.

Other Marine Corps facilities which received construction authorizations included Marine Corps Supply Centers, Albany, Ga., and Barstow, California; troop housing at Camp Lejeune, N. C.; troop housing and community facilities at Parris Island, S. C.; training facilities, administrative facilities, troop housing and utilities at Camp Pendleton, Calif.; operational and training facilities at Quantico, Va.; training facilities at MCRD, San Diego, Calif.; and utilities at 29 Palms, Calif.

There were also authorizations for Marine Corps Reserve activities at Johnstown, Pa.; Phoenix, Ariz.; and Topeka, Kans.

It should be noted, however, that an authorization for construction does not

necessarily mean that the construction will proceed forthwith. The authorization must precede the appropriation by a separate Act of Congress. But an authorization once enacted, which must originate in the Committees on Armed Services of the House and Senate, does not necessarily mean that an appropriation will be approved for the projects authorized.

Reserve Inequity Corrected

Another law, P. L. 86-638, gives reservists who go on inactive duty after more than eight years of active duty, the same right as regulars to select a home of choice and be authorized travel and transportation allowances for themselves and their dependents.

Another law, P. L. 86-589, permits military officers overseas to administer oaths and perform other notarial acts for American civilian employees and dependents. Enactment of this law was necessary because the Supreme Court ruled that civilians are not subject to the Uniform Code of Military Justice. Since officers could only perform notarial acts for persons who are subject to the Code, and since the Supreme Court ruled that civilians and service dependents were not subject to the Code, there was grave doubt that officers could administer valid oaths to civilians and dependents overseas. Had the law not been enacted, many absentee ballots might have been invalidated.

Household Effects Limitation

Another law, P. L. 86-837, places certain limitations on the transportation of household effects by commercial air carriers. This law resulted from the disclosure by the General Accounting Office of certain air freight shipments of household effects by members of the Armed Services which involved excessive costs. Under the new law, household goods may not be shipped by commercial air when the cost exceeds the cost of shipment by other means of transportation. Exceptions are authorized when the transportation officer certifies to his commanding officer that the household effects are required for use in carrying out assigned duties or are necessary to prevent undue hardship and that these requirements cannot be met by using other means of transportation. However (and this is of particular significance to Marines), 1,000 pounds of unaccompanied baggage may be excepted from this limitation under regulations to be issued under the authority of the Secretary of Defense.

Another law, P. L. 86-641, permits the Armed Services to make settlements of the accounts of members who die with no designated beneficiaries, without referring the cases to the Comptroller General except in cases involving the law of the member's home state, and then only if the Comptroller General requests review of the settlement. This sounds technical, and is, but it is intended to expedite payment of deceased members' final accounts.

Another law, P. L. 86-635, amended the Career Compensation Act to permit the two crews assigned to nuclear submarines to draw submarine pay following assignment to nuclear submarines, during periods of duty which include training and rehabilitation. The new law also authorizes submarine pay for operators and crew members of the bathyscape-type underwater research

craft. While this law may not appear to be important to the Marine Corps at present, it is significant from the viewpoint of authorizing incentive hazardous duty pay for submarine duty even though members of the crew may be absent from the submarine for more than 15 days. It is intended to help recruitment in the nuclear submarine program.

The perennial bill to establish a peacetime limitation on the number of lieutenant generals in the Marine Corps did not become law, although it passed the House as it has on previous occasions. This bill would permit a permanent peacetime limitation of five lieutenant generals instead of three, which would be the maximum number authorized in event the national emergency in effect since 1950 were terminated.

Another proposed bill which was not considered, and in fact not introduced, would have raised per diem rates for service personnel from $12 to $15 per day.

Another bill not considered, although introduced, would have increased trailer allowances.

Yet another bill not considered would have authorized enlisted personnel to include their inactive reserve service as a multiplier in determining their retainer or retirement pay after completing 20 years of active duty, in the same way officers may now include such service.

In addition, and probably of greater significance, is the fact that the retired pay recomputation bill which passed the House was not considered in the Senate. This is the bill which would have permitted members of the uniformed services retired prior to 1 June 1958 to compute their retirement pay, if paid under the Career Compensation Act, under the pay scales that went into effect 1 June 1958.

The Senate Armed Services Committee has directed that a thorough study be made of military retired pay. This study is to be done by an independent, non-government research group.

Finally, there was no attempt to conduct hearings on a revision of the Uniform Code of Military Justice. However, one law, P. L. 86-633, was enacted which amended UCMJ to overcome a decision of the Court of Military Appeals. This decision held that Army and Air Force personnel convicted by a court martial with an approved sentence which included a punitive discharge, confinement, or hard labor without confinement, could not be automatically reduced to the lowest enlisted grade in spite of the clear language of the Executive Order which authorized such a reduction. While the Navy and Marine Corps never automatically reduce enlisted personnel unless the sentence includes such a reduction, it has nevertheless been a traditional and accepted method of imposing punishment in the Army and Air Force.

CMA Holding Reversed

The Court of Military Appeals held that the Court must actually impose such a sentence and that the regulations could not bring about an automatic reduction. The new law overrode this decision of the Court of Military Appeals, and permits each Service, under Secretarial regulation, to effect such automatic reductions.

While the accomplishments or lack of accomplishments of the 86th Congress will probably be debated at great length by service personnel, the fact is that laws now on the statute books as a result of the 86th Congress have vitally affected the careers of service personnel.

In addition to the laws mentioned, there were many other activities which must be considered as a part of the accomplishments of the 86th Congress. These included, for example, the passage by the House of a conflict of interests bill affecting the employment of retired regular officers during the two years immediately following retirement. While this bill did not become law, it nevertheless may have an effect on the employability of retired officers. It is also an indication of considerable Congressional interest in the problem of conflict of interests insofar as they pertain to retired officers.

Special Report

Investigations of procurement activities, together with inquiries into many other phases of the operations of the Department of Defense, clearly indicate that Congress will play an increasingly vital role in the overall structure and effectiveness of the Armed Services. For example, the Military Construction Authorization Act of 1959 contained this notable language:

> "SEC. 412. (a) The Secretary of Defense shall, on or before January 31, 1960, submit to the President of the Senate and the Speaker of the House of Representatives complete and detailed information with respect to various types and kinds of aircraft, missiles, and naval vessels being procured by the armed forces of the United States, including the number of each type and kind procured and the cost thereof and the number of each type and kind proposed to be procured and the estimated cost thereof.
>
> "(b) No funds may be appropriated after December 31, 1960, to or for the use of any armed force of the United States for the procurement of aircraft, missiles, or naval vessels unless the appropriation of such funds has been authorized by legislation enacted after such date."

The Congress, in effect, has served notice that from here on out, legislative committees will concern themselves with the procurement of aircraft, missiles, and naval vessels. This covers a great deal of procurement.

There was more to the accomplishments of the 86th Congress, from the serviceman's viewpoint, than appears on the surface. These accomplishments may well be remembered for many years to come. USMC

★ ★ ★ ★

The Military Mind

IN 1956 HEADQUARTERS, MARINE CORPS, began a program which required certain recruit platoons to fill out questionnaires in their third and tenth weeks of training. The individual recruit stated what he liked or disliked about boot camp, his DI and the Marine Corps in general. To ensure freedom of expression, the questionnaires were not signed.

One recruit, after praising the training and his DI, came to the part for gripes or praise of a general nature. His comment:

"The chow is lousy and I don't get enough of it."

$15.00 to Maj W. M. Van Zuyen

MARINE CORPS GENERAL OFFICERS ON ACTIVE DUTY

General David M. Shoup....Commandant of the Marine Corps
LtGen Robert H. Pepper (Ret).....Off of SecDef
LtGen Joseph C. Burger.....CG, FMFLant
LtGen Edward W. Snedeker.....CMCS, Quantico
LtGen Thomas A. Wornham.....CG, FMFPac
LtGen John C. Munn.....Asst CMC
LtGen Wallace M. Greene Jr.....C/S, HQMC
MajGen Samuel S. Jack.....CG, AirFMFPac; COMCAB West
MajGen Henry R. Paige.....CG, 1stMarDiv
MajGen Marion L. Dawson.....CG, MCAS, El Toro
MajGen Alan Shapley.....CG, MCB, CamPen
MajGen Robert B. Luckey.....CG, MCB, CamLej
MajGen Arthur F. Binney.....DirAvn; ACNO (MarAvn)
MajGen Thomas G. Ennis.....CG, MCRD, PI
MajGen Carson A. Roberts.....CG, 3dMAW
MajGen James P. Berkeley.....CG, 2dMarDiv
MajGen Donald M. Weller.....CG, 3dMarDiv
MajGen Charles H. Hayes.....DC, FMFPac
MajGen August Larson.....Director of Personnel
MajGen Richard C. Mangrum.....DC, FMFLant
MajGen Frederick L. Wieseman.....DC/S (Plans), HQMC
MajGen Victor H. Krulak.....CG, MCRD, SDiego
MajGen Chester R. Allen.....Quartermaster General
MajGen Alpha L. Bowser.....AC/S, G-1
MajGen Avery R. Kier.....CG, 1stMAW
MajGen Sidney S. Wade.....AC/S, G-3
MajGen James M. Masters Sr.....Inspector General
MajGen Ralph K. Rottet.....CG, 2dMAW
BGen Harold D. Hansen.....Asst QMGen
BGen Lewis C. Hudson.....Dep AC/S, G-3
BGen William P. Battell.....CG, MCSC, Albany
BGen George H. Cloud.....CG, MCSC, Barstow
BGen Austin R. Brunelli.....CG, LFTULant
BGen Harvey C. Tschirgi.....AC/S, G-4
BGen Samuel R. Shaw.....CG, LFTUPac
BGen John P. Condon (1).....D/J-3, CINCEUR
BGen Frank C. Tharin.....CG, MCAS, CherPt; COMCAB East
BGen Robert E. Cushman Jr. (2)
Asst (National Security Affairs) to Vice President
BGen Richard G. Weede.....CG, 1stMarBrig
BGen Lewis J. Fields
CG, ForTrps, FMFPac; CG, MCB, 29 Palms
BGen Leonard F. Chapman Jr.....CG, ForTrps, FMFLant
BGen Paul R. Tyler.....CG, MCSA, Philadelphia
BGen Henry W. Buse Jr.....MarCorps LnO
BGen Herman Nickerson Jr.....Fiscal Director
BGen William J. Van Ryzin.....C/S, CINCNELM
BGen Raymond L. Murray.....AsstBC, MCB, CamPen
BGen Thomas F. Riley.....ADC, 3dMarDiv
BGen Frederick E. Leek.....ADC, 1stMarDiv
BGen Odell M. Conoley (3).....ADC, 2dMarDiv
BGen Philip W. John.....AC/S Logistics, CINCSOUTH
BGen William T. Fairbourn.....Director of Reserve
BGen Bruno A. Hochmuth.....DC/S (R&D), HQMC
BGen Roy L. Kline.....AWC, 1stMarDiv
BGen William R. Collins.....Dir, MCLFDC, MCS, Quantico
BGen Forest C. Thompson (Ret).....Off of SecDef
BGen John C. Miller Jr.....Dir, MCEC, MCS, Quantico
BGen Louis B. Robertshaw.....COMART
BGen Rathvon McC. Tompkins.....Asst Dir of Personnel
BGen John H. Masters.....Legislative Asst to CMC
BGen Paul J. Fontana.....DepDirOpns, J-3, JCS
BGen George S. Bowman Jr.....J-3, CINCPAC

(1) To CG, 1stMAW—Spring '61; (2) To ADC, 3dMarDiv; (3) To D/J-3, CINCEUR.

General Officers

Recent Command and Staff Assignments

MajGen

Dawson, M. L., Cdr MCAB's, Western Area

Colonels

Transfers

Anderson, N. J. 9907
Fr 1stMAW
To HQMC By5Jan
Cargill, W. M. 9907
Fr Colorado Springs WDJan
To 1stMAW
Hammond, B. B. 9908
Fr 3dMarDiv WDJan
To 1stMarDiv
Harwick, V. J. 9906
Fr LFTULant
To Iowa St Univ 16Jan
Humberd, W. C. 9907
Fr 1stMAW WDJan
To MCAF New River
Post, N. T. 9907
Fr 3dMarDiv WDJan
To COMCABWest
Smith, S. A. 9907
Fr 3dMAW WDJan
To HQMC
Wismer, R. M. 9906
Fr 1stMarDiv WDJan
To MCB CamPen

Temporary Promotions

Roach, M. E. Dec

Retired

Bell, G. B. 9906
1Dec
Kengla, W. A. 9906
31Jan

Recent Command and Staff Assignments

Arsenault, A., CO, 7thMarRegt, 1st MarDiv
Benson, A. R., Facilities & Services Div, SupDept, HQMC
Dulacki, L. J., Naval Attache & Naval Attache for Air, American Emb, Moscow, USSR
Hodges, C. T., CO, 1stMar, MCB, CamPen
Huizenga, R. M., DivAvn, HQMC
Roise, H. S., Ass't C/S, G-2, 1st MarDiv
Stiles, W. A., CO, 9thMar, 3dMarDiv
Sweeny, J. B., Career Adv Sect, Per Dept, HQMC
Walker, A., Div Insp, 1stMarDiv
Wallace, R. W., Ass't C/S, Comptroller, MCB, CamPen

Lieutenant Colonels

Transfers

Baird, R. 7333
Fr 1stMarBrig WDJan
To AFSC Nor
Bohannon, T. J. 0302
Fr AFSC Nor WDJan
To FMFLant
Boyd, K. B. 2502
Fr MCRD SDiego WDJan
To 3dMarDiv
Bruder, J. A. 0302
Fr 1stMarDiv WDJan
To 1stMAW
Carver, N. H. 1302
Fr 1stMarDiv WDDec
To CWTC Bridgeport Calif
Cervell, J. G. 0302
Fr AFSC Nor
To HQMC By13Feb
Clark, A. L. 7302
Fr 1stMAW WDJan
To 1stMarBrig
Cole, G. O. 0302
Fr AFSC Nor WDJan
To 3dMAW
Dwyer, R. T. 0302
Fr CinCUSNavEur
To AFSC Nor By3Feb
Ebel, A. 0805
Fr AFSC Nor WDJan
To FMFLant
Finlayson, E. H. 7302
Fr AFSC Nor WDJan
To 3dMarDiv
Herrick, D. L. 0302
Fr AFSC Nor WDJan
To 3dMAW
Hughes, T. H. 1802
Fr MCRD PI WDDec
To ComCruForLantFlt
Kern, R. H. 2502
Fr AFSC Nor WDJan
To FMFLant
Kersey, R. W. 7302
Fr AFSC Nor WDJan
To HQMC
Kew, G. D. 7333
Fr AFSC Nor WDJan
To AirFMFPac
Lines, J. D. 0302
Fr CinCLant Nor
To 1stMarDiv By23Jan
Lobell, W. R. 0302
Fr 2dMarDiv
To London Eng By13Feb
Mentzer, J. F. 1302
Fr AFSC Nor WDJan
To 2dMarDiv
Merchant, C. E. 7304
Fr 1stMAW
To Univ Omaha By26Jan
Miller, L. 0302
Fr HQMC WDDec
To LFTUPac
Newlands, J. P. 7335
Fr 2dMAW WDDec
To 3dMAW
Reed, E. O. 7335
Fr 2dMAW WDJan
To MCS Quant
Reifel, H. C. 0302
Fr 2dMarDiv WDJan
To AFSC Nor
Robertson, C. S. 0302
Fr NavMis Brazil WDaJn
To AFSC Nor
Ross, T. J. 7335
Fr FAA Wash DC
To Okla State Univ
Skinner, J. 7333
Fr HQMC WDJan
To AFSC Nor
Soupios, A. V. 3002
Fr 2dMAW WDJan
To 3dMarDiv
Wailes, E. A. 7307
Fr HQMC WDDec
To Off JCS

Temporary Promotions

Allen, R. L.
Bauman, G. F.
Doherty, J. J.
Dove, C. E.
Healy, R. M.
Lillie, J. L.
Smith, L. R.
Sumerlin, E. B.

Temporary Promotions, Reserve

Gavitt, W. M. 1Dec
Hatton, R. E. 1Dec
McJennett, J. F. 1Dec

Retired

Ahee, D. 7304 WDDec
Copeland, J. A. 0302 31Jan
Kelly, J. G. 0302 1Dec
Parnell, L. J. 1802 31Dec
Prosser, B. 7304 1Dec

Deaths, Reserve

Sarbacher, C. G. 16Nov
Lewiston Idaho

Deaths, Retired

Gowan, R. J. 12Nov
Tampa Fla

Recent Command and Staff Assignments

Bartram, V. L., Financial Management Br, SupDept, HQMC
Baughman, L. D., SupDept, HQMC
Cook, H. E., Off, CNO, Wash, D.C.
Daddazio, A. G., ExO AA Gr, 29 Palms
Ellis, G. W., CO, 7thEngBn, MCB, CamPen
Flinn, N. J., Off, SecDef, NASA, Wash, D.C.
Fulton, C. E., Insp, ForTrps, MCB, 29 Palms
Hale, M. J., Op's Br, G-3 Div, HQMC
Mehaffey, H. N., Plans Br, G-3, HQMC
Miller, W. T., CO, 1stMTBn, 1st MarDiv
Remington, R. M., G-4, MCAS, CherPt
Wall, R. B., Off, PCS, Wash, D.C.
Zastrow, H. E., CO, 1stLAAM Bn, 29 Palms

Majors

Transfers

Beau, J. C. 0302
Fr 2dMarDiv WDDec
To HQMC
Dormandy, W. K. 0302
Fr 3dMarDiv WDJan
To MCB 29Palms
Ellzey, H. J. 9901
Fr 1stMAW WDJan
To MCB CamPen
French, H. D. 0302
Fr MCRD PI
To NB NPT By15Dec
Gallentine, O. V. 7333
Fr 1stMarBrig WDJan
To 1stMAW
George, M. E. 0302
Fr MCS Quant
To HQMC By1Dec
Goode, C. L. 1302
Fr Ft Belvoir Va
To HQMC By10Feb
Gore, F. A. 0802
Fr 3dMarDiv WDJan
To ForTrps FMFPac
Gourley, N. W. 7302
Fr 1stMAW WDJan
To MCAS Kaneohe
Helm, W. H. 7304
Fr Univ Omaha WDJan
To 2dMAW
Hoey, J. A. 0302
Fr NWS Yorktown
To Ft Bragg NC By26Feb
Jackson, G. K. 7302
Fr 1stMAW WDJan
To 1stMarBrig
Johnson, J. R. 0302
Fr AFSC NorVa WDJan
To MCS Quant
Johnston, G. A. 7304
Fr AFSC Nor WDJan
To MB NS SFran By25Feb
Lynk, H. P. 7302
Fr 1stMAW
To Boston Univ By1Feb
Menjes, J. H. 3302
Fr MCS Quant
To Ft Lee Va By5Jan
Mottl, G. 7335
Fr 1stMarBrig WDJan
To 3dMAW
Needham, R. C. 0302
Fr 12th MCRRD
To CWTC Bridgeport Calif By1Feb
Preis, R. L. 7302
Fr 1stMarBrig WDJan
To 2dMAW
Smith, J. B. 7331
Fr MCS Quant
To Univ Md By6Feb
Tief, F. W. 0302
Fr MCS Quant WDJan
To Rome Italy
Valentour, J. V. 4002
Fr MCSFA SFran
To MCRD SDiego By31Dec
Vernon, T. E. 7333
Fr MCS Quant
To NavIntelScol Wash By8Jan
Wall, C. 1302
Fr HQMC 21Feb
To 1stMarDiv
West, R. H. 0802
Fr MCRD SDiego WDJan
To 3dMarDiv

Retired

Courington, R. N. 0302 1Dec
Davis, W. A. 1360 1Dec
Dyer, C. A. 3002 WDDec
Elms, H. D. 3002 1Dec
Grasselli, A. A. 7304 1Dec
McGee, C. H. 7333 1Dec
Milless, E. W. 6602 31Dec
Ravensberg, E. F. 7333 30Dec
Ryder, T. J. 3002 31Dec
Skelt, E. P. 1302 1Dec

Recent Command and Staff Assignments

Hilgart, V. F., WOTC, Acctg Unit, HQMC
Lewis, L. G., MarCorLnOff, USA AirDefBd, Ft Bliss, Tex
Middleton, A. D., FinManBr, Sup Dept, HQMC
Varley, W. J., AdminDiv, PubBr, HQMC

Captains

Transfers

Allen, J. H. 2020
Fr 3dMarDiv WDJan
To ForTrps FMFLant
Badamo, F. J. 2502
Fr 1stMarDiv WDJan
To 3dMarDiv
Blanc, R. J. 7302
Fr 1stMAW WDJan
To NAS CORPC
Bowen, A. W. 3010
Fr 6th MCRRD WDJan
To 3dMarDiv
Breslauer, C. K. 0302
Fr 1stMarDiv
To MCS Quant By28Feb
Bridges, R. L. 0302
Fr Dow AFB Maine WDJan
To 3dMarDiv
Bright, R. E. 7305
Fr DOW AFB Maine WDJan
To 2dMAW
Buck, R. 3310
Fr 3dMarDiv WDJan
To ForTrps FMFLant
Caliendo, D. N. 6709
Fr 1stMAW WDDec
To MB NB Bklyn
Campbell, J. W. 0802
Fr 4thMCRRD WDJan
To 3dMarDiv
Castro, J. 6402
Fr 3dMAW WDJan
To 1stMAW
Chapin, R. W. 7333
Fr 3dMAW WDJan
To 1stMAW
Chartrand, V. W. 0302
Fr 3dMarDiv
To HQMC By20Jan
Coombe, D. E. 3010
Fr 1stMAW WDJan
To 1stMarDiv
Crosby, D. A. 2710
Fr 3dMarDiv WDJan
To 1stMarDiv
Cumiskey, F. P. 0130
Fr 3dMarDiv WDJan
To ForTrps FMFPac
Day, J. R. 3502
Fr 2dMarDiv WDJan
To 3dMarDiv
Dekle, C. C. 0302
Fr MCB CamPen WDDec
To MAD NATTC Jax
Delaney, F. L. 0302
Fr ForTrps FMFPac WDJan
To I-I Portsmouth
Dennis, U. G. 7302
Fr 2dMAW 20Dec
To 1stMAW
Duncan, W. B. 0702
Fr Monterey Calif WDJan
To MCS Quant
Echols, A. M. 7335
Fr 2dMAW
To MCAS Beaufort By5Jan
Elliott, J. R. 3102
Fr NSC Oakland WDDec
To MCAS El Toro
Fogo, W. E. 0302
Fr USS Wasp WDJan
To NB Ptsmh
Frain, A. K. 7302
Fr NAS CorpC WDJan
To MCAAS Yuma
Frappollo, P. S. 7333
Fr NAS Pncla
To NAS Memphis
Fritschi, G. W. 7331
Fr 2dMAW WDJan
To NAS CorpC
Galloway, J. J. 7304
Fr 2dMAW WDJan
To 1stMAW
Gavin, L. T. 7335
Fr MCAS Beaufort
To NAS Pncla By22Feb
Haynes, J. W. 7331
Fr 2dMAW WDJan
To 1stMAW
Hendricks, R. G. 0302
Fr MCS Quant WDJan
To USS Wasp
Henry, E. C. 6402
Fr 3dMAW
To MCAS El Toro By1Feb
Hickey, R. E. 6402
Fr 3dMAW WDJan
To 1stMAW
Jacobs, P. M. 7302
Fr 1stMAW WDJan
To NAS CorpC
Jensen, A. E. 2502
Fr 2dMAW WDJan
To MCS Quant
Kelly, F. J. 0302
Fr MB NWS Yorktown WDDec
To MCS Quant
Kostelecky, J. R. 0802
Fr 3dMarDiv WDJan
To ForTrps FMFPac
Laning, E. A. 7302
Fr 2dMAW 20Dec
To MCS Quant
LeBlanc, L. J. 7302
Fr 1stMAW WDJan
To MCS Quant
Light, W. H. 2502
Fr 3dMarDiv WDJan
To 1stMarDiv
Lockhart, O. L. 3402
Fr 1stMAW WDJan
To 2dMarDiv
Lutes, G. W. 1803
Fr ForTrps FMFLant
To 1stMCRRD By15Feb
Machado, L. E. 1803
Fr MCB CamLej
To Indian Head Md By2Feb
Martin, G. H. 0802
Fr MB Bklyn WDJan
To Mitchell AFB
McCarthy, J. J. 7333
Fr 2dMAW WDJan
To NAS CorpC
McClure, R. J. 3010
Fr 3dMarDiv WDJan
To MCSC Albany
McKillop, W. M. 7335
Fr 2dMAW WDJan
To 1stMAW
McMahon, G. F. 0302
Fr Harrisburg Pa WDJan
To USS Boston
McPheeters, T. A. 0802
Fr 1stMarDiv WDJan
To MB Guam
Miller, T. F. 7335
Fr MCAF Santa Ana WDJan
To 1stMAW
Miller, E. W. 7302
Fr 1stMAW WDJan
To Ft Meade, Md
Miller, J. E. 7302
Fr 1stMAW WDJan
To 2dMAW
Moriarity, J. F. 0302
Fr 2dMarDiv
To MCS Quant By28Feb
Morocco, C. P. 0130
Fr 1stMarDiv
To MCB CamPen By4Jan
Muth, H. F. 7332
Fr MCAS CherPt WDJan
To NAS Jax
Nelson, D. L. 2502
Fr 3dMarDiv WDJan
To 1stMarDiv
O'Leary, R. J. 0302
Fr 3dMarDiv WDJan
To MCB 29Palms
Pafford, B. E. 9901
Fr MAG-32
To MCS Quant By28Feb
Papke, M. E. 1802
Fr MCB 29Palms WDJan
To 3dMarDiv
Parish, L. W. 7304
Fr FMFPac WDDec
To 1stMarBrig
Patrick, V. E. 0302
Fr 8thMCRRD WDJan
To 3dMarDiv
Payne, E. S. 7333
Fr 1stMAW WDJan
To 2dMAW
Phillips, C. L. 7333
Fr 3dMarDiv WDJan
To NAS PaxRiver
Pifer, A. C. 6402
Fr 2dMAW WDJan
To 1stMAW
Rappe, J. C. 0302
Fr MCRD PI WDJan
To USS Proteus
Reilly, W. J. 0130
Fr 3dMarDiv WDJan
To MCS Quant
Robinson, R. L. 7307
Fr MCAS CherPt WDJan
To 2dMAW
Romine, R. E. 7307
Fr MCAF Santa Ana WDJan
To 1stMAW
Ross, W. H. 7335
Fr FMFPac WDDec
To H&S FMFPac
Schaefer, D. A. 7335
Fr MCS Quant WDJan
To USS Boxer
Sherlock, J. 7333
Fr 3dMAW
To MCAS El Toro By1Feb
Shetzer, W .J. 3010
Fr MCS Barstow
To NavSupCen Oak By22Jan
Shortt, H. R. 1302
Fr 1stMarBrig WDJan
To 2dMarDiv
Siepicka, A. A. 0302
Fr USS Ticonderoga WDJan
To HQMC
Sproul, R. J. 7333
Fr AIR FMFPac 10Dec
To 1stMAW

Teichmann, D. A. 7304
Fr 2dMAW WDJan
To MCAS Beaufort

Tonnacliff, C. W. 3502
Fr 3dMarDiv WDJan
To 3dMAW

Tremmel, R. M. 0302
Fr 8thMCRRD WDJan
To 3dMarDiv

Tyksinski, W. A. 7304
Fr 3dMAW
To MCAS El Toro By1Feb

Valentine, H. C. 0802
Fr MCSC Barstow WDJan
To 1stMarDiv

Van Deusen, L. E. 7302
Fr 1stMAW WDJan
To MCS Quant

Vanhook, E. H. 6402
Fr 1stMAW WDJan
To 3dMAW

Wall, W. G. 4002
Fr MCB CamLej
To MCAS CherPt By15Jan

Weir, K. W. 7302
Fr 3dMAW WDJan
To NAS PaxRiv

Whitmer, J. A. 7333
Fr 1stMAW
To 2dMAW By1Feb

Wonhof, A. E. 3010
Fr ForTrps FMFLant WDJan
To 3dMarDiv

Yost, R. W. 3060
Fr 1stMAW WDJan
To NAS North Island

Zimba, J. P. 3010
Fr 1stMAW WDJan
To 1stMarDiv

Promotions

Temporary

Jowers, J. W.
Obymachow, J. P.
Ebert, P. E.
Hyde, M. J.
Mann, R. G.
McCarvill, W.
Meaney, T. J.
Melly, L. T.
Mulhall, H. G.

Permanent

Collins, R. L.
Davis, C. L.
Dunn, C. W.
Earle, G. H.
Hendrix, C. E.
Holbein, D. S.
Ramirez, J. A.
Taylor, R. A.

Retired

Douglas, W. E. 3302
1Dec

Douville, C. G. 0130
1Dec

Graves, F. E. 4002
1Dec

Green, H. A. 2715
1Dec

Guidone, F. J. 0302
1Dec

Haines, G. C. 3102
31Dec

Langley, J. F. 3102
1Dec

Lee, H. J. 0130
1Dec

Light, P. L. 2010
1Dec

Meinke, T. 3025
1Dec

Rogers, W. M. 3402
1Dec

Deaths, Active Duty

Leathers, R. I. 7302
1stMAW 18Nov

Taylor, J. F. 7305
NAS Atsugi Japan 4Dec

Recent Command and Staff Assignments

Hitz, J. C., CO, Btry H, 3/12, 1st MarBrig, FMF

Phillips, R. J., Jr., CO, HqBtry, 3/12, 1stMarBrig, FMF

Taylor, J. R., Off of the Comptroller, NavDept, Wash, D.C.

Delong, SpecSer Cust, MCB, CamLej To NAS CorpC

1st Lieutenants

Transfers

Acott, R. D. 7304
Fr 2dMAW WDJan
To 1stMAW

Alexander, R. E. 7302
Ft 1stMAW WDJan
To NAS CorpC

Anthis, B. G. 7399
Fr 2dMarDiv WDJan
To MAD NABTC Pncla

Arnold, R. F. 3010
Fr MCB CamLej WDJan
To NAG Korea

Ashe, J. T. 9901
Fr 3dMarDiv WDJan
To 2dMAW

Baker, C. M. 1802
Fr ForTrps FMFLant WDJan
To USS Saratoga

Barry, A. P. 0802
Fr 3dMarDiv WDJan
To MCAS CherPt

Beaulieu, R. J. 7398
Fr NAS CorpC WDJan
To 2dMAW

Beckwith, R. L. 7302
Fr 2dMAW WDJan
To 1stMAW

Bergan, D. T. 7333
Fr 1stMarBrig WDJan
To 3dMAW

Bergen, D. F. 0802
Fr 1stMarDiv
To FMFPac

Blackwell, T. S. 0802
Fr 3dMarDiv WDJan
To 2dMAW

Bordic, G. A. 6709
Fr 1stMAW WDJan
To 3dMAW

Borre, J. P. 6709
Fr 1stMAW WDJan
To 3dMAW

Braun, R. G. 0302
Fr MB NWS Yorktown WDDec
To MCS Quant

Braun, R. C. 3010
Fr 2dMarDiv WDJan
To Rodman CZ

Brock, D. A. 0802
Fr 2dMarDiv WDDec
To ForTrps FMFLant

Brusha, D. R. 6709
Fr 1stMAW
To MCAAS Yuma

Carpenter, C. L. 0302
Fr ForTrps FMFLant WDDec
To FMFPac

Chaimson, R. C. 7302
Fr 1stMAW WDJan
To NAS Pncla

Chalmers, R. H. 2502
Fr 3dMarDiv WDJan
To 1stMarDiv

Chapin, H. 7304
Fr 1stMAW WDJan
To 3dMAW

Cisewski, F. L. 2502
Fr ForTrps FMFLant
To MCS Quant By 28Feb

Clark, C. W. 1802
Fr 3dMarDiv WDJan
To MCS Quant

Colcaire, P. J. 9901
Fr MCS Quant WDDec
To 2dMarDiv

Conaty, D. B. 0302
Fr USS Saratoga WDJan
To Ft Holabird Md

Cook, E. T. 0302
Fr 2dMarDiv WDJan
To NS Argentia

Crowley, T. J. 6406
Fr 1stMAW WDJan
To 2dMAW

Daas, R. F. 7335
Fr 2dMAW
To MCAS El Toro By1Feb

Dau, M. E. 0802
Fr 3dMarDiv WDJan
To MCB CamLej

Davidson, J. U. 4102
Fr 1stMAW WDJan
To MCRD SDiego

Deemer, J. C. 0802
Fr 3dMarDiv WDJan
To MCB CamLej

Denby, D. B. 1302
Fr 3dMarDiv WDJan
To ForTrps FMFPac

Dennis, G. H. 0802
Fr 3dMarDiv WDJan
To MCRD SDiego

Derryberry, L. D. 3502
Fr ForTrps FMFLant WDDec
To MCB CamLej

Dougherty, P. K. 0302
Fr 3dMarDiv WDJan
To MCS Quant

Douglas, D. M. 0802
Fr ForTrps FMFPac
To MCS Quant By 28Feb

Drum, D. S. 0802
Fr 3dMarDiv WDJan
To MCAS El Toro

Eastman, F. 6709
Fr 1stMAW WDJan
To 2dMAW

Eldred, L. C. 7302
Fr 1stMAW WDJan
To NAS CorpC

Ellefson, D. C. 0302
Fr 3dMarDiv WDDec
To MCB CamPen

Faucette, B. L. 6708
Fr 1stMAW WDJan
To 2dMAW

Ferries, D. W. 2502
Fr 1stMarDiv WDJan
To USS Mathews

Formanek, R. L. 3010
Fr MCS Quant WDJan
To 3dMarDiv

Fraser, D. R. 9901
Fr MCS Quant WDDec
To 1stMarDiv

Frazier, A. C. 1302
Fr 3dMarDiv WDJan
To 2dMAW

Garcia, J. T. 1802
Fr 3dMarDiv WDJan
To 1stMarDiv

Green, J. M. 2502
Fr MCS Quant WDJan
To HQMC

Grooms, H. O. 7304
Fr 2dMAW WDJan
To 1stMAW

Guenther, G. G. 7333
Fr MAD NABTC Pncla WDDec
To 3dMAW

Hagener, R. L. 7302
Fr 2dMAW WDDec
To 1stMAW

Hendrix, C. E. 7333
Fr 3dMAW WDJan
To 1stMAW

Houlahan, A. V. 6708
Fr 1stMAW WDJan
To 2dMAW

Howell, J. W. 1302
Fr 3dMarDiv WDJan
To ForTrps FMFLant

Hubbell, C. O. 6406
Fr 1stMAW WDJan
To 3dMAW

Huffcutt, W. H. 1399
Fr 2dMarDiv WDJan
To NAS Pncla

Ijams, K. F. 2502
Fr 3dMarDiv WDJan
To 1stMarDiv

Johnston, G. R. 0802
Fr USS Mathews WDJan
To 1stMarDiv

Jordan, E. E. 3502
Fr ForTrps FMFLant WDDec
To MCB CamLej

Kelly, M. J. 0302
Fr USS Bon Homme R WDJan
To Indian Head Md

Kennedy, C. A. 0802
Fr MB Yorktown Va.
To MCS Quant By28Feb

Kiger, P. A. 9901
Fr 3dMarDiv WDJan
To MCS Quant

Kretsinger, J. M. 7302
Fr 1stMAW WDJan
To NAS CorpC

Laaksonen, C. D. 0302
Fr MCRD SDiego WDJan

Latting, C. W. 9901
Fr MCS Quant WDJan
To 2dMarDiv

Leaf, A. H. 0802
Fr 3dMarDiv WDJan
To 2dMAW

Leary, D. F. 7399
Fr 2dMarDiv WDJan
To MAD NABTC Pncla

Lee, K. C. 6708
Fr 1stMAW WDJan
To 2dMAW

Lewis, D. A. 7333
Fr NAS CorpC WDJan
To 3dMAW

Little, J. W. 6406
Fr 1stMAW WDJan
To 3dMAW

Marsh, R. L. 6709
Fr 1stMAW WDJan
To 3dMAW

McEvoy, D. L. 7304
Fr 3dMAW WDJan
To 1stMAW

McBrien, T. P. 1333
Fr NAS Pncla WDDec
To 2dMAW

McDonough, J. P. 6708
Fr 1stMAW WDJan
To 3dMAW

Mills, J. G. 7399
Fr 1stMarDiv
To MAD NABTC Pncla By18Jan

Morrow, G. R. 3502
Fr 2dMarDiv WDDec
To MCB CamLej

Mullert, R. G. 1302
Fr 3dMarDiv WDJan
To 2dMAW

Obye, J. R. 0802
Fr 1stMarBrig WDDec
To MCAS Kaneohe Bay

O'Donnell, T. R. 2502
Fr 3dMarDiv WDJan
To MCS Quant

Olson, G. A. 7304
Fr 3dMAW WDJan
To 1stMAW

O'Neal, G. M. 7333
Fr 2dMAW WDJan
To 1st MAW

O'Neill, E. G. 0802
Fr 3dMarDiv WDJan
To MCAS Beaufort

Parkin, D. L. 0802
Fr 3dMarDiv WDJan
To MCRD SDiego

Parks, F. A. 2502
Fr 3dMarDiv WDJan
To MCS Quant

Radzyminski, J. T. 0802
Fr 3dMarDiv WDJan
To MCAAS Yuma

Rausch, R. C. 4102
Fr 2dMarDiv WDJan
To 3dMarDiv

Redmond, J. 6708
Fr 1stMAW WDJan
To 2dMAW

Russell, E. B. 7302
Fr 1stMAW WDJan
To NAS CorpC

Scibeck, R. B. 6708
Fr 1stMAW WDJan
To 3dMAW

Scott, J. R. 6406
Fr 1stMAW WDJan
To 3dMAW

Shelton, J. L. 7335
Fr 3dMAW WDJan
To 1stMAW

Sheridan, E. A. 0302
Fr 3dMarDiv WDDec
To MCB CamLej

Sims, G. W. 9901
Fr 2dMAW
To MCS Quant By12Dec

Snyder, W. H. 6406
Fr 1stMAW WDJan
To 3dMAW

Spence, J. R. 0302
Fr 1stMarDiv WDJan
To MB NAD Oahu

Stettler, L. G. 0802
Fr 3dMarDiv WDJan
To MCAS El Toro

Streit, R. J. 1302
Fr 3dMarDiv WDJan
To MCB CamLej

Sullivan, J. C. 1802
Fr 3dMarDiv WDJan
To MCRD SDiego

Taffee, H. W. 7302
Fr 3dMAW WDJan
To 1stMAW

Tague, F. J. 0802
Fr 3dMarDiv WDJan
To MCAS CherPt

Thomas, B. H. 7302
Fr 1stMAW WDJan
To NAS CorpC

Thrasher, R. R. 0302
Fr 1stMarDiv WDJan
To MAD NABTC Pncla

Tomlinson, W. N. 6709
Fr 1stMAW WDJan
To 3dMAW

Walker, R. J. 6709
Fr 1stMAW WDJan
To 2dMAW

Wamsley, W. H. 1302
Fr 3dMarDiv WDJan
To 3dMAW

Ward, C. L. 1302
Fr 3dMarDiv WDJan
To MCRD PI

Warfield, H. R. 7304
Fr 2dMAW WDJan
To 1stMAW

Weida, G. A. 0802
Fr 3dMarDiv WDJan
To MCRD SDiego

Whipple, L. A. 7302
Fr 1stMAW WDJan
To NAS CorpC

Wilson, K. M. 3502
Fr ForTrps FMFLant WDDec
To MCB CamLej

Wolfe, R. W. 1302
Fr 3dMarDiv WDJan
To MCRD PI

Young, W. J. 9901
Fr MCS Quant WDDec
To 2dMarDiv

Permanent Promotions, Reserve

Flattery, P. C.

Temporary Promotions

Abington, R. C.
Adams, J. C.
Adams, R. A.
Adams, T. N.
Akin, B. E.
Akins, R. E.
Alden, M. I.
Aldrich, T. W.
Allen, J. S.
Ammidon, H.
Ammon, R. D.
Amsler, J. H.
Anderson, D. H.
Anderson, J. F.
Anderson, J. L.
Archambault, A. E.
Archer, C. S.
Arcuri, J.
Armstrong, R. E.
Babbs, K. J.
Baggett, C. A.
Bailey, R. W.
Baker, N. J.
Baker, D. S.
Baker, J. R.
Ballaine, D. A.
Banks, C. G.
Baradat, A. J.
Barnard, K. N.
Barnett, J. W.
Barnes, R. J.
Barry, W. A.
Bartunek, J. F.
Basinski, D. A.
Bauknight, H. L.
Baxter, J. F.
Bean, G. W.
Bearce, L. V.
Beaver, J. P.
Beck, H. D.
Behymer, L. A.
Bellows, B. M.
Benford, N. J.
Bergbauer, D. M.
Bernotas, A. A.
Bice, C. B.
Bickley, L. A.
Bienvenu, D. S.
Bisbee, J. M.
Bishop, J. A.
Bizzano, J. D.
Black, S. E.
Blacque, R. E.
Blake, C.
Bledsoe, L. L.
Bledsoe, L. B.
Blount, L. R.
Bock, P. H.
Boltz, H. W.
Boone, J. B.
Booth, D. A.
Bopko, P. C.
Boston, G. W.
Bottom, E. D.
Bowdoin, H. J.
Bowersox, R. L.
Boyce, E. H.
Boyd, G. D.
Bradfield, R. C.
Braman, G. H.
Brand, R. L.
Branner, W. H.
Bransford, T. L.
Brennan, J. V.
Brindell, W. F.
Britt, W. H.
Broihier, J. E.
Brooke, P. F.
Brotzman, R. D.
Brown, B. G.
Brown, J. H.
Brown, P. C.
Brown, V. A.
Brown, J. L.
Brown D. E.
Brown, J. R.
Bruce, J. J.
Bunker, W. V.
Burdelski, V. R.
Burnett, L. D.
Burns, J. R.
Burns, E. B.
Burns, C. C.
Burrows, W. J.
Burt, R. N.
Bush, C. A.
Butler, J. H.
Buttacavoli, C. A.
Byrd, W. R.
Byrne, T. E.
Calhoun, D. H.
Calteaux, J. A.
Campbell, D. B.
Capin, F. L.
Carew, J. H.
Carieri, C. R.
Carlin, L. W.
Carnes. R. A.
Caro, D. E.
Carr, D. R.
Carr, D. J.
Carroll, J. G.
Carroll, H. G.
Carter, R. S.
Carver, D. M.
Cashwell, R. H.
Cassidy, L. M.
Caverly, D. E.
Chambers, F. X.
Chapman, C. H.
Chappell, G. F.
Chastain, J. E.
Cheney, O. W.
Chilson, J. H.
Christensen, G. E.
Chrisman, J. B.
Christman, M.
Chumo, M.
Churchill, A. B.
Clarence, D. L.
Clark, S. S.
Clark, A. L.
Clements, J. E.
Clifford, E. T.
Cline, E. W.
Clotfelter, R. C.
Coates, R. S.
Coleman, D. C.
Collins, J. H.
Concepcion, D. A.
Cone, D. B.
Conetta, D. L.
Conley, S. T.
Connors, J. J.
Coombs, S. J.
Cooper, R. S.
Coplan, R. F.
Correro, P. O.
Cosgrove, K. G.
Cotton, E. L.
Cotton, J. E.
Cox, F. O.
Crain, J. D.
Cravens, J. R.
Creal, D. S.
Creech, J. A.
Crigler, C. F.
Crisman, J. H.
Croak, T. E.
Crompton, T. R.
Cuppies, G. J.
Cushing, P. S.
Dade, S. J.
Damore, L. J.
Dandison, B. G.
Daniel, R. A.
Daniels, W. E.
Dauer, A. F.
Davis, D. N.
Davis, L. N.
Day, T. T.
Deal, F. E.
Dean, A. B.
Deflavis, T. F.
Deiullis, W. E.
Deluca, A. J.
Dentz, J. G.
Deornellas, C. L.
Dickey, W. M.
Dickie, D. S.
Dickinson, J.
Dienvenu, W. J.
Dimarco, A.
Dincher, T. A.
Dixon, A. K.
Dods, W. K.
Doherty, F. V.
Domzalski, E. J.
Donovan, W. J.
Dougherty, J. W.
Dougherty, C. F.
Doughtie, N. C.
Dove, W. G.
Drewelow, D. G.
Ducote, J. A.
Duff, R. D.
Duffy, T. T.
Dunbar, J. V.
Dunlap, C. R.
Dunn, E. M.
Dusseau, M. W.
Dwan, J. F.
Dyer, E. G.
Dynan, F. J.
Eales, A. R.
Eberhardt, M. B.
Elliott, K. E.
Elliott, J. W.
Ellis, D. E.
Elster, J. R.
Emmons, S. P.
Epstein, J. R.
Eshelman, W. P.
Estes, H. D.
Etcho, L. L.
Fairchild, C. R.
Falgout, R. P.
Farrar, R. W.
Farrier, J. A.
Farrington, F. X.
Faulkner, J. E.
Feind, W. J.
Fekety, A. M.
Fernandez, A.
Filan, R. W.
Filoon, J. W.
Findlay, R. F.
Finley, E. E.
Finn, L. P.
Fisher, Z. B.
Fitch, R. A.
Fitts, W. M.
Fleming, G. C.
Fleming, C. A.
Floyd, D. A.
Flynn, J. F.
Follman, J. T.
Foos, T. C.
Foote, E. T.
Ford, R. F.
Forman, D. M.
Fournier, W. J.
Fowlkes, J. C.
Fox, J. I.
Frazier, R. E.
Freeman, J. A.
Freeman, J. B.
Frost, B. R.
Furlong, W. R.
Gaetani, S. F.
Gaither, J. C.
Gale, P. W.
Gambelli, F. E.
Gapenski, L. C.
Garbacz, G. G.
Gardner, R. B.
Gardner, J. E.
Garth, A. M.
Gasperi, U. A.
Geis, R. W.
Geinaw, D. F.
Gibbons, E. W.
Gibson, C. W.
Gibson, W. O.
Giles, J. E.
Gillespie, B. M.
Gilliard, J. D.
Gilmore, V. K.
Gini, M. L.
Gipson, C. L.
Givan, J. E.
Goldberg, H. A.
Gosnell, K. B.
Gottlieb, P. R.
Gould, F. C.
Grahan, A. A.
Granstra, W. R.
Green, M. M.
Greer, H. D.
Gregor, R. C.
Griffin, B. J.
Griggs, G. R.
Grinalds, J. S.
Gulick, R. S.
Gustafson, D. K.
Hacker, W. E.
Hackert, R. R.
Hadley, R. E.
Hagerman, G. N.
Hagman, T. A.
Halbert, R. O.
Hall, J. R.
Hall, D. F.
Hamilton, J. L.
Hamilton, R. B.
Handley, J. D.
Hanle, R. L.
Hannah, L. B.
Hansen, D. P.
Hansen, A. G.
Hardin, J. R.
Hargrove, R. H.
Harrer, D. R.
Harvath, S. R.
Havrda, J. J.
Hawkey, R. A.
Hawkins, H. H.
Hawkins, R. H.
Haynes, J. D.
Hedwall, J. E.
Heginbotham, S. J.
Henderson, E. H.
Henderson, D. H.
Henry, B. E.
Herd, A. A.
Heyd, J. D.
Hezlep, J. M.
Hicks, H. D.
Hicks, W. R.
Higgins, J. J.
Higgins, L. M.
Hill, T. J.
Hinkle, P. M.
Hipp, C. A.
Hirsch, D. B.
Hixson, M. J.
Hollman, C. G.
Hokom, R. A.
Holtzapple, R. A.
Hornett, J. W.
Horsfall, R. S.
Hoynes, E. J.
Huber, T. P.
Hudson, D. R.
Hull, R. K.
Humphries, W. R.
Humphries, E. W.
Hunnicutt, J. E.
Hyatt, W. R.
Inglee, P. S.
Ingram, J. F.
Isola, A. C.
Itchkawich, H. E.
Iversen, K. M.
Jackson, T. C.
Jacobs, J. P.
Jadlos, J. P.
Jenkins, R. S.
Jenkins, H. F.
Jenning, J. W.
Johnston, C. J.
Johnson, R. E.
Johns, H. L.
Johnson, R. D.
Johnson, P. M.
Johnson, C. M.
Johnson, G. C.
Johnson, R. A.
Jolley, L. E.
Juddy, N. W.
Koury, V. A.
Kane, P. J.
Kappes, C. H.
Kappelman, G. W.
Kay, D. S.
Keane, C. C.
Keiser, G. W.
Kelly, G. D.
Kemper, D. L.
Kempf, D. G.
Kennedy, G. C.
Kessenich, M. F.
Kiely, D. J.
Kilday, J. J.
King, G. J.
King, R. F.
Kingston, G. P.
Kirland, T. P.
Kitto, C. W.
Kluth, E. J.
Knapp, J. E.
Knepper, R. L.
Knief, J. H.
Koester, A. K.
Krebser, J. N.
Kruger, A. L.
Krumrei, A. A.
Kubik, E. F.
Kuhar, M. A.
Kunkel, H. L.
Kupets, G. A.
Kurilich, R. V.
Kurtz, P. T.
Lain, B. D.
Laing, M. W.
Lamar, L. W.
Lamb, R. W.
Lannes, W. J.
Larimore, J. W.
Larimore, G. C.
Larowe, W. C.
Larsen, H. P.
Larson, G. M.
Lashbaugh, M. J.
Lathrop, J. L.
Laughlin, J. H.
Laumbach, D. D.
Lavan, R. E.
Lawson, R. D.
Lee, T. A.
Legro, S. W.
Leidich, R. G.
Lemay, R. E.
Lemmel, K. G.
Lennartz, F. J.
Leonard, M. W.
Levitt, M. G.
Lewin, L. S.
Lewis, J. W.
Libkie, F. A.
Liittschwager, R. C.
Lindstrom, R. L.
Ling, H. A.
Lohr, R. E.
Long, J. H.
Longua, H. L.
Longua, T. J.
Losik, F. A.
Lovett, W. D.
Lowe, R. E.
Ludmerer, V. J.
Lyons, T. E.
Lyons, P. D.
MacEachin, D. J.
MacLaren, M.
MacLetchie, J. G.
MacMinn, R. C.
Madden, R. J.
Maddox, C. T.
Maher, J. E.
Makowski, P. R.
Maney, D. A.
Manley, J. M.
Mansfield, J. M.
Marks, A. M.
Martin, D. J.
Martinez, T. F.
Martin, J. E.
Martin, R. G.
Martz, G. R.
Mason, J. E.
Matthews, G. H.
Mauldin, W. T.
Maurer, J. J.
Mayer, E. C.
McCafferty, R. W.
McCarthy, E. J.
McColl. D. K.
McCormick, R. G.
McCubbin, T. R.
McDermott, P. R.
McEldowney, B. C.
McFall, W. T.
McFarlane, R. C.
McGlynn, P. J.
McGowan, R. W.
McGraw, C. L.
McHugh, J. C.
McKanna, L. M.
McLelland, D. R.
McMinn, W. C.
McMorrow, P. J.
McNamara, J. D.
McRoberts, J. C.
Mead, W. H.
Meehan, J. L.
Meharg, B. A.
Meibaum, G. R.
Meier, F. J.
Menning, F. H.
Messerschmidt, D. B.
Metcalf, C. B.
Metry, R. A.
Metscher, W. H.
Mikkelson, P. C.
Miller, A. M.
Miller, R. E.
Miller, D. D.
Mills, M. R.
Miskow, K. P.
Mitchell, G. R.
Mitchell, P. M.
Mnick, J. J.
Monaghan, T. O.
Monroe, J. W.
Moore, W. S.
Moran, J. G.
Moran, J. B.
Morgart, R. J.
Morgan, H. A.
Moriarty, W. S.
Morris, R. S.
Morrow, W. A.
Mosser, G. E.
Muller, M. E.
Murphy, J. T.
Nash, W. A.
Naxiaux, J. C.
Nelson, J. O.
Nelson, T. J.
Neville, W. H.
Nevins, G. R.
Newbrough, E. R.
Newman, L. F.
Nickolson, R.
Noll, E. P.
Norris, J. T.
Northcutt, T. C.
Northropp, K. P.
Norton, J. J.
Norton, G. D.
Noteboom, K. W.
O'Bryan, C. D.
O'Connor, M. D.
Olson, A. J.
Omer, J. L.
O'Reilly, P. C.
Osgood, J. K.
Ostermann, G. A.
Parker, L. E.
Paul, W. B.
Paydo, M. A.
Peet, C.
Pereira, R. J
Peterson, C. L.
Phelan, L. H.
Phillips, H. A.
Phillips, J. W.
Piccola, F.
Pilaroscia, L. J.
Pittman, R. L.
Piwowarczyk, R. W.
Platt, J. C.
Pond, R. C.
Porter, S. M.
Powell, J. B.
Prather, G. D.
Price, R. G.
Proctor, J. M.
Rademacher, M. J.
Rapp, C. S.
Rector, E. B.
Redelman, R. L.
Redgate, J. H.
Redpath, R. J.
Reed, A. R.
Reed, G. D.
Reilly, J. E.
Reitman, J. M.
Reynolds, R. C.
Rice, C. T.
Richardson, J. H.
Richards, T. J.
Rider, J. W.
Ries. H. N.
Riley, R. A.
Riley, J. B.
Rindfleisch, J. A.
Roberts, A. J.
Rogers, W. R.
Rollins, H. M.
Rollins, J. H.
Rolstad, L. A.
Rone, W. H.
Roof, D. P.
Ross, C. G.
Rucksdashel, R. N.
Ruff, W. E.
Ryman, R. K.
Saenz, R.
Sallstrom, D. M.
Samuels, P. J.
Sapp, J. W.
Sarvi, A. R.
Savage, R. B.
Sayer, M. W.
Schaeffer, J. H.
Schneider, R. J.
Schon, P. C.
Schrader, D. W.
Schrefer, P. J.
Schulze, J. B.
Schwarze, R. C.
Scofield, J. B.
Scott, W. W.
Scott, G. W.
Searle, R. E.
Sedutto, W. H.
Selby, M. C.
Sengpiehl, R. L.
Severs, H. B.
Shaffer, J. R.
Shay, G. G.
Sheetz, W. O.
Shirreffs, J. J.
Shoquist, B. W.
Shubin, P. V.
Shuter, D. V.
Silver, F. M.
Simmons, G.
Sisneros, T. D.
Sisson, W. W.
Skellenger, J. R.
Skordas, R. G.
Sledge, J. W.
Smith, M. M.
Smith, E. J.
Smith, L. A.
Smith, G. C.
Smith, S. R.
Snee, J. M.
Snell, J. C.
Snyder, F. J.
Somers, K. J.
Soriesen, M. G.
Souders, J. P.
Southard, F. L.
Spence, G. B.
St. Pierre, G. S.
Staley, J. H.
Stamand, N.
Stanford, G. R.
Stanton, J. E.
Staples, S. A.
Stecchi, D. F.
Steinberger, R. J.
Stepcick, R. J.
Stewart, C. A.
Stockwell, J. R.
Strandtmann, R. L.
Strickland, J. D.
Strong, B. W.
Sturdivant, J. M.
Sullivan, J. V.
Swickheimer, G. L.
Swingen, R. K.
Taggart, T. M.
Tanner, L. R.
Tate, J. H.
Taylor, Z. L.
Tessem, T. E.
Thomas, J. R.
Thomas, A.
Thomas, D. E.
Thomas, H. E.
Thompson, T. W.
Tibbetts, O. P.
Tingley, T. T.
Tinsley, J. H.
Tjompson, W. S.
Todd, J. H.
Topham, J. T.

Towers, T. B.
Town, K. R.
Traynor, D. R.
Trevarthen, A.
Tupper, J. O.
Turner, R. A.
Tuttle, J. M.
Updyke, J. M.
Urciuoli, J. A.
Vanlancker, J.
Vann, F. M.
Vecchio, R. J.
Velie, A. R.
Vogt, R. L.
Voorheis, V. J.
Voss, H. F.
Walker, R. F.
Walters, J. R.
Ward, H. T.
Ward, F. R.
Ward, M. J.
Warman, K. E.
Warren, D. D.
Wary, R. M.
Laoterhouse, L.
Waters, A. L.
Watson, D. W.
Watson, R. L.
Waugh, W. H.
Weathers, P.
Weber, E. M.
Wegner, V. B.
Weidner, R. J.
Weinsz, D. A.
Weisenauer, J.
Werner, I. R.
West, L. W.
Wetzel, R. A.
Whelan, J. E.
Whelan, J. J.
White, J. M.
White, J. P.
Wicklein, P. C.
Wilke, M. R.
Wilkinson, P.
Willis, J. L.
Williams, J. S.
Wilmerding, W.
Wilson, E. B.
Windolf, J. A.
Winter, R. D.
Wirkus, F. E.
Witwer, J. L.
Wolk, C. J.
Wollard, D. A.
Wolpert, R. J.
Wood, M. E.
Woods, R. M.
Woodworth, M.
Worley, J. W.
Wright, W.
Wright, J. E.
Wright, G. D.
Weiderhold, B.
Whitney, R. H.
Young, G. F.
Stavinski, R.
Yarmy, R. L.
Yates, J. B.
Youle, J. W.
Young, E. I.
Young, R. K.

Recent Command and Staff Assignments

Carlson, C. J., Admin Br, DivAvn, HQMC

2d Lieutenants

Transfers
From MCS, Quantico

Alsop, J. R.
To 3dMarDiv
Anderson, P. J.
To 1stMarDiv
Antonille, R. T.
To 1stMarDiv
Baig, M. M.
To ForTrps FMFLant
Bannester, C. D.
To 1stMarDiv
Barnhill, D. D.
To 1stMarDiv
Bartel, J. A.
To ForTrps FMFLant
Bartnick, S. J.
To 1stMarDiv
Bass, M.
To MCB CamPen
Bastian, D. L.
To 3dMarDiv
Beaudoin, L. J.
To 3dMAW
Bennett, A. L.
To 3dMarDiv
Brawley, E. T.
To 2dMAW
Bunker, W. V.
To 2dMarDiv
Burke, F. M.
To 1stMarDiv
Burkley, G. W.
To NAS Pncla
Burns, C. W.
To NABTC Pncla
Caaser, W. R.
To 1stMarDiv
Carroll, T. J.
To 1stMarDiv
Cassel, L. A.
To ForTrps FMFPac
Cathell, P. H.
To 1stMarDiv
Connor, B. K.
To 2dMarDiv
Copeland, R. G.
To 1stMarDiv
Crisman, J. H.
To 1stMarDiv
Cullinane, K. J.
To 1stMarDiv
Currell, J. R.
To 3dMarDiv
Davis, B. P.
To 3dMarDiv
Dietrich, R. H.
To ForTrps FMFLant
Dopko, T. G.
To 1stMarDiv
Edgell, G. P.
To ForTrps FMFPac
Eisenhammer, J. C.
To NAS Pncla
Enochs, G. H.
To 2dMarDiv
Farrington, D. O.
To 1stMarBrig
Fava, A. E.
To 2dMarDiv
Ferrence, J. S.
To 2dMarDiv
Fitzgerald, E. T.
To 2dMarDiv
Flynn, R. G.
To NAS Pncla
Fox, R. F.
To 3dMarDiv
Frese, H. R.
To 1stMarDiv
Friis, D. J.
To 1stMarBrig
Fulmer, M. T.
To NAS Pncla
Gallegos, D. M.
To 1stMarDiv
Gardberg, J. M.
To 3dMarDiv
Gardner, M. R.
To ForTrps FMFLant
Gay, A. O.
To 3dMarDiv
Gibbons, J. W.
To NABTC Pncla
Gibbs, J. W.
To 1stMarDiv
Gosnell, H. C.
To 1stMarDiv
Grimm, E. A.
To 1stMarDiv
Gruning, C. R.
To 1stMarDiv
Hackert, R. R.
To 1stMarDiv
Haines, S. W.
To 1stMAW
Hardin, J. R.
To 2dMarDiv
Harter, G. D.
To ForTrps FMFPac
Helm, J. R.
To 1stMarDiv
Hitchcock, G. R.
To 3dMAW
Hollingshead, M. L.
To 3dMarDiv
Huggins, G. C.
To NAS Pncla
Hughes, R. W.
To MCB CamLej
Jackson, J. W.
To 2dMarDiv
Johnson, R. A.
To 2dMarDiv
Jones, K. N.
To 1stMarDiv
Jordan, G. W.
To NAS Pncla
Keane, C. C.
To 2dMarDiv
Keating J. H.
To 3dMarDiv
Kelly, J. F.
To 3dMarDiv
Kelly, G. L.
To MCB CamLej
Kennedy, G. O.
To ForTrps FMFLant
Klingler, D. P.
To NAS Pncla
Knepp, D. R.
To 2dMarDiv
Knestis, J. F.
To 1stMarBrig
Kruger, O. T.
To ForTrps FMFPac
Lafon, R. W.
To 1stMarDiv
Landess, B. H.
To 1stMarDiv
Larson, D. H.
To 2dMarDiv
Lawson, J. H.
To 1stMarBrig
Lefeve, D. A.
To 1stMarDiv
Leiker, R.
To 1stMarDiv
Lohmeier, D. L.
To 2dMarDiv
Lowe, J. W.
To ForTrps FMFLant
Marshall, R. D.
To NAS Pncla
Martikke, E. J.
To 2dMarDiv
Maudlin, W. T.
To 3dMarDiv
McCubbin, T. R.
To 1stMarDiv
McDonald, J. C.
To NAS Pncla
McInteer, R. C.
To 3dMarDiv
McIntyre, W. A.
To 1stMarBrig
McNamara, J. F.
To 1stMarDiv
Mehl, S. P.
To 1stMarDiv
Meiss, G. T.
To USS Essex
Metzler, H. R.
To 1stMarDiv
Miller, R. W.
To 2dMarDiv
Miller, D. G.
To 3rdMarDiv
Miner, R. L.
To 1stMarDiv
Muyskens, D.
To 1stMarDiv
Myers, O. L.
To 1stMarDiv
Nichols, J. E.
To 1stMarDiv
Oliver, T. R.
To 1stMarDiv
Oots, S. E.
To 2dMarDiv
Open, M. I.
To NAS Pncla
Otto, M. C.
To MCAS CherPt
Pease, M. C.
To 1stMarDiv
Perrin, R. K.
To 3dMarDiv
Pfrimmer, R. E.
To 3dMarDiv
Phillips, H. A.
To 1stMarDiv
Presley, O. D.
To ForTrps FMFPac
Pritchett, T. L.
To MCB CamPen
Pruiett, D. I.
To 2dMarDiv
Puckett, S. C.
To 1stMarDiv
Rademacher, M. J.
To ForTrps FMFPac
Reams, W. H.
To 1stMarBrig
Reed, R. M.
To 1stMarDiv
Reynolds, A. L.
To 3dMarDiv
Rhodes, W. M.
To 1stMarDiv
Robinson, B. B.
To NABTC Pncla
Rosales, R. G.
To 1stMarDiv
Sabater, J.
To 1stMarDiv
Sale, C. L.
To 3rdMarDiv
Sampson, C. W.
To USS Topeka
Schwarze, R. C.
To 2dMarDiv
Scrivner, J. D.
To 1stMarBrig
Shaver, W. C.
To 3dMarDiv
Silva, L. M.
To ForTrps FMFPac
Smith, J. M.
To 2dMarDiv
Springer, W.
To 2dMarDiv
Stewart, S. R.
To 1stMarDiv
Stiegman, D. L.
To NAS Pncla
St. Peter, G. M.
To 1stMarDiv
Straehl, R. L.
To 1stMarDiv
Strickland, A. R.
To 3dMarDiv
Sutton, E. N.
To ForTrps FMFLant
Swetman, R. E.
To MCSC Barstow
Todd, G. E.
To 1stMarDiv
Trafas, R. A.
To Tengan Okinawa
Trotter, R. L.
To 1stMarDiv
Troutman, H. P.
To 1stMarDiv
Vaughan, S. R.
To 3dMarDiv
Vaughan, S. R.
To 3dMarDiv
Wallace, A. L.
To 1stMarDiv
Watson, D. C.
To 3dMarDiv
Watson, R. C.
To 2dMarDiv
Watson, J. R.
To MCB CamLej
Watson, J. H.
To 1stMarDiv
Werner, E. C.
To 2dMarDiv
Williams, P. R.
To NAS Pncla
Wilson, E. B.
To MCB CamPen
Winston, H. T.
To 2dMarDiv
Wood, C. C.
To NAS Pncla
Wright, F. K.
To NAS Pncla
Yohn, J. D.
To 2dMarDiv
Young, G. K.
To 2dMarDiv
Zike, K. N.
To 1stMarDiv
Zoller, A. R.
To 1stMAW

Transfers

Ballantyne, R. L.
Fr Phila Pa
To MCS Quant
Fairchild, C. R.
Fr CNABATRA
To MCS Quant
Humphries, E. W.
Fr 2dMAW
To MCAF New River

Warrant Officers

W-4
Transfers

Daskalakis, G. C. 6502
Fr 1stMAW WDJan
To 2dMAW

Retired

Fiori, D. F. 0302
MCRDep SDiego 1Dec

Recent Command and Staff Assignments

W-4

Woodbury, L., PerSect, DivRes, HQMC

W-3
Transfers

Gibson, H. S. 0406
Fr MCAS Kaneohe WDJan
To MCS Quant
Kerr, J. D. 3010
Fr FMFPac WDJan
To 1stMAW
Marx, E. A. 6602
Fr AirFMFPac
To MCAS El Toro By1Feb

Retired

Charlton, A. L. 2710
2dMarDiv Dec
Ferguson, R. B. 3402
MCDisbOff Wash DC 1Dec
King, J. E. 3402
MCAS CherPt 1Dec
Speer, E. 4102
1Dec
Suess, H. T. 3010
1Dec

W-2
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To MCAS El Toro By1Feb
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Fr MCRD SDiego WDJan
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Fr 1stMarDiv WDDec
To FMFPac Oahu
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To 1stMarBrig

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MCS Quant 31Dec
Cage, R. E. 1360
2dMarDiv 31Dec

W-2
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Linton, D. A. 5Dec
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Mattera, G. D. 5Dec
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Quigley, T. W. 5Dec
Sorenson, R. R. 5Dec
Wais, J. A. 5Dec

W-1
Transfers

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

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